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The end of the Cold War called into question NATO's relevance to the new global 
security environment. The Alliance's aspirations for a broader future security role are 
packaged in a structural initiative: the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). CJTF is designed 
to provide a mechanism for crisis response and peacekeeping operations conducted beyond 
Allied borders by variable coalitions of NATO members and associates. Also, CJTF is 
intended to facilitate better resource-sharing between the U.S. and the European Allies, 
permitting the Europeans to undertake some missions without direct U.S. involvement. Such 
arrangements will promote a distinct European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within 
the Alliance, as well as helping to satisfy the American desire to share more of the global 
security burden with Europe. 
Events in the former Yugoslavia have provided impetus for the Alliance's evolution, 
as well as creating a proving ground for its new initiatives. In the absence of a final agreement 
on CJTF, the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia is serving as a prototype. This thesis 
examines the CJTF concept's historical and strategic underpinnings, surveys the current state 
of the CJTF debate, and illustrates how NATO's experiences in the former Yugoslavia have 
contributed to the Alliance's post-Cold War renaissance. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The end of the Cold War called into question NATO's relevance to the new global 
security environment. The Alliance's aspirations for a broader future security role are 
packaged in a structural initiative: the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). CJTF is designed 
to provide a mechanism for crisis response and peacekeeping operations conducted beyond 
Allied borders by variable coalitions of NATO members and associates. Also, CJTF is 
intended to facilitate better resource-sharing between the U.S. and the European Allies, 
permitting the Europeans to undertake some missions without direct U.S. involvement. Such 
arrangements are intended to promote a distinct European Security and Defense Identity 
(ESDI) within the Alliance, as well as to help satisfy the American desire to share more of the 
global security burden with Europe. Finally, CJTF is designed to promote good relations 
between NATO and the nations of the former Soviet bloc -- and, implicitly, to facilitate 
NATO expansion -- by providing a framework for operational military cooperation between 
the Allies and their post-Communist neighbors. 
Approved in principle by the Allied Heads of State and Government at their January 
1994 summit in Brussels, the adoption of a final CJTF format has been delayed by intra-Allied 
political disagreements. As presently envisioned, the concept is centered around several 
permanent nucleus staffs, to which forces can be added in building-block fashion to respond 
to a given contingency. Nuclei, along with likely component forces, are widely envisioned 
as maintaining a peacetime regime of training, exercising, and planning, so that NATO as a 
whole as well as specific national units are prepared to respond to a broad variety of scenarios 
at short notice. To accommodate the wide range of potential participants, CJTF employs a 
X 
-------------------------------------, 
"variable_ geometry," which encompasses four possible CJTF configurations: a NATO-led 
operation, a WEU-led operation, and coalitions in which members of NATO or the WEU are 
joined by other members of the UN or OSCE. 
A pure NATO configuration is the most likely. A task force would not necessarily 
have to include contingents from every Ally to be classed as a NATO CJTF; any collection 
of Alliance members conducting an operation under NATO auspices would retain access to 
all of the Alliance's collective infrastructure, even if some allies chose not to participate. Such 
''NATO-minus" groupings may, in fact, be the rule for smaller non-Article 5 contingencies. 
The second CJTF configuration, WEU-led, might be described as an extreme case of NATO-
minus: a coalition in which the U.S. and other non-WEU Allies decline to participate. While 
this configuration has generated the most political attention due to its implications for an 
ESDI, it seems unlikely that the U.S. will remain uninvolved in any major security crisis in 
Europe, in view of (for example) the continuing American commitment in Bosnia. The final 
CJTF configurations, NATO- or WEU-plus, involve the addition to a NATO or WEU CJTF 
of other nations who are members of the UN or the OSCE, particularly those participating 
in the Alliance's Partnership for Peace program. 
While all of the Allies have agreed to these concepts in theory, the process of 
implementation has raised political issues which have effectively stalled the initiative. In its 
role as a process of building military coalitions, there has been little controversy over the 
nature of the CJTF. The proper placement of the CJTF, regardless of composition, within the 
Alliance's decision-making structure has been more difficult to determine. NATO's Atlantic 
pillar sees CJTF as an extension of the present integrated military structure, an effective 
xi 
infrastructure built up at great cost over the past 45 years; the majority of the European Allies 
tend to agree with this perspective. On the other hand, some elements within the European 
pillar, particularly those nations who do not participate in the integrated military structure, 
view Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions as fundamentally incompatible, requiring distinct 
political-military control structures. At the June 1996 NAC Ministerial in Berlin, the Allies 
agreed to use the integrated military structure for both Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions, 
provided that the structure was "renovated" to provide for an increased European command 
presence and more thorough political oversight for out of area missions. The exact details of 
this "renovation" have yet to be agreed upon, and still have the potential to derail or at least 
delay significantly the implementation of the CJTF concept. 
Events in the former Yugoslavia have provided impetus for the Alliance's evolution, 
as well as creating a proving ground for its new initiatives. Indeed, IFOR represents NATO's 
first out-of-area deployment, its first employment as a peacekeeping force on the ground, and 
its first involvement in a coalition with non-members. In the absence of a final agreement on 
CJTF, the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia is serving as a prototype. NATO leaders, 
relying on the experience gained over the past three years of involvement in the former 
Yugoslavia, have adapted existing NATO doctrine and command structures to fit the 
requirements of the Bosnia scenario. Despite the "ad-hockery" involved in their 
implementation, these arrangements appear to have been satisfactory, although their 
temporary nature has left Allied military leaders eager to create permanent command 
arrangements for contingency operations. Perhaps the most important lesson learned in 
Bosnia, as far as CJTF is concerned, is that IFOR and its NATO predecessor operations have 
xii 
demonstrated the inherent robustness and flexibility of the Alliance's integrated military 
structure, and its viability to serve as the foundation for the CJTF concept. 
This thesis begins with an examination of the Alliance's strategic culture and the oft-
divergent goals of its principal members. Innovative as it is, CJTF still reflects the long-
standing trans-atlantic compromises that make up NATO's collective strategic vision. Once 
this context is established (Chapter ll), the thesis lays out CJTF's fundamental tenets (Chapter 
III), followed by a survey of the current state of the debate surrounding CJTF' s 
implementation (Chapter IV). These sections pay particular attention to areas of intra-Allied 
contention, as these sticking points reveal the hidden national fears and agendas that lie 
beneath the surface of the CJTF deliberations. After the central issues and implications raised 
by the CJTF initiative are thoroughly scrutinized, the thesis shifts its attention to Bosnia. An 
examination and critique of the principal NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia 
(Chapters V and VI) should prove instructive for those seeking to institutionalize the CJTF 
framework within the Alliance, because in many respects, practice has been driving theory 
(rather than the reverse) as NATO has adapted itself to the new strategic environment of the 
post-Cold War world. 
Xlll 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR, the deployment of a NATO-led multinational 
Implementation Force (IFOR) to war-ravaged Bosnia, represents a seminal point in the 
Alliance's post-Cold War development. Politically, JOINT ENDEAVOUR has "attest[ed] 
to NATO's capacity to fulfill its new missions of crisis management and peacekeeping,"1 
missions designed to enhance the Alliance's relevance to the world's changing security order. 
NATO's aspirations for a broader future role are packaged in a structure: the Combined Joint 
Task Force (CJTF). Although the definitive format for CJTF has not yet crystallized at the 
political or military level as of this writing, the concept's intent is to provide a mechanism for 
crisis response and peacekeeping operations conducted in or out of area by coalitions of 
Allied and non-Allied nations supported by NATO military structures and collective assets. 
The initiative's title speaks to this purpose: "a 'task force' is a military body brought together 
and structured for a particular operational purpose, 'combined' denotes participation by two 
or more nations, and 'joint' entails the involvement of elements from two or more services. "2 
First approved by the Allied Heads of State and Government at their Brussels meeting 
in January 1994, the adoption of a final CJTF format has been delayed by intra-Allied political 
disagreements. After a two and a half year deadlock, CJTF began to move again at the Berlin 
'Statement on Bosnia-Hercegovina issued by the Allied Foreign and Defense Ministers, meeting in joint session at Brussels, 5 December 1995, p. 1. 
2Anthony Cragg, "The Combined Joint Task Force Concept: A Key Component of the Alliance's 
Adaptation," NATO Review, Vol. 44, No.4 (July 1996), p. 7. 
1 
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in June 1996. At Berlin, the Allies 
agreed that, irrespective of its military details, CJTF must: 
• give NATO's command structures sufficient flexibility to allow the Allies to 
respond effectively to new missions beyond the defense of Allied nations from 
direct attack 
• facilitate the dual use of NATO forces and command structures for Western 
European Union (WEU) operations in the context of an emerging European 
Security and Defense Identity 
• permit non-NATO partners to join NATO countries in operations, exercises and 
training, as envisioned in the "Partnership for Peace. "3 
With these political concepts as a base, NATO military planners began to hammer out 
the details of a CJTF scheme, which was expected to be complete by December 1996, almost 
three years after the concept's endorsement at Brussels. 4 Former Supreme Allied Commander, 
Atlantic (SACLANT) Adm. Paul David Miller, USN, characterizes a CJTF as: "both a 
process and a structure: as a process, it enables us to assemble and groom the forces and 
capabilities to operate together; as a structure, it provides the command and control 
architecture to direct and employ a coalition operation."5 The concept is centered around 
several permanent "nucleus" staffs, to which forces can be added in building-block fashion 
3Sununary of the Berlin Ministerial Communique taken from Stanley Sloan, NATO Adapts for New 
Missions: The Berlin Accord and Combined Joint Task Forces CCJTF), CRS Report for Congress 96-561F 
(June 19, 1996), pp. 2-3. A similar synopsis is provided in Cragg. 
4Political disagreements within the Alliance, especially between France and the United States, over 
the details of the CJTF format continue to delay the initiative's implementation. As of this writing, it appears 
that no final agreement on CJTF can be expected prior to the sununer 1997 NATO summit. 
5Adm. Paul David Miller, USN, "Adapting National Forces and Alliances to a New Security 
Environment," Brassey's Defense Yearbook 1995 (London: Brassey's, 1995), p. 86. 
2 
to respond to a given contingency. Staffs, along with likely component forces, are widely 
envisioned as maintaining a peacetime regime of "training, exercising, command, control, 
communications and planning in advance, so that individual units can be prepared to work 
together in whatever configurations are required."6 
Events in the former Yugoslavia have provided impetus for the Alliance's evolution, 
as well as creating a proving ground for its new initiatives. "In many ways," notes NATO 
Secretary General Javier Solana, "the CJTF concept is having a trial run in Bosnia."7 Indeed, 
IFOR represents NATO's first out-of-area deployment, its first employment as a 
peacekeeping force on the ground, and its first involvement in a coalition with non-members. 
The situation in the former Yugoslavia has made for a rude transition from Cold War 
operations and doctrine within NATO, particularly for sectors like the Southern Region 
(AFSOUTH) which have traditionally held secondary status ( duriD.g the Cold War, the Central 
Region (AFCENT) received the lion's share of Allied resources and attention due to the 
concentration of Soviet forces in East Germany). Thrust ·into the limelight, AFSOUTH's 
once-sleepy Neapolitan headquarters has evolved command structures "on an ad hoc basis 
and in response to requirements posed to NATO from outside [rather] than as the result of 
carefully coordinated planning."8 In the absence of a functional blueprint for organizing a 
6S. Nelson Drew, "Trans-Atlantic Security and the Development of a European Security and Defense 
Identity: A View From the U.S.," presented at the 9th Annual Strategic Studies Conference sponsored by 
USNATO and INSS/NDU, Knokke-Heist, Belgium, 23-26 September 1993, p. 15. 
'Javier Solana, "NATO's Role in Bosnia: Charting a New Course for the Alliance," NATO Review, 
Vol. 44, No.2 (March 1996), p. 5. 
SOietrich Genschel, "The Evolution of Civilian and Military Structures," presented at the Conference 
on Transatlantic Relations and International Security organized by UNIDIR, Caen, France, 22-23 September 
1994, p. 4. 
3 
CJTF, IFOR has served as a prototype: NATO leaders, relying on the experience gained over 
the past three years of involvement in the former Yugoslavia, have adapted existing NATO 
doctrine and command structures to fit the requirements of the Bosnia scenario. Despite the 
"ad-hockery" involved in their implementation, these arrangements appear to have been 
satisfactory. IFOR's successes notwithstanding, "winging it" is not the preferred method of 
operation for any military organization; CJTF is designed to ensure that "instead of having 
to improvise a force when a crisis develops, there will in future be a command element in 
[NATO's] structure whose task will be to prepare for rapid and effective assembly of a 
multinational peacekeeping force. "9 
As "any discussion of NATO's military future should begin with the theme of 
continuity, since that is the foundation for NATO adaptation,"10 this thesis begins with an 
examination of the Alliance's strategic evolution, customs, and the oft-divergent goals of its 
principal members. Innovative as it is, CJTF still reflects the long-standing trans-atlantic 
compromises that make up NATO's collective strategic vision. Once this context is 
established, the thesis lays out CJTF' s fundamental tenets, followed by a survey of the current 
state of the debate surrounding CJTF' s implementation. These sections pay particular 
attention to areas of intra-Allied contention, as these sticking points reveal the hidden national 
fears and agendas that lie beneath the surface of the CJTF deliberations. After the central 
issues and implications raised by the CJTF initiative are thoroughly scrutinized, the thesis 
9Javier Solana, Speech to the Dutch Atlantic Commission, the Hague, 21 October 1996. 
1~t. Gen. Daniel W. Christman, USA, "NATO's Military Future," Joint Forces Quarterly (Spring 
1996), p. 76. 
4 
shifts its attention to Bosnia. An examination and critique of the principal NATO operations 
in the former Yugoslavia should prove instructive for those seeking to institutionalize the 
CJTF framework within the Alliance, because in many respects, "it's not the theory that is 
going to drive the practice, but the practice that will drive the theory."11 
11Elizabeth Pond, "Europe Welcomes American Military Leadership," The Wall Street Journal 
(European Edition)(December 6, 1995). 
5 
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ll. HISTORICAL PRECEDENT: THE TRANS-ATLANTIC DISCOURSE 
The book ofEcclesiastes observes that there is nothing new under the sun; this maxim 
holds true when one examines NATO's strategic development. Although the specific features 
of Alliance strategy and force structure have varied in response to geo-political and 
technological developments, the fundamental strategic positions of the Alliance's "twin 
pillars" -- the Atlantic and the European -- have not altered significantly since the signing of 
the Washington Treaty in April1949. Each of the Alliance's major strategic initiatives since 
then, successful or not, has reflected a discourse between the deep-seated beliefs, goals and 
fears of both pillars. Because the underlying priorities of the two sides are often divergent, 
NATO strategy always reflects some degree of accommodation; this give-and-take, based 
upon shared interests and a consequent determination to reach mutually acceptable solutions, 
constitutes the glue of the Alliance. These same dynamics lie beneath the CJTF initiative, 
which is the post-1989 manifestation of the long-standing trans-Atlantic strategic exchange. 
To understand the significance and nuances of the CJTF debate, one needs to examine the 
root issues involved. This chapter lays out the general strategic perspectives of the U.S. and 
Europe and provides examples from NATO history to illustrate how trans-Atlantic differences 
have been resolved -- or left unresolved -- in the formulation of past Atlantic strategies. 
7 
A. THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 
1. Reluctant Involvement 
America has been traditionally reluctant to involve itself in European wars, and has 
observed the past two centuries of European carnage with a mixture of fear and moral 
distaste. One of the principal factors contributing to the American Revolution was a colonial 
populace tired of being forced to spend blood and treasure on the imperial ambitions of a 
distant and seemingly ungrateful mother country. In this context, it is not surprising that as 
the foreign policy of the fledgling Republic coalesced, its fundamental tenet was isolation. In 
his farewell address, George Washington reminded his countrymen that "Europe has a set of 
primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation," and observed that "our 
detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course." A few 
years later, Thomas Jefferson would cement these ideas in a formal policy of non-intervention 
as Europe engaged in its largest-scale slaughter yet. 
As a third-rate power on a distant shore, America could afford such policies and 
Europe was content, by and large, to let her alone. Unfortunately for American preferences, 
the technical and economic innovations of the 19th century inexorably narrowed the 
geographic buffers that permitted and encouraged policies of isolation. At the same time, 
Europe was experiencing a growing bifurcation between authoritarianism and liberal 
democracy. Whereas America had traditionally viewed the objectives and methods of the 
various European monarchies with more or less equal distaste, the period following the 
8 
American Civil War brought a slow realization among U.S. leaders that political systems were 
emerging in Europe that were particularly at odds with cherished American ideals. 
World War I accelerated America's international coming of age. By the time the U.S. 
entered the war, the average American -- however reluctant -- had been made to understand 
the danger posed by the potential domination of Europe, and hence the world, by a political 
system inimical to liberal democracy. Thus animated, America went to war with 
determination, but only as an "associate" of the European democracies rather than a full ally. 
The American mind was not prepared to accept a permanent military engagement in Europe; 
to all but the most far-sighted, "victory in battle was all that was necessary."12 Wilsonian 
idealism notwithstanding, U.S. policy in the immediate aftermath of World War I was heavily 
conditioned by the two primordial elements of the American view of Europe: fear of 
entanglement in European conflicts and a sense of moral superiority. The Versailles 
conference and the Allied occupation of the Rhineland constituted America's first peacetime 
involvement in European security affairs, and America's performance in these two 
engagements reflected the tug of war between her venerable political traditions and her 
newfound status as a great power. 
For a short while after the armistice, Americans had "loyally accepted their 
unexpected responsibilities around the globe."13 The public viewed participation in the 
Rhenish occupation as a necessary adjunct to the war; Americans "were on the Rhine simply 
12Keith L. Nelson, Victors Divided (Berkeley: UC Press, 1975), p. 3. 
131bid, p. 79. 
9 
to remind themselves and the Germans that the Allies had won the war . . . they had no 
ulterior motives . . . they had no desire to change things. "14 Soon, however, these 
arrangements began to unravel. President Wilson defended the League of Nations to the 
public as an alternative to Old World balance of power policies, but the enduring presence of 
American troops on the Rhine and elsewhere seemed at odds with Wilson's promises. 
Extreme isolationists in Congress, termed "the Irreconcilables," tended "with mounting 
frequency to construe the maintenance of any troops abroad as creating a precedent for the 
League."15 Senator Hiram Johnson of California, a leading Irreconcilable, neatly captured 
America's instinctive fear of entanglement in Europe: 
This morning's news visualized the League of Nations for all . . . 
American boys fighting an undisclosed war in Siberia; American boys sent to 
Silesia; American boys alleged to have been cruelly treated in Dalmatia; 
American boys to remain on the Rhine for fifteen years . . . the logic of events 
demonstrates what the League ofNations is for - to have America underwrite 
the peace treaty in which are interwoven the secret treaties disposing of the 
world among the allies. 16 
Johnson's bluster also highlights the deep American distrust of European motives and 
feelings of moral revulsion towards Bismarckian power politics. The relish with which the 
European Allies carved up the German Empire and their calls for massive reparations did not 
sit well with America. Relatively untouched by the war physically and economically, 
Americans had difficulty understanding Europe's economic and security needs. The Rhenish 
14Nelson, p. 25. 
15Ibid, p. 129. 
16Quoted in Nelson, p. 130. 
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occupation soon became synonymous in the American mind with European money-grubbing 
and expansionism, particularly on the part of the French. Pierpont Noyes, the first American 
commissioner on the Rhine, soon came to believe that the occupation had "become a cover 
for French activities aimed at separating the left bank of the Rhine or at seizing the Ruhr,"17 
and French economic activity in the occupied zone prompted an outcry from the 
Irreconcilables to the effect that "under no circumstances should the U.S. Army serve as a 
debt collector for any other nation, particularly France. " 18 American leaders were careful to 
keep a high moral tone throughout the occupation and consistently resisted French attempts 
to exert undue economic and political control in the Rhineland, so much so that they were 
accused at times ofbeing pro-German. Ultimately, the French invasion of the Ruhr appeared 
to vindicate American suspicions and provided a final pretext for U.S. withdrawal in late 
1922. In spite of this deterioration of trans-Atlantic relations, astute Americans discerned that 
the presence of U.S. troops in Europe had "helped reduce tension in an area of the world 
peculiarly important to America."19 In spite of an isolationism deeply entrenched in the public 
mind and soon to be reinforced by a global depression, America's brief involvement in post-
World War I Europe set the stage for the present era of American engagement. 
17Nelson, p. 138. 
181bid, p. 186. 
191bid, p. 229. 
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2. Full Engagement 
The U.S. entered the Second World War in much the same frame of mind as it had the 
First. Faced with the interwar return of hostile political systems overseas capped by the Axis 
perfidy of December 1941, the U.S. stepped once more into the breach on behalf of the 
world's free nations. As the war drew to a close, a tired America clamored for demobilization 
and withdrawal from global commitments. Initially, the conditions seemed ideal for 
retrenchment. The Soviet Union, while clearly not our natural ally, had not yet revealed itself 
as our dedicated adversary, and the nuclear monopoly provided America with "the ultimate 
Jeffersonian weapon . . . the means by which America could remain remote and secure from 
Europe, as well as the arbiter of its fate. "20 The unmasking of Soviet hostility and 
expansionism and the subsequent loss of the nuclear monopoly resulted in a new dynamic in 
the American view of Europe. Suddenly, America needed a healthy Europe as a 
counterweight to Soviet power; the results included the Marshall Plan for economic 
reconstruction and the Washington Treaty establishing the Atlantic Alliance. 
The Cold War magnification ofEurope's value to America gave rise to "a permanent 
anxiety about the credibility of the American guarantee to defend [Europe] and fear that the 
Europeans would 'go neutral' or worse, if theY- perceived a weak United States."21 This new 
worry found expression in the 1950 policy paper NSC 68, which helped commit the U.S. to 
20John Lamberton Harper, American Visions of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), p. 109. 
2
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the containment of Soviet power. The authors of NSC 68, led by Paul Nitze, sought to 
"prevent a European sellout, which would leave the U.S. isolated in the world ... the essence 
of the NSC 68 program, in other words, was the propitiation of Europe. "22 Set against 
traditional American fears of entanglement and distrust of European political morality, 
Europe's newfound importance during the Truman administration triggered a considerable 
backlash within certain sectors of the American public. As a result, the need to "propitiate the 
Europeans was now at war with the necessity to prod them to do the things that would 
counteract anger and cynicism toward Europe in the United States."23 The necessary corollary 
to an American presence in Europe has been the demand that Europeans help shoulder the 
economic, political and military burdens of engagement. From the beginning of the U.S. 
peacetime presence in Western Europe, the underlying rationale in the view of many, if not 
most, Americans has been to assist Europe in re-creating its military and economic strength 
so that the U.S. could safely withdraw; in other words, "let us restore responsibility for 
Europe to the Europeans."24 
American policy within NATO has always reflected a dynamic tension between the 
conflicting demands of propitiation and burden-sharing. The U.S. has, moreover, pursued two 
strikingly different methods of reconciling the two imperatives: European integration and 
Atlantic coordination. From the beginning of American involvement in postwar Europe, two 
22Harper, p. 293. 
231bid, p. 306. 
24fuid, p. 201. 
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factions, the ''Europeanists" and the "Atlanticists," have struggled for control of U.S. policy 
towards Europe. The Europeanist view, which sought to create a federally integrated Europe 
as a counterweight to Soviet power, predominated through the mid 1960's. America's initial 
overtures to Europe were heavily influenced by burden-sharing considerations and isolationist 
reflexes. As the U.S. transitioned back to a peacetime economy, its attitude towards Europe 
was "show us what you are prepared to do for yourselves and each other and then we will see 
what we can do."25 Early European efforts to pool resources, especially the 1948 Brussels 
Treaty and the 1950 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), seemed to reveal "an 
unexpected degree of European political vitality"26 which made the costs of assistance more 
palatable to Americans. 
Buoyed by these early European initiatives, American Europeanists began to lobby 
for a "supranational Europe with a greater degree of economic, political and military unity 
[which] defined a framework that would not only strengthen Europe economically and 
politically, but would also ensure a greater European contribution to the common defense. "27 
In addition to appeasing advocates of burden-sharing, early U.S. support for multilateral 
projects like the proposed European Defense Community (EDC) of the early 1950's was also 
conditioned by the traditionally contemptuous American view of European politics, which 
25Theodore C. Achilles, "The Omaha Milkman," NATO's Anxious Birthed. Nicolas Sherwen (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 31. 
26Nelson, p. 297. 
27Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower Kennedy. and the United States of Europe (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1993), p. 30. 
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blamed petty nationalism on the continent as the root ofboth World Wars. In this context, 
"one of the main reasons for U.S. support for European integration had been the desire to 
prevent the specter of nationalism from re-emerging. "28 
American enthusiasm for European integration centered around expectations of 
increased military and political strength; when the Europeans began to emphasize economic 
cooperation over other forms, American support began to wane. As Europe's economy 
recovered from its wartime devastation and America continued to pay for the stationing of 
U.S. troops on the continent, the balance of payments began to swing in favor of Europe. 
Moreover, the Europeans had shown a marked lack of enthusiasm for multilateral solutions 
to basic strategic problems. By the end of the Kennedy Administration, "increased economic 
competition between the U.S. and the European Economic Community (EEC), as well as a 
European tendency to criticize or oppose certain American political or military initiatives, did 
much to usher in an eclipse of the support by the U.S. for European integration."29 The 
return ofDe Gaulle in 1958 did much to sour American enthusiasm for a united Europe. De 
Gaulle's enthusiasm for a Europe based on the nation-state and led by an independently-
minded France was not what even the most ardent American Europeanist had in mind. Rather 
than dampen European nationalism, De Gaulle's vision of a united Europe threatened to 
revive it by demonstrating that "supranationalism and Europeanism could also serve 
28Winand, p. 246. 
29Ibid, p. XV. 
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nationalist interests ... 'in the name of Europe' ."3° Furthermore, a Europe built upon these 
tenns would be more likely to become a "third force, holding place with the U.S. and Russia 
in the determination of world policy . . . and leaning towards a middle-ground or neutralist 
position. "31 
Most grievously, a united Europe threatened America's freedom to act as 
unchallenged leader of the free world; this could not be borne. After all, "speaking of burden-
sharing and partnership was one thing; renouncing or sharing leadership was another."32 This 
stance was not purely chauvinistic, but reflected a realistic, if somewhat jaded, assessment of 
Europe's past record of wielding power. 
Enter the Atlanticists, who advocated "Atlantic partnership with a view towards 
monitoring the development of the new Europe by keeping it solidly anchored to the U.S .. "33 
Preferring multinational cooperation rather than multilateral integration, the Atlanticists have 
sought to maintain "multiple centers of decision" within Europe and to encase European 
political and military initiatives within the larger framework of the Alliance and American 
leadership in order to "ensure that European resources would be channeled towards meeting 
the 'common tasks' of the 'free world.'"34 The Atlantic perspective, which has dominated 
3DJ)avid Clay Large, Germans to the Front (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1996), p. 139. 
31Former U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter, quoted in Winand, p. 158. 
32Winand,p. 192. 
33Jbid, p. 255. 
34Jbid, p. 252. 
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American policy towards Europe since the mid-1960's, balances the desire to share burdens 
and maintain American leadership against the need to propitiate an increasingly assertive 
Europe. This balance has not been easy to keep; in the absence of a common and compelling 
threat, it is likely to become even more difficult. 
B. THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
European strategic preferences are more difficult to express, as Europe is still not a 
single unit with a coherent foreign and security policy. Each of the major players in Europe 
has a distinct view of what "Europe" means: for the Germans, integration and open markets, 
for the French, independence and leadership, and for the British, particularism and selective 
engagement. Nonetheless, common perspectives exist and it is possible to generalize about 
European beliefs. Europe's traditional view of the U.S. has been that of the colonial master, 
observing with bemused contempt their former subjects's naive and supercilious attempts at 
establishing themselves as a force on the world stage. At the same time, the Europeans have 
recognized America's raw power and vitality as a force badly needed to replace their own 
fading glory. Perhaps the most important factor coloring the European perspective has been 
geography: "differences in location mean different degrees of vulnerability, which in tum 
shape perceptions about the nature, magnitude and immediacy of the threat."35 In Europe's 
case, the Cold War brought the direct threat to its door. The immediacy and enormity of the 
35John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution ofNATO's Conventional Force Posture (Palo Alto: 
Stanford Univ. Press, 1995), p. 20. 
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threat translated into an enduring dependence on American security resources as the only 
available defense against Soviet power. 
As early as World War I, the European "public ... image of the doughboy tended to 
confirm a belief in America's power and impartiality."36 Europe's economic prostration and 
military exhaustion after World War II compounded its reliance on the U.S .. At the same 
time, the rapidity of American demobilization gave rise to a European fear of abandomilent, 
which has remained a constant in Euro-Atlantic relations. Europe greeted the early U.S. 
decision to maintain a sizeable peacetime military presence on the continent with a sigh of 
reli~f; American troops have become "the most visible symbol of the U.S. commitment to 
European security ... such expectations make it difficult for the U.S. to reduce its forces on 
the continent without triggering allied remonstrances. "37 While American security guarantees 
have been reassuring to Europe, their convenience and relative stability have served to 
dissuade Europe from pursuing more difficult and costly solutions to its security dilemma. 
This situation has been somewhat paradoxical: "in progressively extending the political-
military 'umbrella' without which-- the Europeans were the first to insist-- an integrated 
Europe would never emerge, the U.S. also fostered a situation in which the incentives for 
collective European self-reliance and autonomy were reduced. "38 As a result, throughout the 
first two decades of the Alliance's history, Europe concentrated primarily upon strengthening 
36Ne1son, p. 171. 
37Duffie1d, p. 7 4. 
38Jlarper, p. 280. 
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itself economically rather than facing the more difficult tasks of political and military 
integration. 
Awareness of their dependent status has produced a profound desire, at least in some 
European circles, to assert European interests in relations with the U.S .. Because Europeans 
"did not like the feeling ofbeing wards of the U.S.,"39 they set about creating leverage for 
themselves. For the first two decades of the Alliance especially, Europe favored multinational 
rather than multilateral strategies, with each state maintaining an independent, though 
coordinated, link to their Atlantic partner. Distracted by unrest in the remnants of their 
empires, the major European states were unwilling to fully integrate their armies in defense 
of Europe under the auspices of the French-proposed and U.S.-backed EDC; to have done 
so would have dramatically reduced national forces available for colonial duty, forcing an 
accelerated forfeiture of Europe's remaining colonies. While Jean Monnet's integrationist 
vision may have borne early fruit in the economic arena, "when it came to security matters, 
Europe was not yet ready for Europe." To the suspicious De Gaulle, the U.S.-backed 
integrationists "favored the creation of a politically amorphous Europe, which the U.S. would 
only be too happy to provide with the political guidance that it lacked."40 In other words, 
security integration would weaken rather than_ strengthen Europe, at least in the short-term. 
Instead, the wily old general conceived a "European order subject to French hegemony and 
3~obert Bowie, quoted in Winand, p. 190. 
40Winand, p. 253. 
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based on the preeminence of the nation-state."41 France's costly development of an 
independent nuclear deterrent and 1966 withdrawal from NATO's Integrated Military 
Structure (IMS) were the penultimate expressions of De Gaulle's hopes for a Europe able to 
"look the U.S. in the face," but these were the maneuvers of a solitary nation rather than the 
joint efforts of a united Europe. 
Ironically, as American enthusiasm for multilateral European security solutions waned, 
the Europeans began to see the benefits of acting with a united voice. By the mid- 1960's, 
U.S. economic friction with Europe caused America to cast a jaundiced eye on the prospects 
of a truly integrated Europe. At the same time, Europeans began to see that a "Europe able 
to act as an effective entity would deserve and could exercise comparable influence ·on 
[NATO] common policy and action ... disposing resources much nearer to those of the U.S.; 
such a Europe could join in the genuine partnership of equals."42 Modem advocates of 
European union do not intend to use Europe's pooled resources to tear themselves away from 
their partnership with the U.S.; instead, the intent is to redress the existing "excessive 
concentration of power in the hands of the senior partner. "43 In the last two decades of the 
Cold War, however, Europe's desire for a greater voice in Alliance security policy has been 
fundamentally at odds with its dependence on U.S. resources and the attendant fear of 
41Winand, p. 219. 
42Bowie, quoted in Winand, p. 167. 
43Henry Kissinger, quoted in Winand, p. 193. 
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abandonment. With the recent demise of the obvious and compelling threat, the European 
drive towards integration has accelerated, though not to the point of consummation. 
C. PATTERNS OF INTERACTION 
Though both the U.S. and Europe viewed the Soviets as a dire threat, the underlying 
fears and motives of the two pillars have been fundamentally at odds throughout the 
Alliance's history. The U.S. has tried to maintain a strong enough presence in Europe to 
reassure its allies and maintain the leading role in the Alliance, while at the same time 
attempting to shift as much of the security burden as possible onto European backs. Europe, 
on the other hand, has sought to attain as much independence as possible from U.S. political 
control while at the same time preserving access to American military resources. As the 
conflicting strategic preferences of America and Europe have played themselves out within 
the context of the development of Alliance strategy and force structure, several clear patterns 
have emerged. As these patterns have remained relatively constant throughout Alliance 
history, one can reasonably expect them to manifest themselves again as NATO struggles to 
re-shape itself in the post-Cold War environment, even in the absence of such a tangible threat 
as the Soviet Union. 
1. The Superiority of Political over Military Considerations 
The first and most important pattern in Alliance strategic planning is the superiority 
of political over military considerations. Each new initiative, in the words of former SACEUR 
Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, has to meet "the dual criteria of credibility: that is, military 
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effectiveness of our weapons and political acceptability of our plans for their use in war."44 
Of the two criteria, the political is clearly dominant. As an example, the genesis of the EDC 
in 1950-51 lay in the need to make an unpalatable military requirement, the armament of 
Federal Germany, politically acceptable to a wary Europe by integrating West German troops 
at the regimental level (and later at the division level) into a supranational European army. 
Europeanists on both sides of the Atlantic soon came to view the EDC as the logical next step 
towards a united Europe as well as an amicable means of assimilating the still-feared 
Germans. From the American viewpoint, a pooling of resources would enable Europe to 
shoulder a greater portion of the conventional defense burden. The idea met with much less 
enthusiasm from military leaders, who were aghast at the difficulty of integrating troops with 
incompatible languages, doctrine and equipment. 
Military objections were swept aside by the idea's political attractiveness. Jean 
Monnet observed pointedly that "the crux of the [EDC] was not so much military 
effectiveness as political soundness . . . the critical issue was not the size of the divisions or 
other technicalities, but the creation of a common European outlook. "45 The EDC' s ultimate 
failure in 1954 was less a result of its manifest military unsoundness than a question of 
fundamental incompatibilities in its political implications for the Alliance's two pillars. While 
the Americans "saw the EDC as the most effective means to facilitate a rapid military exodus 
44Goodpaster, quoted in Ivo H. Daalder, The Nature and Practice ofFlexible Response (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 117. 
45Winand, p. 28. 
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from Europe, the Europeans who favored the scheme saw it as a way of guaranteeing a long-
term American presence by demonstrating Europe's shared commitment to the defense of the 
West. "46 More skeptical Europeans deplored the implied loss of sovereignty and resented 
American interference in matters pertaining to European integration. Similar issues bracketed 
the U.S. proposal in the late 1950's and early 1960's to integrate NATO's nuclear deterrent 
in a Multilateral Force (MLF). In spite of misgivings in the Pentagon, the MLF was designed 
to "meet not only European desires for greater participation in their own defense but also 
American concerns for control over the development of European production of nuclear 
weapons and American hopes for increasing the financial contribution of their allies to nuclear 
defense."47 Like the EDC, the MLF foundered over issues of European sovereignty and 
resentment of U.S. oversight rather than over the initiative's military merits or lack thereof. 
Even less ideologically . ambitious proposals have revolved around political 
imperatives. When the U.S. first began to consider the modernization and concurrent 
reduction ofNATO's nuclear stockpile in the early 1970's, it found that the Europeans prized 
the stockpile more for its symbolic importance than its military value. From the military 
perspective, a significant portion of these warheads were dangerously obsolete, and the 
expense of storage took money away from other projects. Politically, however, the reasoning 
was quite different; the fact that "the stockpile had reached 7,000 [warheads] was irrelevant 
46Large, p. 126. 
47Winand, p. 218. 
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in itself What mattered was that this number had become symbolic of the American 
commitment. Lower the number and the Europeans would see a lowered commitment. "48 
For this reason, the modernization initiative, which eventually resulted in the Long 
Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) deployment of the early 80's, met with much greater 
enthusiasm in some European expert circles when first proposed than the attendant proposals 
for stockpile reduction and consolidation. Throughout the 1970's, Alliance consensus dictated 
that "while the composition of the NATO nuclear stockpile might be subject to change, the 
negative political repercussions of any significant reduction in size were believed to outweigh 
any conceivable military benefits. "49 Although the advent of the nuclear disarmament 
movement ultimately mired the LRTNF deployment in controversy and made stockpile 
reduction more attractive politically, that reduction was only accomplished after the new 
LRTNF "Euromissiles" had reaffirmed the validity and utility of U.S. nuclear guarantees. 
Though LRTNF deployment was driven primarily by the larger geostrategic implications of 
the global nuclear balance, it also illustrated an axiom that has held true throughout the 
Alliance's history: it is far easier from the political standpoint to make qualitative 
modifications to NATO force structure than significant quantitative changes. 
In the case ofthe 1970's nuclear stockpile, qualitative improvements were intended 
to substitute for quantitative reductions. For NATO's conventional force posture over the last 
25 years, the reverse has typically been true: qualitative improvements have been implemented 
4sr.awrence Freedman, quoted in Daalder, p. 153. 
49J)aalder, p. 141. 
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when quantitative increases have proven politically and economically unfeasible. Such was 
the case in the aftermath of the 1961 Berlin crisis, which highlighted serious conventional 
deficiencies in Allied force structure. Arguing for a politically unpopular expenditure on 
conventional forces, the U.S. advanced the belief that "much of the necessary increase in 
strength could be obtained simply by correcting deficiencies in existing allied forces" 50 rather 
than dramatically expanding troop levels. 
A similar dynamic played itself out following NATO's adoption of Flexible Response 
in 1967, a strategy which, in principle, required further improvements to conventional forces. 
On both sides, however, the domestic political climate precluded numerical additions to troop 
levels and induced pressure for force reductions. From the European point of view, U.S. 
requests for increased conventional force contributions seemed unfair: "by implying that the 
Europeans should devote the bulk of their resources to fielding the necessary conventional 
forces while the U.S. alone would provide NATO's nuclear backing, the U.S. proposals ... 
raised the specter of an unequal division oflabor."51 At the same time, the U.S. government 
found no constituency, other than the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the maintenance of existing 
troop levels, let alone any increase; American priorities, especially for Congress, were to 
"reduce the U.S. balance of payments deficit_ ... and to free trained manpower for use in 
Vietnam. " 52 
5
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The solution to the impasse between the dictates of military requirements and political 
acceptability was to make qualitative improvements to the Alliance's conventional 
capabilities. In the mid-1970s, both pillars hoped to improve the efficiency of NATO's 
conventional forces without significant expenditures through a dedicated process of 
Rationalization, Standardization and Interoperability (RSI) to eliminate waste and duplication 
of effort. Though the RSI programs bore some fruit, the allies soon recognized that 
"rationalization alone would not reverse the adverse trends in the NATO-Warsaw Pact 
military balance."53 NATO then agreed upon a Long-Term Defense Plan (LTDP) in 1978, 
which sought to effect a significant strengthening of the Alliance's conventional defense 
through the 1980's. While the LTDP involved significant outlays, much of which failed to 
materialize, it was "most notable [for] what it did not try to do, which was to increase the size 
ofNATO's conventional force structure ... instead, its emphasis was almost entirely upon 
force modernization and other qualitative improvements."54 The Alliance's Conventional 
Defense Improvement (CDI) initiative of the mid-1980's followed the same logic. 
Finally, in demonstrating the superiority of political considerations within the process 
of Alliance strategy and force structure formulation, one must consider the degree to which 
each ally uses NATO strategy to justify national programs and priorities. This tendency has 
been pronounced throughout Alliance history, as "member states actively seek to shape 
53Duffield, p. 215. 
54Jbid, p. 219. 
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strategy in ways that help justify the forces they are willing to provide. " 55 As an example, in 
the mid-1950's, the faltering British economy led that nation to consider major cutbacks in 
its forces assigned to NATO. Realizing that a unilateral withdrawal based upon national 
imperatives would undercut allied cohesion, British policymakers determined that "a military 
rationale would be needed to justify the desired withdrawals . . . and the most direct way to 
devise such a rationale was to revise NATO strategy. "56 Nations have also sought to influence 
allied strategy in order to justify national procurement programs. America has been among 
the worst offenders in this regard: MC 48 helped promote the U.S. Army's introduction of 
the "Pentomic" division and the massive buildup of the U.S. Air Force's Strategic Air 
Command. Likewise, the MLF initiative was intended in part to boost the fortunes of the 
Polaris program and its follow-ons, and the push for the LRTNF deployment was partly 
fueled by the U.S. military's interest in cruise missile development. 
2. The Dictates of Consensus 
In both the nuclear and conventional realms, allied planning has traditionally obeyed 
the dictum that states: "the details of NATO's force structure are less important than the 
preservation of alliance cohesion."57 In practice, this has meant that NATO has been slow to 
deviate from the status quo, and that major_ changes are arrived at only after prolonged 
negotiation. While the Alliance made a succession of rapid strategic adjustments in its early 
55Du:ffield, p. 235. 
561bid, p. 121. 
57lbid, p. 255. 
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years, NATO strategy has become "increasingly stable over time ... until the upheavals that 
ended the Cold War, NATO's formal strategic concept had not changed in more than two 
decades."58 Force structure, both nuclear and conventional, remained remarkably stable as 
well throughout the last two decades of the Cold War. As with any organization requiring 
consensus among disparate perspectives, any satisfactory agreement becomes something of 
an institutional norm; the existence of a norm creates powerful incentives to adhere and 
renders attempts at deviation both conspicuous and traumatic. Strategically, "perpetuation 
of the status quo [has] represented a more acceptable compromise among the divergent views 
within the Atlantic Alliance than would the implementation of any of the alternatives. "59 
Accordingly, Flexible Response (ca. 1967 ff) remained the Alliance's strategy throughout the 
latter part of the Cold War, in spite of American doubts about the willingness of the 
Europeans to shoulder an appropriate share of the defense burden and European misgivings 
about the reliability of American nuclear guarantees. 
Pressures to maintain institutional norms have been even more pronounced in the 
Alliance's force structure, where "the highest norm was that . . . states should seek to provide 
previously agreed force levels or at least to preserve the status quo."60 The last NATO 
formulation of conventional force requirements (in division-equivalents) occurred in 1961. 
Although total Allied force levels never quite reached the target of 29 2/3 divisions, they 
5SOuffi.eld, p. 233. 
59J)aalder, p. 156. 
6<Duffi.eld, p. 251. 
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remained remarkably stable until the end of the Cold War, never fluctuating by more than 1 
Y2 divisions (of an average of26).61 Each of the Alliance's pillars had a distinct motive for 
adherence. The Europeans "tended to maintain their forces at established levels largely to 
ensure that no U.S. forces were withdrawn from the continent ... the benefits to be derived 
from unilateral reductions would not outweigh the resulting costs in diminished security if 
U.S. force levels were also reduced."62 On the U.S. side, "American leaders feared that U.S. 
troop withdrawals would precipitate corresponding allied force reductions, rather than 
compensatory allied increases."63 Whether the motivation was fear of American abandonment 
or ofEuropean defection, the end result was the same: the perpetuation of the status quo. 
This laudable strategic stability has come at the price of vagueness. In order to 
accommodate and reconcile the generally opposing strategic views of the Atlantic and 
European pillars, NATO strategy has been "presented in such a way that each country could 
plausibly interpret the document as satisfying its minimal strategic requirements, which 
typically necessitated couching the strategy in vague language."64 The ambiguity of NATO 
strategy explains a good deal of its longevity: "as the strategic concept became more 
indeterminate, its modification became increasingly unnecessary because it could 
61Du:ffield, from Table 7.1 on p. 235. 
62Jbid, p. 254. 
631bid. 
6%id, p. 245. 
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accommodate an expanding range ofinterpretations."65 As an example, the development of 
NATO Selective Employment Plans (SEP) for nuclear forces in the 1970's was conditioned 
by the need to accommodate conflicting European and American views on the proper 
employment of nuclear weapons. The SEPs, which presented NATO leaders with a variety 
of nuclear use options that encompassed the range of Allied employment preferences, 
"represented a classic political compromise among divergent strategic perspectives . . . as a 
result, the Alliance was able to avoid a continual debate about when, how, where and for 
what purpose NATO should employ nuclear weapons."66 Of course, deliberate ambiguity is 
no substitute for true consensus; such measures simply "kick the can down the road" for 
future generations to take up. 
3. The Acceleration Effects of Crisis 
Much of the Alliance's cohesion during the Cold War was due to the series of global 
crises provoked by the Soviets and their satellites, which served to remind the oft-fractious 
allies of the reality and immediacy of the threat. The divergent strategic perspectives of 
NATO's two pillars created a built-in entropy within the Alliance; in order to "counteract the 
tendency towards [Allied] fragmentation . . . the West needed catalysts to focus the common 
political will of the [member] nations."67 Inter_estingly, these catalysts, which typically came 
in the form of crises, seldom triggered new responses; rather, they served to accelerate 
65Duffield, p. 241. 
66Daalder, p. 104. 
67Winand, p. 166. 
30 
initiatives already begun but mired in intra-Alliance dispute. The first such crisis was the 
Korean War, which provided a shocking demonstration in June 1950 of the Soviet Union's 
malevolence and willingness to take action against the West. The results of the Korean War 
were a dramatically expanded U.S. military presence in Europe and the call for Federal 
German armament. What is less commonly known is the fact that "initiatives to put Germans 
back on the front, albeit of an informal nature, had been launched well before the Korean War 
began . . . the strategic reassessment of which German rearmament was a part was well 
advanced by the time the North Koreans attacked."68 Moreover, the Americans had already 
been considering greater security involvement on the continent, though these ideas had been 
sidelined by their political unpopularity. The outbreak of war added impetus to these 
moribund proposals by elevating fear of the Soviets over prior political objections. 
Admittedly, residual intra-Allied resentments and political maneuvering delayed West 
Germany's admission to NATO and the founding of the West German armed forces until 
1955, but the strategic implications ofthe Korean War provided the incentive for compromise 
that made the eventual agreements possible. 
Similarly, the 1956 Soviet invasion ofHungary accelerated NATO's shift away from 
a defense centered primarily around nuclear weapons. This crisis "cast doubt on the argument 
that the danger of thermonuclear war had significantly dampened the willingness of the Soviet 
Union to use force ... to the contrary, some Europeans concluded that the risk of aggression, 
6~arge, p. 62. 
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including the possibility of a limited war, had increased. "69 The result was that initiatives to 
improve the Alliance's conventional capabilities were revived and enshrined in a new strategy, 
MC 14/2, which gave increased weight to conventional forces. A few years after the 
Hungarian crisis, however, Allied fears waned, and conventional force improvements were 
stalled in budgetary gridlock. The Berlin Crisis of 1961 broke the Allies out of their reverie 
and reinforced "their initial interest in obtaining stronger non-nuclear forces."70 This same 
pattern repeated itself in the latter part of the decade, when the 1968 Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia accelerated the implementation of the 1967 revision ofNATO strategy, MC 
14/3. In spite of the new strategy, which placed still greater emphasis on conventional forces, 
the allies in late 1967 were contemplating force reductions to relieve economic burdens and, 
in the case of the U.S., to release manpower for use in Vietnam. Images of Soviet tanks 
rolling through downtown Prague, "by raising new doubts about Soviet intentions, served to 
arrest the cascade offorce reductions that ... threatened to weaken NATO's military posture 
significantly. "71 On the nuclear side, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided much-
needed political cover for the controversial LRTNF deployment, which had been informally 
agreed upon by the Allies some months prior. 
6~uffie1d, p. 125. 
70Ibid, p. 152. 
71Ibid, p. 190. 
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D. IMPLICATIONS FOR CJTF 
In the immediate aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union, the Alliance's twin 
pillars seemed to be reverting to more traditional patterns of behavior as Cold War fears of 
abandonment and defection lost sway. Political pressures for a U.S. withdrawal from Europe 
began to mount as the American public sought to realize its eagerly awaited "peace dividend." 
Some Europeans lost no time in attempting to "throw off the American yoke" by 
strengthening European institutions at NATO's expense. Fortunately for the Alliance, outside 
events once again conspired to create internal pressure for compromise. Following the old 
pattern of the effect of crisis on Allied consensus, the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia helped 
convince reluctant Allied publics and governments that threats to Euro-Atlantic security exist 
in the absence of the Soviet Union and that NATO requires a capability to intervene out-of-
area as crises arise. While the military genesis of the CJTF lay in the success of multinational 
military cooperation during the 1990-91 GulfWar, the eruption in the Balkans brought the 
initiative to the forefront of Alliance deliberations and helped overcome the unrealistic 
euphoria that accompanied the end ofthe Cold War. 
Overall, the long-standing NATO pattern of political imperatives outweighing military 
concerns seems to be repeating itself once again in the case of CJTF. CJTF' s eventual form 
will therefore reflect a compromise between the oft-competing political demands of the 
Alliance's two pillars, even to the possible detriment of pure military efficiency. Though some 
claim that CJTF represents a revolutionary change in the Alliance's orientation and 
capabilities, it is in fact grounded in the status quo and the need to maintain Alliance cohesion. 
33 
At its core, CJTF is about preserving existing NATO institutions, notably the integrated 
military structure, in the face of a changing strategic environment. Though CJTF will result 
in the modification of the Alliance's core structures, these will be evolutionary changes rather 
than a revolutionary overthrow of the Alliance's hard-won consensus. The essence ofthe 
CJTF initiative is an improvement to NATO's ability to respond to contingencies with existing 
conventional means. By adapting currently available forces and headquarters, the Allies hope 
to use CJTF to enhance the quality and utility of NATO's conventional forces without 
requiring quantitative increases in personnel or defense expenditures. 
There will undoubtedly remain a degree of vagueness in CJTF arrangements to allow 
room for the various strategic and political preferences of the Alliance's diverse membership. 
On the other hand, the economic and social realities of the post-Cold War order are pressing 
the Alliance towards more efficient and specific solutions. In the recent past, NATO has 
enjoyed a relative abundance of military capacity, which has permitted some "slop" in military 
arrangements in order to accommodate political compromises. As budgets tighten and 
resources grow scarcer, this flexibility will diminish, forcing the Alliance to make harder 
choices. The next two chapters lay out the details of these choices as they pertain to CJTF 
and highlight the hidden political and strategic agendas that undergird the initiative. 
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ill. FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE CJTF CONCEPT 
Among the many pronouncements of the NATO Heads of State and Government at 
the January 1994 Brussels Summit, their endorsement of the CJTF concept may have the 
most significant strategic and operational impact upon the next century. If properly realized, 
this initiative also has the potential to address several of the Alliance's most pressing political 
challenges. Two principal goals underpin the project: a desire to "strengthen the European 
pillar of the Alliance and allow it to make a more coherent contribution to the security of all 
of the Allies,'m and an anticipated need "to undertake missions in addition to the traditional 
and fundamental task of collective defense," which may include "peacekeeping and other 
operations under the authority of the UN . . . or CSCE. "73 CJTF is also intended to foster 
NATO cooperation with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe by providing for their 
participation in selected contingencies. This chapter examines these three goals in detail. 
A. STRENGTHENING THE ALLIANCE'S EUROPEAN PILLAR: 
"SEPARABLE BUT NOT SEPARATE" 
The Alliance's commitment to strengthen its European pillar reflects deep-seated goals 
on both sides of the Atlantic. Officially, "the U.S. supports the development of a greater 
European security identity and defense role as a means of strengthening the integrity and 
72Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council Held at NATO Headquarters Brussels on 10-11 January 1994, para. 3. 
731bid, para. 7. 
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effectiveness ofNAT0."74 The late strategic planner and diplomat Col. S. Nelson Drew, 
USAF, observed pointedly that "such a position is a logical outgrowth of the long-standing 
American desire for revised 'burden sharing' ... a desire to see the European Allies shoulder 
a greater share of the roles, risks, and responsibilities of their own defense."75 Thus, 
American support for CJTF is not based upon an altruistic desire to see Europe united for its 
own sake; rather, the U.S. view reflects traditional American economic concerns and desires 
for limited liability in Europe, as discussed in the previous chapter. U.S. military and political 
leaders are facing a new political and economic reality: it will not always be feasible for the 
U.S. to intervene globally on a unilateral basis, even when such intervention is desired. In an 
era of fiscal constraint and military retrenchment, "the U.S. will need allies, coalition partners, 
to enable us to insert troops and maintain those troops and accomplish our missions in distant 
places ... in almost any scenario involving the use of American military power."76 
In Europe, two interrelated objectives are addressed. Ideologically, strengthening the 
European pillar promotes the process of European political union by prompting a collective 
"judgement of the role the European Union (EU) wishes to play in the world and the 
contribution it wishes to make to security in its immediate neighborhood and in the wider 
74Departrnent of State Dispatch: NATO Fact Sheet (U.S. Dept. of State, June 1995), p. 19. 
75Drew, "A View from the U.S .... ," p. 4. 
76Eric Newsome, U.S. Dept. of State, "U.S. Participation in Future Coalition Operations," keynote 
address delivered at the Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe Conference on Problems and Solutions in Future 
Coalition Operations, July 1996, p. 7. 
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world."77 More practically, it provides for greater European autonomy, when desired, from 
American influence in defense decision making. The first major NATO commitment to a 
greater role for Europe within the alliance was expressed by the Ministers ofF oreign Affairs 
in mid-1991 at Copenhagen. The Heads of State reaffirmed this position at Rome later in the 
year by recognizing the desirability of "the development of a European security identity and 
defense role. "78 This statement was subsequently refined into its current form, delivered at 
Brussels in 1994: "We give our full support to the development of a European Security and 
Defense Identity (ESDI) which ... might in time lead to a common defense compatible with 
the Atlantic Alliance.'m Although there are several potential venues for an ESDI, only one, 
the Western European Union (WEU), stands out as being sufficiently developed to express 
it. Jose Cutliero, then WEU Secretary-General, noted with pride in 1995 that the "WEU is 
well-placed to continue as the focus for the further development of the European Security and 
Defense Identity,"80 and he was correct, given the unique links the WEU has to both NATO 
and theEU. 
On the part of the EU, the 1992 Treaty on European Union characterized the WEU 
as "an integral part of the development of the Union" and requested that the WEU "elaborate 
77Preliminarv Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defense Policy, report to the 
Western European Union Council of Ministers by the Permanent Council, 14 November 1994, p. 4. 
7~ome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, Issued by the Heads of State and Government 
Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th November 1991, para. 3. 
7~russels Declaration, para. 4. 
80Ambassador Jose Cutliero, "WEU's Operational Development and its Relationship to NATO," 
NATO Review, Vol. 43, No.5 (September 1995), p. 11. 
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and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications."81 While 
this statement stopped short of a formal linkage between WEU and the EU, in practical terms, 
the WEU serves as the EU' s security appendage. There is, however, little drive to 
consummate the EU-WEU relationship, as "Europeans have no consensus as to [WEU's] role 
... Germany sees it absorbed by the EU as the defense agency of the EU, but the UK does 
not like this, and keeps alive the WEU to prevent the EU from taking responsibility in foreign 
and security affairs ... even France sees the WEU as neither efficient nor capable."82 
The German view is driven by their ardor for European integration as well as an 
interest in efficiency. By folding the WEU into the EU, Germans argue, the EU would be 
strengthened and a potentially redundant structure would be eliminated. The British, on the 
other hand, are most reluctant to surrender their tradition of unfettered sovereignty in foreign 
and security affairs to a supranational body and wish to keep European security matters within 
an inter-governmental framework in which they would maintain strong veto rights. Viewing 
the EU as primarily an economic instrument rather than a true government of Europe, the 
British feel that "encumbering the Union with military responsibility would do nothing to 
enhance the unique contribution that the EU can make to greater regional security through 
the political and economic instruments available to it. "83 
81Treaty on European Union, February 1992, Title V, Article J.4.2. 
82Gen. Klaus Naumann, GEA, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, remarks upon his visit to 
the National Defense University, Washington, D.C., May 7, 1996. 
83Sir John Goulden, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the North Atlantic and 
Western European Union Councils, "The WEU's Role in the New Strategic Environment," NATO Review, 
Vol. 44, No. 3 (May 1996), p. 24. 
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Perhaps surprisingly, the French have the most balanced vision for the WEU: the 
French see the WEU as having the potential to become a viable European institution in its 
own right, believing that "the WEU, as the natural tool for the development of the European 
defense identity needs to be able to become, in political terms, the consultative framework for 
European cooperation on defense matters, both as the defense component of the Union and 
as the European pillar of the Alliance. "84 
At Brussels in January 1994, NATO adopted this line of reasoning by formalizing its 
support for "strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European 
Union, which is being developed as the defense component of the European Union."85 This 
"dual vocation" -- as NATO's European pillar and the EU's semi-official defense arm--
places the WEU in the unique position of potentially bridging the political-military gap 
between the EU and NATO: "WEU has become an unavoidable point in the decision-making 
process ... it has grown into a European bloc within the Alliance Structure. "86 This solution 
appears satisfactory to all: "France can claim that Europe's visibility within the Alliance has 
grown, Germany can point to progress towards European integration, and the UK can point 
to a pragmatic, useful outcome that reduces the perceived need for EU involvement in matters 
84Herve de Charrette, Foreign Minister ofFrance, remarks to the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, December 5, 1995, printed in NATO Review, Vol. 44, No. 1 (January 1996), p. 16. 
85Brussels Declaration, para. 5. 
86Edward Foster, NATO's Military in the Age of Crisis Management, Whitehall Paper no. 29 (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, 1995), p. 22. 
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of security and defense. "87 Such arrangements, however amicable, are not without their 
hazards. A powerful European security organization could potentially become a rival to 
NATO for political authority and ever-scarce defense resources. This prospect is especially 
worrisome for the U.S., and in the recent past, "the tension between a European desire for 
greater independence and the American desire to avoid creation of a competitor for NATO 
became a source of considerable frustration among Allies. "88 
European officials are quick to dismiss fears of a competitive relationship between 
NATO and the WEU, yet on paper at least, the possibility for overlap exists. Article V of the 
Modified Brussels Treaty outlines collective defense responsibilities for WEU members 
markedly similar to, and in some respects exceeding, those contained in Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty. 89 At their 1992 meeting at Petersberg, the WEU Council ofMinisters 
defined additional missions that might be carried out by WED-directed forces: humanitarian 
relief, search and rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management (including limited 
peacemaking). In 1994 at Noordwijk, the same body noted that the stage had been set for 
the WEU's "development as an effective defense organization with full operational capacities 
to carry out the Petersberg tasks."90 Indeed, declares Jean-Marie Guehenno, France's 
87
"NATO, CJTF's and IFOR," IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 2, No.5 (June 1996), p. 2. 
88Col. S. Nelson Drew, USAF, Trans-Atlantic Security in Transition: the Evolution ofNATO from 
Berlin to Bosnia, McNair Paper No. 35 (Arlington, VA: National War College, 1995), p. 20. 
89See Preliminary Conclusions ... , p. 4. 
9<beclaration of the WEU Council ofMinisters meeting at Noordwijk 14 November 1994, para. 4. 
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Permanent Representative to the WEU, "WEU cannot content itself with being a subsidiary 
body ofNAT0."91 
In practical terms, however, the WEU is far from being a threat to NATO. Lacking 
NATO's highly-developed military infrastructure and integrated chain of command, the WEU 
has thus far relied almost wholly on the willingness of its members to find and provide 
national military assets not already earmarked for NATO use, an uncertain task in an era of 
numerically declining armed forces. Likewise, the WEU lacks a major military staff and 
permanent commanders, forcing it to rely on national officers and headquarters offered to 
WEU on a case-by-case basis. As far as concrete measures go, "little has been done to 
prepare the WEU for its place in the spotlight as the Union's security arm ... one official at 
the WEU says money is so tight that one even has to fight for paper clips."92 For the 
foreseeable future, therefore, the WEU "has no choice but to look to NAT0"93 to ensure its 
operational effectiveness and the efficacy of an ESDI. 
At the January 1994 Brussels Summit, NATO recognized the implications of the 
current and future paucity of defense resources for the emerging ESDI. By agreeing "to 
make collective assets available . . . for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies 
91Jean-Marie Guehenno, Permanent Representative of France to the WEU Council, "France and the 
WEU," NATO Review, Vol. 42, No.5 (October 1994), p. 11. 
92Stephanie Anderson, "EU, NATO and CSCE Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis: Testing Europe's 
New Security Architecture," European Securitv, Vol. 4 (Summer 1995), p. 338. 
93Foster, p. 27. 
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in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy,"94 both pillars of the Alliance 
underwrote ESDI and, at the same time, prevented wasteful competition. As Secretary 
General Solana notes, this is a matter of fairness and efficiency: "The European Allies have 
no separable operational capability of their own, even though they invest heavily in NATO 
infrastructure. At a time when resources are so constrained, it makes no sense for European 
assets to lie dormant within NATO's structure ... these assets should not be separate from 
NATO, but they should be realized and exploited."95 CJTF is the mechanism by which these 
forces, "separable but not separate"96 from NATO, are to be provided. So closely linked were 
ESDI and CJTF at the Brussels Summit that "for a time, it looked as if the CJTF concept 
would itself largely define the parameters of the ESDI ... for each is objectively interrelated 
with the other."97 At the same time, it must be recalled that strengthening the European pillar 
is only one of CJTF' s goals, not its exclusive rationale. As Drew emphasized, the CJTF 
concept "does not need the ESDI as a justification, but rather permits the Alliance to adapt 
to its own requirements in a manner that is supportive of-- rather than in competition with --
ESDI."98 
94Brussels Declaration, para. 6. 
95Javier Solana, "NATO: Shaping Up for the Future," speech by the Secretary General at the IISS, 
London, September 19, 1996. 
96Brussels Declaration, para. 6. 
97Rafael Estrella, rapporteur, Structure and Functions· European Security and Defense Identity and 
Combined Joint Task Forces, draft report to the Defense and Security Committee of the North Atlantic 
Assembly, October 1995, p. 3. 
9S0rew, The Evolution of NATO ... , p. 22. 
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B. MOVING NATO OUT OF AREA: "COALffiONS OF THE WILLING" 
1. NATO's Peacekeeping Mission 
European political considerations notwithstanding, the CJTF' s most fundamental role 
is to provide a framework within which NATO can support missions for which the Alliance's 
traditional structure was not designed. The origins ofNATO's willingness to participate in 
peacekeeping operations coincide, chronologically, with the breakup ofYugoslavia in 1991, 
but they are not rooted in that crisis; rather, they stem from the unexpected collapse of the 
Communist bloc, a trauma whose grand scale drowned out the first rumblings in the Balkans. 
The experiences of Allied nations participating in the 1990-1991 Gulf War coalition 
contributed to the awareness that the end of the Cold War had left the Alliance poorly 
prepared -- politically even more than militarily -- to confront any threat to peace and stability 
besides the Soviet one. NATO's New Strategic Concept, adopted by the Heads of State and 
Government at the Rome meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in November 1991, 
"reflected Alliance realization that significant changes were required in the way in which 
NATO would have to perform if it was to remain relevant to the security interests of its 
members in the post-Cold War environment."99 
While the New Strategic Concept e~plicitly reaffirmed collective defense as the 
Alliance's essential purpose, it also acknowledged that the profound changes in the world 
order meant that: 
~rew, The Evolution ofNATO ... , p. 5. 
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Risks to Allied Security are less likely to result from calculated 
aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse 
consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social 
and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, 
which . . . could lead to crises inimical to European Stability and even to 
armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO 
countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance. 100 
This prescient statement anticipated Allied involvement in the Balkans, but at that point, 
direct intervention was not foreseen. Instead, the New Strategic Concept and the 
accompanying Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation advocated "a broad approach 
to security . . . reflected in three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy: 
dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of a collective defense capability."101 This 
relatively pacific ideal was based upon a more vigorous exercise of economic and diplomatic 
consultations, as called for in Articles 2 and 4 of the Washington Treaty, through the 
mechanism of"a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe 
and North America."102 
As events in Bosnia progressed, it became increasingly obvious that for the 
foreseeable future, Europe's institutional security framework would be too weak and 
uncoordinated to address outright conflict. Europe's economic giant, the European 
Community-- which became the European Union in November 1993 -- was a self-professed 
100The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating 
in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991, para. I 0. 
101New Strategic Concept, para. 25. Also, see The Rome Declaration, para. 4. 
102Ibid, para 3. 
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military dependant of NATO and the WEU, and its ability to make far-reaching political-
military decisions was -- and still is -- subordinated to the task of Europe's economic 
integration. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) had too limited 
a mandate and too many members to make operational military decisions. Also, CSCE lacked 
the political interest among its members necessary to even call itself a full-fledged regional 
security organization, although that too would change. The WEU had perhaps the most 
potential to accept a role in peacekeeping, as its adoption of the Petersburg Tasks 
demonstrated. Unfortunately, the WEU' s organizational deficiencies and chronic lack of 
resources hindered it from taking a leading role; at one point, "the WEU had drafted plans for 
an interpositional force [in the former Yugoslavia], which its members shied from 
inserting."103 Only NATO possessed adequate diplomatic and military means, and it soon 
became "difficult to envision a means by which NATO ... could make good on [its] 
commitment to stability and peace throughout the trans-Atlantic community without 
consideration of an Alliance role in peacekeeping activities."104 Such consideration would be 
contentious. 
Some Allies, France among them, "rejected an Alliance role altogether, preferring to 
see an expanded CSCE role in this field, perhaps in concert with the new European 
mechanisms for a common foreign and security policy as called for in Maastricht. "105 Others, 
103Foster, p. 11. 
104Drew, The Evolution of NATO ... , p. 8. 
IOSJbid. 
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the United States in particular, were not keen on peacekeeping to begin with or, like 
Germany, had constitutional restrictions on out-of-area military endeavors. The first step 
was, typically, a compromise. At the ministerial meeting of the NAC at Oslo in June 1992, 
the Allies agreed to support "on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, 
peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available 
Alliance resources and expertise."106 Deference to the CSCE satisfied the "Eurocentrics," 
while the agreement to "make available resources and expertise" was non-committal enough 
to soothe the wary. Ironically, this half-measure proved sufficient to draw the Alliance into 
active participation in the former Yugoslavia. Shortly after the NAC meeting at Oslo, the UN 
called upon the CSCE to provide assistance in Bosnia, and the CSCE, lacking the structure 
and resources to comply, passed the UN request to NATO. 
After heated debate, the NAC agreed in July 1992 to provide naval forces to help 
monitor the UN arms embargo against all republics of the former Yugoslavia, and in October 
1992 to provide airborne monitoring of the UN-mandated no-fly zone over Bosnia.107 In 
December 1992, NATO legitimized its new link with the UN at the NAC Ministerial in 
Brussels by confirming "the preparedness of our Alliance to support, on a case-by-case basis 
and in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping operations under the authority of 
the UN Security Council . . . we are ready to respond positively to initiatives that the UN 
106Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, 4 June 1992, 
para. II. 
107NATO's Role in Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia, Basic Fact Sheet No.4 (Brussels: NATO 
Office of Information, January 1996), pp. 2-3. 
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Secretary General might take to seek Alliance assistance in the implementation of UN 
Security Council Resolutions."108 Within six months, the UN would broaden the mandate of 
NATO's air and maritime monitoring operations to include embargo and no-fly zone 
enforcement, although direct NATO peacekeeping on the ground remained out of reach for 
two more years. 
The January 1994 Brussels Summit moved the Alliance even closer to a full role in 
peacekeeping. On the one hand, the Brussels Declaration soft-pedaled the issue by reiterating 
the hedging language of Oslo (case-by-case basis, under the authority of the UN or CSCE, 
etc.) and by adding reassurances that "participation in any such operation or mission will 
remain subject to decisions of member states."109 At the same time, however, the Heads of 
State and Government sought "to conduct more efficiently and flexibly the Alliance's 
missions, including peacekeeping."110 Somewhere in between Oslo in June 1992 and Brussels 
in January 1994, peacekeeping had become a NATO mission. The seeds of this development 
were sown at the NAC Ministerial in December 1992, when the Alliance pledged to "share 
experiences in peacekeeping with our Cooperation Partners and other CSCE participating 
states."111 The chosen vehicle for the evolution of a NATO peacekeeping capability was not 
a long-established alliance body; rather, the task was given to the year-old North Atlantic 
108f'inal Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, 17 
December 1992, para. 4. 
109f3russels Declaration, para. 8. 
110lbid, para. 9. 
111Final Communique, 17 December 1992, para. 3. 
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Cooperation Council (NACC), which was formed primarily to coordinate NATO political 
initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe. Use of the NACC in this capacity was politically 
shrewd for a divided Alliance. It provided a meaty issue for the cooperation partners to help 
chew on which was within their modest political and military means, while at the same time 
pushing the peacekeeping issue out of the Alliance's core, into a forum where decisions 
would not be binding. 
The NACC set to work fairly briskly. As tasked, the NACC dutifully chartered an Ad-
Hoc Group on Co-operation in Peacekeeping to "develop a common understanding on the 
political principles of and the tools for peacekeeping, and to share experience and thereby 
develop common practical approaches."112 By June 1993, the Ad-Hoc Group had formulated 
a conceptual approach to peacekeeping that included definitions, general principles and 
operational guidelines. The only problematic feature in this document was its reliance on the 
UN or CSCE "to define in each case the arrangements for the conduct of a peacekeeping 
operation, including command relationships."113 This statement notwithstanding, the NACC 
report was good enough to have many of its features, including its definitions, absorbed by 
the NATO Military Committee into MC 327, NATO Military Planning for Peace Support 
Operations (5 August 1993).114 While disagreements in the NAC blocked official NATO 
11~eport to Ministers by the NACC Ad-Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping. Meeting at 
Athens, 11 June 1993, p. I. 
113Ibid, p.4. 
114Foster, p. 6. 
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adoption of the NACC-fonnulated peacekeeping principles, the NACC's work served to keep 
consideration of peacekeeping active in Allied councils until the subject was finally brought 
into public view at the January 1994 Brussels Summit. 
2. CJTF' s Links to PfP and NATO Enlargement 
Not only did the 1994 Brussels Summit institutionalize peacekeeping as a NATO 
mission; it also strengthened the emphasis on European cooperation in peacekeeping through 
the newly created Partnership for Peace. Multilateral cooperation in peacekeeping has been 
one of the Alliance's principal means of establishing and maintaining a meaningful security 
dialogue with the post-Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. NATO's New 
Strategic Concept, adopted in November 1991, committed that body to a "broad approach 
to security ... [with] three mutually reinforcing elements"115 : dialogue, cooperation and 
collective defense. In conjunction with the first two of these goals, the Alliance created the 
NACC to facilitate consultation between the Allies and their non-NATO European neighbors, 
particularly those of the former Communist bloc. As previously discussed, the NACC at its 
first ministerial meeting agreed to "cooperate in preparation for UN or CSCE [-mandated] 
peacekeeping operations and to share experience in peacekeeping and related matters."116 
The Partnership for Peace (PfP), unveiled at the January 1994 Brussels Summit, 
accelerated the rapprochement between the Allies and their former foes. While commonly 
115The New Strategic Concept, para. 25. 
116NATO's Role in Peacekeeping, NATO Basic Fact Sheet No.4 (Brussels: NATO Office of 
Information, October 1994), p. 7. 
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viewed as a compromise measure to forestall a more permanent solution to the question of 
NATO enlargement, the Partnership is also a reaffirmation of NATO's desire to broaden 
overall European participation in peacekeeping. Initially conceived as a "Partnership for 
Peacekeeping,"117 PfP in its final form encompasses a wider variety of diplomatic and military 
functions related to the stabilization of the European security environment and the 
democratization of the post-Communist states to the east. Peacekeeping remains a major 
cooperative mechanism within the Partnership, however. Two of PiP's five primary objectives 
involve strengthening the willingness and ability of Partners to participate in peacekeeping 
operations in conjunction with the Allies. Within nine months of the Partnership invitation, 
23 nations had tendered their Partnership Framework Documents and major military exercises 
had been held involving Allied and Partner ground forces in a simulated peacekeeping 
environment. In 1995, additional exercises strengthened the ability of Partner staffs to 
coordinate with NATO's integrated military structure. The speed with which these 
developments proceeded revealed both the Partners' eagerness to solidify ties with NATO 
as well as the Alliance's growing awareness that its vision for European security cooperation 
would soon face the acid test: ground involvement in Bosnia. 
3. CJTF' s "Variable Geometry_" 
Non-Article 5 operations -- which encompass a range of missions including 
peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian aid -- carry with them important conceptual 
117Drew, The Evolution of NATO ... , p. 26. 
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implications. Such contingencies are generally assumed to take place "out of area," that is, 
beyond the borders of the Allied nations, and require a concomitant "recasting [of] the 
Alliance as a structure adapted to force projection."118 Such measures are fraught with 
political peri~ as there is "a tremendous difference between the ability to generate consensus 
to respond to an Article 5 attack . . . and the ability to generate and sustain consensus to 
deploy NATO forces to engage in ... operations outside of the territory of member states. "119 
Since the Alliance operates on a consensus basis, the political complications of out of area 
deployments could potentially have paralyzing effects on NATO's decision-making apparatus. 
Allied unanimity stems from the concept of equal sharing of risk, enshrined in Article 5, 
whereby each member is obligated to participate in the common defense. Since out of area 
contingencies are not necessarily matters of common defense, "it is not practical to hope to 
enforce this Article 5 principle for non-Article 5 missions; certain allies may not have the 
[appropriate] military resources . . . others may have unavoidable political or historical 
reservations." 120 
From the outset, the Alliance recognized the impracticability of insisting on unanimous 
participation in out of area missions. While unanimous consent is still required for NATO to 
initiate or participate in such operations, _it was specifically stated at Brussels that 
"participation in any such operation ... will remain subject to decisions of member states in 
118foster, p. 37. 
119JJrew, The Evolution ofNATO ... , p. 37. 
12Df'oster, p. 38. 
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accordance with national constitutions."121 The CJTF concept expressly allows for a "variable 
geometry'' of participants for each operation, allowing some Allies to opt out while preserving 
the availability of collective resources to those who choose to participate. To help flesh out 
these "coalitions of the willing," the CJTF also provides an avenue for participation by 
"nations outside the Alliance,"122 particularly those participating in NATO's Partnership for 
Peace. These arrangements, while flexible, carry with them significant danger, as they 
"sanctify a fundamental and inevitable shift away from the basic rule of every coalition: the 
more or less equal sharing ofrisk."123 Additionally, since non-Article 5 missions are to be 
carried out in support of the UN or OSCE, there is the problem of relations between the 
Alliance and these bodies: "the dialogue between the UN and national military command has 
always been difficult, but it is even more complicated once the UN delegates the conduct of 
military operations, not to a country, but to an international organization."124 Preserving 
Alliance autonomy becomes a priority; as former NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes 
reminds us, NATO "supports the UN, but we are not its sub-contractor."125 
121Brussels Declaration, para. 7. 
1221bid, para. 9. 
123Foster, p. 45. 
124Nicole Gnesotto, Lessons of Yugoslavia (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, March 1994 ), 
p. 39. 
125Willy Claes, "NATO and the Evolving Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture," NATO Review, Vol. 
42, No. 6 (December 1994-January 1995), p. 6. 
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The language ofthe January 1994 Brussels Declaration implies four possible CJTF 
configurations: a NATO-led operation, a WEU-led operation, and coalitions in which 
members of NATO or the WEU are joined by other members of the UN or OSCE. A pure 
NATO configuration is the most likely, and is the "first and most important use of the CJTF 
concept."126 A task force would not necessarily have to include contingents from every Ally 
to be classed as a NATO CJTF; any collection of Alliance members conducting an operation 
under NATO auspices would retain access to all of the Alliance's collective infrastructure, 
even if some allies chose not to participate. Such "NATO-minus" groupings may, in fact, be 
the rule for smaller non-Article 5 contingencies. NATO task forces potentially have access 
to a wide variety of national and multinational formations. By 1995, Alliance forces will be 
grouped into three categories, first articulated in the 1991 New Strategic Concept: Main 
Defense Forces, the bulk of NATO's conventional deterrent; Reaction Forces, capable of 
rapid deployment to trouble spots; and Augmenting Forces, available to reinforce the other 
two. All three types possess crisis-response capability via mobile and detachable units,127 
which may be drawn upon to form and support a NATO CJTF. 
All three force categories are composed of formations increasingly multinational in 
character at the corps level. Currently, four main defense corps are bi-national128, and the 
126Drew, The Evolution of NATO ... , p. 22. 
127See Basic Fact Sheet: NATO's New Force Structures (Brussels: NATO Office of Information 
Press, August 1995), p. 2. 
1280ne Danish-German, one German-Dutch, one German-US and one US-German. 
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ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), the "likely first instrument of [Allied] response,"129 is 
multinational down to the divisional level. Additionally, the five-nation Eurocorps is available 
for NATO use as a Main Defense Force or as a "Rapid Reaction Force, ACE-wide."130 The 
proliferation of multinational formations may be beneficial for Allied solidarity and 
interoperability, but poses a potential problem in a NATO-minus situation. Nations choosing 
not to participate in a "coalition of the willing" may inadvertently gut multinational forces and 
staffs available to a CJTF by withdrawing critical units. This issue will be particularly critical 
for the CJTF nucleus staffs, which may need to seek "national approval to allow all assigned 
personnel to deploy -- irrespective of a nation's decision to contribute forces -- to avoid 
degrading command and staff functions on the brink of deployment."131 
The second CJTF configuration, WEU-led, might be described as an extreme case of 
NATO-minus: a coalition in which the U.S. and other non-WEU Allies decline to participate. 
While this configuration has generated the most political attention due to its implications for 
ESDI, "from a practical point of view, the scenarios where we will have a WEU force going 
out with the U.S. standing aside are not likely to arise."132 On the other hand, in the words 
of U.S. diplomat Eric Newsome, "if we determine that there are few or no U.S. national 
129peter Saracino, "ARRC at the Sharp End," International Defense Review (May 1994), p. 33. 
130foster, p. 25. 
131Lt. Col. Charles L. Barry, USA, "NATO's Bold New Concept-- CJTF," Joint Forces Quarterly 
(Swnmer 1994), p. 49. 
132Stanley Sloan, quoted in "France and NATO," transcript of meeting at U.S.-CREST in Washington 
D.C., January 22, 1996, p. 13. 
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interests at stake [in a given contingency], the degree of our participation will be much 
different than if there are important interests at stake."133 The January 1994 Brussels 
Declaration indicates that NATO military capabilities will be available to the Alliance's 
European pillar, implying that, with the NAC' s consent, staff and other collective resources 
will be provided to the WEU where appropriate. 
In anticipation of such contingencies, the WEU is now seeking to define Forces 
Answerable to the WEU (FA WEU) which may be drawn upon to form a WEU-led CJTF. 
Heading this list is the Eurocorps, which, though obligated to NATO as an :MDF for Article 
5 purposes, was initially designed to provide a European crisis-response capability. Joining 
Eurocorps as potential FAWEU are the Multinational Airborne Division (Central), the 
UK!Netherlands Amphibious Force, the newly established 4-nation EUROFOR and 
EUROMARFOR, and, potentially, the 1st German/Netherlands Army Corps. 134 These 
European multinational formations suffer from the same vulnerability to selective non-
participation as their NATO counterparts, and require "unanimity among their burgeoning 
masters to deploy."135 Additionally, many of the formations comprising these forces are 
"dual-hatted," being primarily obligated to NATO; the availability of such forces to the WEU 
is therefore contingent on their release from NATO duties. As the WEU members themselves 
133Newsome, p. 14. 
134See European Security: a Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries, report to the WEU Council 
of Ministers at Madrid, 14 November 1995, p. 56. 
135F oster, p. 31. 
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acknowledge, "the readiness of the Alliance to make collective assets and capabilities 
available for WEU operations is fundamental to ensuring that WEU has access to a 
sufficiently wide range of capabilities."136 
The final CJTF configurations, NATO- or WEU-plus, involve the participation of 
other nations who are members of the UN or the OSCE. The broad language of the January 
1994 Brussels Declaration includes the possibility of coalition with Western-oriented nations, 
such as Australia or Japan, as well as with other regional powers, notably Russia. However, 
the NATO-plus configuration is most commonly envisioned as a function of the Partnership 
for Peace initiative, whose objectives for partners include "the development of cooperative 
military relations with NATO ... in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in 
the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may 
subsequently be agreed."137 For Partner nations, integration into NATO military operations 
represents "a hedge against instability and external threats."138 This goal, while laudable and 
politically desirable, is bound to carry with it inconvenient and expensive interoperability 
issues, which should not be set aside lightly. In spite of the inconvenience, former 
CINCSOUTH Adm. Leighton Smith believes that "an ever-increasing and genuine possibility 
of ad hoc coalitions requires a more inclusive approach to interoperability,"139 which is being 
136European Security: a Common Concept ... , p. 57. 
137Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, Brussels, II January 1994, para. 3(d). 
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pursued as a principal objective of PfP. Neither this nor any of the other obstacles yet 
discussed are insunnountable, and all 16 Allies are firmly committed to overcoming them. At 
the same time, unresolved issues remain. The next chapter examines these sticking points in 
the CJTF debate and the larger political and strategic efforts from which they stem. 
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IV. THE FORMAT DEBATE: CJTF'S UNCERTAIN SHAPE 
As NATO's flagship initiative for the post-Cold War order, CJTF raises several 
political and military issues with the potential to seriously affect Allied cohesion and the 
balance of influence between the Alliance's two pillars. In its role as a process ofbuilding 
military coalitions, there has been little controversy over the nature of the CJTF. The proper 
placement of the CJTF, regardless of composition, within the Alliance's decision-making 
structure has been more difficult to determine. The Atlantic pillar sees CJTF as an extension 
of the present integrated military structure, an effective infrastructure built up at great cost 
over the past 45 years; the majority of the European Allies tend to agree with this perspective. 
On the other hand, some elements within the European pillar, particularly those nations who 
do not participate in the integrated military structure, view Article 5 and non-Article 5 
missions as fun~amentally incompatible and requiring distinct political-military control 
structures. For a time, there seemed to be "a grave danger of splitting NATO into an article 
5 organization and a non-Article 5 organization, the former without, the latter with French 
participation, thus overloading the whole structure by constant redundancy and overlap."140 
Though this contentious debate was resolved in general terms at the June 1996 NAC 
Ministerial at Berlin, the details ofCJTF's place in the Alliance's political-military structure 
1400ietrich Genschel, "The Evolution of Civilian and Military Structures," forthcoming in Serge Sur, 
ed., Transatlantic Relations and International Security (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament 
Research, 1996), p. 9. 
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are not yet fixed and remain the subject of much controversy. This chapter surveys the current 
state of the debate, laying out the substance of the major disagreements and identifying likely 
areas of compromise. 
A. FROM BRUSSELS TO BERLIN: A STALLED INITIATIVE 
Though the Alliance collectively approved CJTF at Brussels in January 1994 as the 
Alliance's way ahead, the spirit of consensus which prevailed at that historic meeting broke 
down rapidly as the Allies struggled to work out the details. For a short while, military 
planners made sound progress until they found that, in spite of the general support for the 
concept expressed at Brussels, there were very real disagreements over how the concept was 
to be implemented. Both the U.S. and the Europeans had hidden agendas: "France's priority 
was to enhance the visibility and potential effectiveness of the ESDI ... the U.S., however, 
was more interested in preserving both Washington's leading role in the Alliance, and 
NATO's unity of command."141 The next two-plus years passed in stalemate as "the debate 
on CJTF became increasingly intricate, complex, and lost the attention of the political 
leaders." 142 
1. The Mainstream View 
The "mainstream" view, championed by the U.S. and supported by the majority of the 
Allies, has been that all CJTF development and employment must take place under the 
141liSS, NATO CJTFs and IFOR, p. 1. 
142Gilles Andreani, former Deputy Permanent Representative of France to the North Atlantic Council, 
quoted in "France and NATO" (U.S.-CREST), p. 4. 
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auspices ofNATO's integrated military structure. The paramount concern for the mainstream 
nations prior to Berlin was that the integrated military structure, long a mainstay of Alliance 
solidarity and productivity, not be weakened by a competing structure. From the standpoint 
of efficiency, "the well proven integrated military structure would be made irrelevant for the 
new tasks of crisis management, conflict prevention and peace support operations, where the 
inherent flexibility of the structure, its adaptability, expertise and communality of operating 
procedures are needed most,"143 if CJTFs were to be subordinated to a new command 
authority. Additionally, there has been "a prevailing view in NATO circles that [non-Article 
5] operations could assume Article 5 proportions,"144 leading to rival command structures 
contending for operational control of forces. From the standpoint ofEuro-Atlantic relations, 
former U.S. Military Representative to NATO Lt. Gen. Daniel Christman, USA, points out 
that "we simply cannot afford two alliances . . . bifurcation in the approach to Article 5 and 
non-Article 5 missions is a certain way to disengage this hemisphere from the European 
continent,"145 an undesirable outcome for both sides. 
While the desire to preserve the authority of the integrated military structure is shared 
more or less equally by the Allies that participate in it, the U.S. has additional reservations 
regarding the employment ofCJTFs outside pfthe Alliance. When U.S. assets are among 
those provided by NATO for a WEU-led CJTF, which would be the case for almost every 
143Genschel, from Transatlantic Relations and International Security, p. 9. 
144Estrella, p. 26. 
145Christman, p. 79. 
61 
imaginable contingency, the U.S. wishes to preserve a measure of control over their use. In 
particular, "the U.S. wants NATO to be able to control the assets before an operation, allot 
them in accordance with NATO priorities and monitor their use throughout any operation." 146 
Rejecting French proposals for a prearranged turnover ofNATO assets to the WEU 
for European CJTF operations, the U.S. government made it clear that "there is no way we 
are going to hand over our assets lock, stock and barrel to the WEU without some form of 
oversight."147 As the U.S. is widely represented in the integrated military structure, 
maintaining some oversight of American assets provided by NATO to the WEU through that 
structure seems an adequate substitute for direct U.S. national supervision. To this end, the 
U.S. has pressed for the designation of one of the Major NATO Commanders (MNC) as "the 
'supporting CINC' to the WEU operational commander for the provision of NATO resources 
as well as for ... U.S. assets."148 The designated MNC would monitor the employment of 
Allied forces by the WEU to ensure that they are used in a manner consistent with NATO 
and, implicitly, U.S. policies. Conveniently, both MNCs are American officers. Some 
Europeans see this as an unacceptable U.S. veto on European operational autonomy; for the 
146Frederick Bonnart, "Balancing Act: Integrating a European Component Into NATO," The 
International Herald Tribune (May 28, 1996). 
147Unnamed U.S. official, quoted in Brooks Tigner, "Will Alliance Embrace or Evade CJTF Issue?", 
Defense News (June 3-9, 1996), p.4. 
148J3arry, "NATO's Bold New Concept," p. 52. 
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U.S., however, such an arrangement represents insurance against "being drawn into a military 
commitment, in which it had no influence from the beginning, through the back door."149 
2. The Minority View 
Feelings have been equally strong on the other side of the debate. The minority view, 
developed primarily by France, seeks to create maximum maneuvering room for the ESDI 
within CJTF. Firstly, the minority view sees "a fundamental difference between common 
defense ... and the management of post-Cold War crises, for in the latter case, a priority for 
the Europeans may not be a priority for our North American allies."15° For this reason, the 
French argue, the maintenance of a structural separation between the two tasks is the best 
means of preserving Europe's ability to decisively and autonomously intervene in localized 
security problems. In particular, the minority view holds that political control mechanisms 
within the integrated military structure are not sufficient for peacekeeping and other non-
Article 5 tasks, which require an elevated degree of political oversight. In the minority's eyes, 
the integrated military structure is a creature of the Cold War, when "the immediacy of the 
threat called for predelegation of authority to a single identifiable commander, who had to be 
American. "151 
14~olger Mey, "A European Security and Defense Identity-- What Role for the United States?", 
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150Guehenno, p. 11. 
151Andreani, p. 13. 
63 
Non-Article 5 missions, on the other hand, are more subtle, calling for a civilian "hand 
on the throttle" capable of making continuous adjustments in a fluid environment. V. Adm. 
Jean Betermier, French Navy, of the Centre des Hautes Etudes de 1' Armement, Ecole 
Militaire, Paris, makes the interesting observation that "the U.S. experience in Vietnam has 
made them more willing to push the policy side out of the chain of command,"152 an 
uncomfortable situation for the French, who have come to insist upon unusually tight political 
control over military activities. The French view of the proper place for the military in the 
national and European security establishments has been heavily conditioned by a series of 
difficulties in civil-military relations dating back to 1940. 
The French, like the U.S., have additional national reservations about CJTF 
arrangements. Within the French government especially, the integrated military structure "is 
still widely perceived . . . as being incompatible with independence in political-military 
affairs."153 For many Frenchmen, the prospect ofNATO/US assets provided to a WEU-led 
CJTF being administered through the integrated military structure smacks of subordination 
and an involuntary return to the structure they deliberately abandoned in 1966. For this 
reason, the French have pressed for NATO assets provided to the WEU to be administered 
by the NAC, a body in which they participate, rather than the integrated military structure. 
Particularly under Mitterrand, "Paris preferred that the NAC determine the political goals for 
!52V. Adm. Jean Betermier, French Navy, remarks given at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
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and continually monitor CJTF operations, wanting to de-emphasize the role of NATO's 
military decision-making bodies."154 From a French perspective, the heavy U.S. presence in 
the integrated military structure makes the problem worse: "if it is agreed that the supporting 
officer [that is, the U.S. officer serving as a Major NATO Commander] should have the right 
to control or inspect both the aim and execution of the European-led operation through the 
assets that he is supposed to provide, the ESDI would still be dependent on the United 
States,"155 an unacceptable situation for France. 
To preserve the ESDI from American influence, France has sought to build structural 
:firewalls between European-led CJTF arrangements and those for full NATO participation. 
In particular, Paris has pressed for "assets preallotted and available for a European 
commander, with a staff to make contingency plans for possible European-only operations 
... in particular, France sees such operations, although nominally within the Alliance 
framework, taking place independently under WEU political control without any interference 
from NAT0."156 These demands have been consistently rejected by the Americans as an 
irresponsible "blank check" and a wasteful duplication of structures. While a cynic might 
argue that "for Paris, the problem is how to secure access to NATO/US resources without 
subjecting the Europeans to US political control,"157 the minority view must be respected. 
154Sloan, NATO Adapts ... , p. 4. 
155M. Blaauw, rapporteur, "The United States and Security in Europe," Report by the WEU Defense 
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For the French, "American insistence on using the command relationships of the [integrated 
military structure], where France is not a player, seems designed to deliberately marginalize 
the French role."158 That role is not inconsiderable. The French have "the potential to be the 
most important European contributor to CJTF operations,"159 and it would be unwise to 
alienate or exclude them. 
B. RESOLVING THE IMPASSE 
1. The Franco-Allied Rapprochement 
On December 5, 1995, the ice began to thaw. On that day, addressing the NAC 
Ministerial Session in Brussels, M. De Charette, the French Foreign Minister, announced that 
henceforth: 
• the French Defense Minister would participate regularly in the work of the Alliance 
• France would take its place in the Military Committee and also in the bodies 
coming under it 
• France would participate in the NATO Defense College, the Oberammergau 
College and the Alliance's Situation Centre 
• France would bring about a process likely to improve its working relations with 
SHAPE. 160 
15S0rew, The Evolution of NATO ... , p. 17. 
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These decisions reflect a dramatic change in France's policy and attitude towards NATO, 
though they have been generally misinterpreted by the press. France's decisions do not 
represent a ''French return to NATO"-- as the French never left NATO in the first place, only 
its integrated military structure -- and they stop short of reintegrating France into that 
structure. What these overtures represent, in the words of political analyst Stanley Sloan, is 
"an invitation to bargain. "161 More officially put, the French announcements are "a unilateral 
gesture . . . we have not set any conditions . . . our aim is to give a new impetus to the 
Alliance reform process decided at the January 1994 Summit."162 This gesture was achieved 
at considerable political cost for President Jacques Chirac, who has "felt pressure from the 
right, for 'selling out France,' and from the left, for 'selling out Europe. "'163 The fact that 
Chirac is a Gaullist made his decisions all the more ground-breaking, proving once again the 
adage that "only Nixon could go to China." 
France's overtures were not purely altruistic. The fact that the announcements were 
made as NATO was finalizing plans for JOINT ENDEAVOUR was no coincidence. As one 
of the three main participants in IF OR, France had a reasonable desire to be represented in 
the political-military bodies that would be overseeing the employment of over 10,000 French 
troops. France also realized that an increased French presence in Allied councils would 
translate into increased leverage for French positions on the CJTF debate and other important 
161S1oan, "France and NATO," p. 7. 
162
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issues. By taking a more active role in certain key NATO institutions France hoped to "make 
a better contribution to these thoughts [on the renewal of the Alliance] and to enable her 
partners to share her convictions in favor of strengthening political control and the European 
identity within NAT0."164 More subtly, France has tried to seize the moral high ground in the 
CJTF debate, saying, in effect, ''France has taken the first step, but henceforth, we must walk 
together."165 As discussions on CJTF resumed, the implication seemed to be that it was 
America's tum to make some concessions. 
2. The Berlin Ministerial 
Meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers in Berlin in early June 1996, the NAC 
crafted a carefully-worded set of compromises designed to satisfy both the majority and 
minority views on CJTF. Shortly before the Ministerial, the NATO Military Committee 
(NMC), with French participation, agreed upon six military principles for CJTF development; 
these principles undergird the Berlin accord. Under the NMC guidelines, CJTF must: 
• preserve the integrated military structure 
• provide for separable but not separate forces in support of ESDI 
• maintain a single command structure for Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions 
• retain the role of the Military Committee in advising the NAC and in transmitting 
strategic guidance from the NAC to NATO Military Authorities 
164Charles Millon, Minister of Defense of France, "France and the Renewal of the Atlantic Alliance," 
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• avoid ad hoc participation in NATO bodies 
• preserve the ability of Major NATO Commands to do timely contingency 
planning.166 
At Berlin, the Alliance's civilian leaders gave these principles the political legitimacy 
needed to make CJTF palatable to each ofNATO's sixteen member nations; as usual with the 
Alliance, "there was a great deal of ritual and theology to the adaptations."167 In brief, the 
minority conceded that NATO must retain a single military structure, and in tum, the majority 
committed itself more concretely to the development of an effective ESDI. Reduced to a 
single statement, the Berlin compromise ensured that rather than the WEU, the EU, or the 
OSCE, NATO would remain "the essential forum for consultation among its members and 
the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of the 
Allies. "168 
a. Concessions to the Majority View 
The principal concessions to the majority view at Berlin were the commitment 
to a single military structure and the agreement on NATO oversight over forces provided to 
the WEU. By affirming that NATO will continue to be built upon "a single multinational 
166Christman, p. 79. 
167Steven Erlanger, "NATO Plans Component That Will Be All-European," The New York Times 
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command structure ... able to undertake all missions,"169 the NAC ended any threat of a rival 
structure competing with the integrated military structure for funding and staff resources. 
While acknowledging that the integrated military structure will have to be "renovated" in 
order to better undertake the Alliance's new missions, the Berlin decisions ensured that the 
integrated military structure will be the forum for "the ability to mount NATO non-Article 5 
operations, guided by the concept of one system capable of performing multiple functions. "170 
The integrated military structure is also to be the structure through which European-led 
CJTFs are to be planned for and organized; the Berlin accord provides for the "elaboration 
of appropriate multinational European command arrangements within NATO [emphasis 
added] ... able to prepare, support, command and conduct the WEU-led operations. "171 The 
primacy of the integrated military structure, even for WEU-led operations, means that 
"Washington can rest assured that it will maintain an effective veto over European use of 
NATO assets for missions of which it does not approve."172 Furthermore, there will be no 
"blank check" guarantees for the automatic provision of NATO assets and forces to the 
WEU; rather, "the NAC will approve the release of NATO assets and capabilities for WEU 
169J3erlin Communique, para. 7. 
170Ibid. 
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operations,"173 providing all NATO members with the opportunity to veto the provision of 
Allied support for a WEU operation. 
b. Concessions to the Minority View 
From the minority viewpoint, the Berlin agreements give the ESDI teeth by 
permitting "the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under 
the political control and strategic direction of the WEU."174 In spite of the subordination of 
WEU-led operations to the integrated military structure, the Berlin arrangements permit "all 
European Allies to play a larger role in NATO's military and command structures" and ensure 
that "such European command arrangements should be identifiable and the arrangements 
should be sufficiently well articulated to permit the rapid constitution"175 of a WEU-led CJTF. 
While the provision ofNATO assets to the WEU is subject to the judgement of the NAC, the 
NATO military authorities are effectively shut out of the approval and monitoring process, 
being limited to giving "advice" on such matters. The Berlin decisions also assuage minority 
concerns about the level of political oversight for non-Article 5 missions by establishing a new 
forum, the Policy Coordination Group (PCG), which is intended to "meet the need, especially 
in NATO's new missions, for closer coordination of political and military viewpoints."176 





C. UNRESOLVED ISSUES: "RENOVATING" NATO'S MILITARY 
STRUCTURE 
As critical is it has been towards progress in CJTF, in some respects, the June 1996 
Berlin Ministerial "kicked the can down the road" on a number of issues. The most critical 
of these is the nature of the "renovated" integrated military structure. The term "renovation" 
satisfied both sides politically. For the majority, it means that the integrated military structure 
will be modified rather than superseded, while the minority sees it as guaranteeing that 
fundamental changes will occur in the way that the Alliance does business. Unfortunately, at 
Berlin, the NAC was-- deliberately-- not explicit about what "renovation" will entail. NATO 
Secretary General Javier Solana believes that a renovated or "new" military structure must 
be: 
• equally able to defend NATO interests out of area, as well as protect territory 
within it, including after NATO enlarges 
• capable of including all existing members and new members 
• reflective of a growing and visible European responsibility in defense and 
security .177 
The third of these goals will be the most difficult to implement. While the U.S. is 
generally supportive ofESDI, American leaders, particularly in the military, "want a structure 
that recognizes the U.S. commitment and contribution to European security."178 Put more 
177Solana, IISS speech. 
178Walter Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Transcript of Press Briefing at the 
Informal Defense Ministers Meeting in Bergen, September 25, 1996, p. 1. 
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bluntly, the U.S. will resist any revision that significantly diminishes its leading role in Allied 
military affairs, particularly where the oversight ofU.S. assets is concerned. As the format for 
CJTF has coalesced, several issues relating to the renovation of the integrated military 
structure have emerged as potential sticking points. 
1. The Long Term Study 
Shortly after the Brussels meeting in January 1994, the NATO Chiefs of Defense 
Staffs (CHODS) determined that fundamental reorganization and streamlining were needed 
within the integrated military structure, both to prepare it for potential new roles and to make 
it more militarily and fiscally efficient. To that end, the CHODS commissioned the NMC to 
undertake a Long-Term Study (LTS) on the adaptation ofNATO structures. The LTS has 
been driven by "across-the-board consensus that the existing command structure is top-heavy, 
too expensive and incapable of accommodating a possible NATO enlargement."179 As it 
stands, the current integrated military structure has 65 headquarters, including the two Major 
NATO Commands (MNC), 8 Major Subordinate Commands (MSC), 23 Principal 
Subordinate Commands (PSC) and 32 sub-PSCs. Many of these headquarters, particularly 
sub-PSCs, are the result of a "pork barrel" mentality, whereby each NATO member has 
attempted to get as many NATO headquarters as possible within its borders. 
While the details of the L TS remain classified, current plans apparently envision a 
sweeping rationalization of this structure, including the reduction in power of many of the 
17~laauw, para. xxxviii. 
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smaller, more nationally oriented headquarters. The MNCs will likely be renamed Strategic 
Commanders (SC), reflecting their role in military planning and resources oversight. Likewise, 
MSCs will be redesignated as Regional Commanders (RC), in recognition of their role in 
directing military operations within preset geographic areas of responsibility. 180 The exact 
number ofRCs under each SC has not yet been determined, but it will most likely be fewer 
than the current eight. Each RC will retain its functional component commanders, e.g., 
AFSOUTH will still have LANDSOUTH, AIR.SOUTH, NA VSOUTH, etc., as well as smaller 
joint subordinate commands that will be responsible for areas of special interest, such as the 
Baltic Approaches, the Iberian Atlantic area, and Asia Minor. 
2. Location of CJTF Nuclei 
While the L TS is in many respects "an appearance game, some changes have 
substance."181 Technically separate from CJTF issues, the results of the still-unfinished LTS 
will nonetheless have a significant impact upon the final format for CJTFs, particularly with 
regard to the location ofCJTF "nucleus" staffs. Shortly after the NATO Foreign Ministers 
met in Berlin in June 1996, the NATO Defense Ministers met as the NAC for the first time 
in almost 30 years. At that session, the Defense Ministers directed that "the NAC in 
permanent session, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities to take forward the 
implementation of the CJTF concept ... including in particular the location, size, number and 
180These basic elements of the LTS were described by Mr. Slocombe at the Bergen press briefing (p. 
2 of the transcript). 
181Interview, Washington D.C., 27 August 1996. 
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structure of CJTF headquarters elements and their operating procedures."182 Immediately 
following the CJTF initiative's adoption at Brussels in January 1994, Allied military planners 
began to sketch out a rough design for the shape of a CJTF. The resulting tri-MNC study on 
CJ1F headquarters concepts, which has been the starting point for CJTF format discussions 
ever since, is based upon the establishment of permanent "nuclei" which would "represent the 
minimum necessary frameworks around which a complete headquarters could quickly be 
constructed once a decision had been taken to form and employ a CJTF."183 In peacetime, the 
nuclei would reside within specific "core headquarters," and would be responsible for 
"informing their 'core' headquarters commander on CJTF matters, assist in generic planning, 
coordinate training of the entire nucleus staff and convey updated information on personnel 
and resources"184 to higher CJTF political-military planning bodies. When activated, each 
nucleus would form a framework staff that could be augmented by "modules" from the core 
or other NATO, WEU and national staffs. 
While the Allies are in agreement over these basic principles, the issues of how many 
nuclei to stand up and to which "cores" they should belong has been contentious. The French, 
in particular, have been insistent that national headquarters of WEU members be granted 
nuclei in addition to NATO headquarters so that WEU has the option of"requesting the use 
182Final Communique Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session in 
Brussels 13th June 1996, para. 5. 
183Cragg, p. 8. 
184Blaauw, para. lxv. 
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of a CJTF headquarters [from NATO] ... or, in some circumstances, WEU operations could 
also be conducted with ... a nucleus from headquarters answerable to the WEU. "185 The 
basis for the French argument is that since the WEU would only undertake modest missions 
based upon the relatively circumscribed Petersburg Tasks, it makes sense to have "little 
nuclei" to complement the "big nuclei" at various NATO headquarters that would handle 
IFOR-sized missions. Some observers speculate, perhaps uncharitably, that hidden behind this 
official rationale is a French desire to have a nucleus or two at headquarters dominated by 
Frenchmen, obviating the need for France to rejoin the integrated military structure in order 
to participate fully in CJTF staff planning and execution. The U.S. opposes the French 
proposal on grounds of inefficiency and unnecessary duplication; the U.S.-proposed modular 
concept would permit the WEU to "flesh out" a NATO-provided nucleus with WEU staff 
elements, rather than having the WEU maintain independent nuclei of its own. Placing nuclei 
outside of the Alliance, in the U.S. view, would complicate CJTF planning and allow the 
French to circumvent and undermine the authority ofthe integrated military structure. 
Uncertainty also exists over the proper location for the first set of CJTF nuclei. Rather 
than attempting to plant nuclei at every MSC simultaneously, there is a general consensus that 
one or two nuclei should be formed on a trial basis. In ACLANT, the choice is simple: a sea-
based nucleus could be formed around the Striking Fleet, Atlantic (STRIKEFLTLANT), 
which, in its other "hat" as the U.S. Second Fleet, has already served as a JTF off ofHaiti. 
185Cragg, p. 8. 
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The choices in ACE are harder. Of the ACE MSCs, the Central and Southern regions have 
the most extensively supported headquarters and the widest ranges of forces available; of the 
two, AFCENT is the largest, while AFSOUTH has become the busiest and most experienced. 
Some planners feel that AFSOUTH' s experience in directing JOINT ENDEA YOUR and its 
predecessors make it the logical choice to shepherd the nucleus concept to maturity. On the 
other hand, AFSOUTH' s exposure to the unique conditions in Bosnia may have prejudiced 
the staff to the degree that they might not be the best choice to develop a concept that must 
meet a wide range of contingencies, some bearing little or no relation to events in Bosnia. In 
this regard, AFCENT may be more of a "sterile petri dish in which to implement a prototype 
CJTF."186 The fact that CINCCENT is European while CINCSOUTH is American may make 
CINCCENT a more inviting choice, particularly for the French. 
3. "Europeanizing" the Integrated Military Structure 
At Berlin, the NAC agreed to pursue the "elaboration of appropriate multinational 
European command arrangements within NAT0."187 How this will be accomplished remains 
to be determined. The crux of the matter is that for the U.S., the "Europeanization" of the 
integrated military structure simply means making provisions for European-led operations in 
extraordinary situations, while the Europeans, particularly France, believe that "the 
'Europeanization' of the Alliance has to be effective not only when an operation is actually 
mounted, but also in time of peace . . . it must be able to take effect not only within the 
186Interview, Washington D.C., 28 August 1996. 
187Berlin Communique, para. 7. 
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framework of the actual military operation but also in the planning and preparatory stages, 
and in the politico-military decision process. "188 Three alternative plans have been suggested 
to facilitate this "peacetime Europeanization": 
• a WEU general officer would work in tandem with SACEUR (probably 
coordinating through the Deputy SACEUR (DSACEUR)) on CJTF matters; this 
WEU officer would command a WEU-led operation 
• the Deputy :MNCs (DSACLANT and DSACEUR) would be made permanent 
European billets; these officers would be "dual hatted" with the WEU for WEU 
CJTF planning and operations 
• a European would be placed in command of the "core" MSC for the first CJTF 
nucleus; this officer would be "dual hatted," serving also as the WEU CJTF 
commander. 189 
Of these options, the second is the preferred solution for the Europeans; the U.S. has serious 
reservations about all three. As far as U.S. planners are concerned, the first option is the least 
desirable, as it could result in precisely the duplication of structures that CJTF is intended to 
avoid. 
The second option is colloquially known as the "deputies proposal" and was proposed 
jointly by the British and the French at the beginning of 1996. In French terms, the Deputy 
MNCs, particularly DSACEUR, would probably be less of a deputy and more of a "petit 
SACEUR," having an independent role in coordinating European CJTF planning and 
18~llon, p. 16. 
189Command alternatives adapted from IISS, "NATO, CJTFs and ITOR," p. 1. 
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l 
execution efforts. 190 In advancing this proposal, the Europeans point to the Berlin agreement, 
which expressly provided for "double-hatting appropriate personnel within the NATO 
command structure to perform these functions." 191 U.S. policymakers, especially on the 
military side, have been highly critical of the deputies proposal, being concerned that "the 
principle of unity of command would be jeopardized by having a DSACEUR report both to 
the NAC and the WEU council."192 More to the point, SACEUR is concerned about the 
erosion of his authority and the command structure disarray that could occur if his supposed 
deputy possessed independent powers to plan for and organize operations which SACEUR 
would have to provide forces for. 
At first glance, the third option seems like the ideal compromise. A "dual-hatted" 
European at the MSC level would pose no threat to SACEUR' s authority, while at the same 
time retaining enough stature to satisfy the Europeans. The problem with this option stems 
from the fact that the U.S. is insistent upon retaining American commanders in certain MSC 
billets for national reasons. The most obvious such case is CINCSOUTH. The U.S. believes, 
in the words of Secretary of Defense William Perry, that "it is essential that NATO's 
AFSOUTH, which includes the U.S. Sixth Fleet and other forces in the Mediterranean, remain 
under U.S. command ... we have a preponder!ifl.t military force in the AFSOUTH area, and 
190Interview, Washington D.C., 28 August 1996. 
191Berlin Communique, para. 7. 
192IISS, "NATO, CJTFs and IFOR," p. I. 
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it really makes supreme sense for an American commander to be in charge. "193 Practically, the 
U.S. uses CINCSOUTH in his American "hat" to monitor potential threats to U.S. national 
strategic interests in the Mediterranean and to support U.S. efforts in the Middle East. Placing 
AFSOUTH under the authority of a senior multinational European commander might disrupt 
these American arrangements considerably. Moreover, only the U.S. has the economic, 
political, and military clout and reputation as an "honest broker" to deal effectively with the 
Greeks and the Turks. 
The French have made matters all the more complex by insisting that CINCSOUTH 
become a European position. Faced with this challenge, the U.S. has reluctantly agreed to 
support the deputies proposal, with the tacit understanding that, in return, the French will 
desist from their push for a European CINCSOUTH. At Bergen in September 1996, both 
Secretary of Defense William Perry and his Under Secretary for Policy, Walter Slocombe, 
acknowledged that "within the European command, very much within the European structure, 
there will be an additional role for the DSACEUR, who is and will continue to be a European 
officer."194 To the extreme consternation of American leaders, the French have since renewed 
their calls for a European CINCSOUTH in addition to the deputies proposal. Matters are 
currently at an impasse. As of this writing, it lqoks as if the disagreement over this issue will 
193Secretary of Defense William Peny, Transcript of the Press Conference held at the Informal 
Defense Minister's Meeting in Bergen, 26 September 1996, pp. 3-4. 
194Slocombe, p. 2. 
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delay approval of the LTS, which might otherwise have been approved at the December 1996 
NAC Ministerial in Brussels, until the next NATO summit in June 1997.195 
For the French, it is a matter of national pride as well as the domestic political need 
to assuage the Gaullists, who want their President to take a harder line towards NATO and 
the U.S .. On France's part, there are "no hard feelings ... we understand that the U.S. has 
its reasons to be particularly concerned about the Sixth Fleet, but we would have a political 
problem if we gave in now."196 French resistance notwithstanding, the Americans look likely 
to win this argument, as most of the European Allies believe that "the French have overplayed 
their hand ... [other Europeans] won't say so publicly, but they're sitting on the fence, and 
if the United States insists on keeping the southern region, they will go along with 
Washington. "197 
4. Political-Military Coordination 
To accommodate French requests for closer political supervision ofCJTF operations, 
the NAC agreed in June 1996 at Berlin to create a Policy Co-ordination Group (PCG). While 
the terms of reference for this body have not yet been released, in general terms, the PCG will 
be a NAC subsidiary "composed of Allied political and military representatives to facilitate 
195Craig R. Whitney, "French Demand That U.S. Pass Control to European Commander Delays 
NATO Restructuring," The New York Times (December 3, 1996), p. A6. 
196Unnamed source in the French defense Ministry, quoted in Craig R. Whitney, "Paris Blames U.S. 
Position for Setback Over NATO," The New York Times (October 13, 1996), p. A4. 
197Unnamed European official, quoted in Whitney, "Paris Blames U.S ..... " 
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coordination of the political goals of a mission and its military implementation."198 
Subsequently, the NAC, meeting at the level of defense ministers, initiated the development 
of two additional CJTF planning and oversight bodies: the Capabilities Co-ordination Cell 
(CCC) and the Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS). The CCC is to "provide staff support 
to the Military Committee on contingency related matters and assist the Military Committee 
in providing planning guidance to the Major NATO commanders."199 Similarly, the CJPS, 
operating at the :MNC level, would "perform centralized CJTF headquarters planning 
functions and co-ordination with all relevant headquarters, as well as with forces that might 
serve under a CJTF headquarters, and as appropriate with the WEU Planning Cell. "200 While 
the CCC and the CJPS are more military than political in nature, their intent is to permit 
NATO Military Authorities to provide better CJTF planning coordination and advice to the 
NAC, both in peacetime and during an operation. 
Considerable disagreement exists over which of these bodies will be primarily 
responsible for providing the political-military link to the WEU, both for planning and 
operational purposes. As each ofthese new organs corresponds to an existing level of the 
NATO structure, the real question is: at which level-- the NAC, the NMC, or the :MNCs --
will NATO coordinate with the WEU on CJTF: matters. The U.S. feels that the CJPS, as the 
most military of the three new bodies, would be the most efficient mechanism for coordinating 
198Sloan, NATO Adapts ... , p. 3. 
199J)efense Ministers Communique, para. 6. 
200Ibid. 
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military planning with the WEU. The fact that the CJPS would operate under MNC -- hence, 
American-- cognizance also makes it attractive to the U.S .. Predictably, the French have 
rejected this notion: "it will never be acceptable to the French that a chain of command would 
go from the WEU council to SACEUR thence back to the CJTF commander ... for France, 
it must be a direct line."201 The French would prefer that the CCC be the primary NATO-
WED coordinating body, which would push the level of contact up to the Military 
Committee. Because the Military Committee is an organ in which they now participate fully, 
the French want to strengthen the role of that body in Allied military planning, declaring that 
"the Military Committee needs to serve as a General Staff for the whole of our Alliance, with 
a mandate to prepare the scenarios for the detailed military planning undertaken by the 
various commands. "202 Such an increase in the scope of Military Committee responsibility 
could only come at the expense of the MNCs, an outcome that will probably be bitterly 
contested by the U.S .. 
5. French Participation in the Integrated Military Structure 
Following the changes to France's NATO policy in December 1995, the French have 
maintained that they "are not excluding accepting positions within the Integrated military 
structure if the Integrated military structure is modified to permit a greater European role."203 
Regrettably, no one within France or the rest of NATO seems to know what degree of 
201Nawnann, NDU remarks. 
2021£.llon, p. 15. 
203Betermier, NPS remarks. 
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"renovation" will be necessary in order to accomplish this. Much of the impetus for CJTF, the 
L TS and other structural modifications stems from the need to "make it possible for the 
French to sell [NATO] to their public ... nothing is as hard for French politicians than trying 
to revise a decision taken by de Gaulle earlier ... it must be a sound sales presentation, i.e., 
where NATO did something new based on a French initiative."204 Unfortunately, the French 
seem to have run out of new initiatives. Upon assuming his duties as Chairman of the Military 
Committee, Gen. Klaus Naumann, German Army, "asked all CHODS about ESDI and how 
to make it more visible ... they all fell silent ... then I addressed the French -- no ideas here 
either."205 The problem is made worse by ignorance; even French officials will admit to "how 
little key French decision makers know about this [integrated military] structure in NAT0."206 
A French return to the integrated military structure would be a desirable outcome for the U.S. 
-- and the Alliance as a whole-- in many respects. By ending the practice of NATO "ala 
carte," all NATO members would be on an equal footing, eliminating the need for inefficient 
special arrangements for France as a participant in CJTF planning. On the other hand, the 
U.S. would have to be prepared to accept a greater French role in NATO military decision 
making. The end result will likely be another compromise; in the post-Cold War NATO, no 
one, not even France or the U.S., can afford to insist on having his cake and eating it too. 
204Nawnann, NDU remarks. 
205Ibid. 
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V. THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: "THE TEST CASE FROM HELL" 
Although structural disagreements are prolonging the formalization of the CJTF 
concept, NATO operations in and around the former Yugoslavia offer a useful model with 
which to judge the viability of some of the CJTF's central tenets. For three years, NATO, 
working in conjunction with the WEU and the UN, enforced economic sanctions and no-fly 
zones in the former Yugoslavia. At the January 1994 Brussels Summit, the Alliance stepped 
closer to full involvement by "reaffirming [NATO's] determination to contribute to the 
implementation of a viable settlement reached in good faith."207 Unfortunately, that 
determination would be tested before the military parameters of the CJTF initiative and the 
political parameters of Allied peacekeeping doctrine could be settled. As of this writing, 
almost twelve months into JOINT ENDEAVOUR, NATO still has no binding guidance for 
the organization of a CJTF or the conduct of peacekeeping operations. As a result, the 
Alliance, "which for years had enjoyed the luxury of long-range detailed planning for potential 
allied military operations [has been] reduced to 'making it up as it [goes] along' on the road 
to the first actual use of force in Alliance history."208 For this reason, Col. Drew characterized 
events in the former Yugoslavia as "the test case from hel1"209; this sobriquet was made 
207Brussels Declaration, para. 24. 
20S0rew, The Evolution ofNATO ... p. 10. 
209Jbid, p. 7. 
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especially apt and tragic when Bosnia numbered Col. Drew among its victims. This chapter 
shows how in fact, if not in name, the Allied responses to this vexing test case constitute a 
"prototype" CJTF. 
A. A PIECEMEAL PROTOTYPE: COMMAND AND OPERATIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 1992-1995 
In describing the shape of the NATO Combined Joint Task Force initiative as it slowly 
evolved in Brussels, Lt. Col. Charles L. Barry, USA, astutely noted in 1994 that "the final 
CJTF concept may, in fact, reflect much of what is being learned daily by AFSOUTH in 
DENY FLIGHT and SHARP GUARD."210 These operations, NATO's first formal out of 
area involvement, proved quite effective, despite the unwieldy diplomatic arrangements used 
to coordinate the use of force in the region. Although NATO efforts in the former 
Yugoslavia were conducted piecemeal, with largely independent air and maritime components 
under the aegis of CINCSOUTH, in toto, they formed an unofficial -- and very loosely 
interpreted-- CJTF. CINCSOUTH, under SACEUR's cognizance, coordinated two non-
Article 5 tasks in 1992-95 in support ofUnited Nations resolutions: a maritime embargo in 
the Adriatic, SHARP GUARD, and multi-mission air operations over Bosnia, DENY 
FLIGHT. A third operation, PROVIDE PROMISE, which supported humanitarian relief 
efforts, was not technically a NATO effort, but was functionally incorporated into 
CINCSOUTH' s command structure. Each of these three operations was conducted by a 
multinational force composed of NATO contingents plus elements drawn from national or 
210Sany, "NATO's Bold New Concept ... ," p. 54. 
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WEU fonnations. Allied participation was the outgrowth of the NAC' s July and September 
1992 decisions to make NATO forces-- maritime and air, respectively-- available to support 
UN missions in the former Yugoslavia, a policy shift prompted by the deteriorating 
situation. 211 From the outset, however, NATO was not content to act simply as the UN's 
pack mule, and actively pursued its own operational vision. The late Adm. Mike Boorda, 
USN, former CINCSOUTH, depicted the relationship between the two as one in which: 
NATO has been a partner supporting the United Nations rather than 
operating directly under its flag. Furthermore, this relationship has been an 
interactive one wherein the United Nations established the operational 
requirement for the mission and NATO provided the capability to meet that 
requirement. It is in this relationship that we have seen a new form of support 
and a possible pattern of future NATO/UN cooperation and, as well, a test of 
the Alliance's new strategy. 212 
1. Operation DENY FLIGHT 
Operation DENY FLIGHT began as a rather modest air monitoring operation, but 
quickly matured into a full air campaign with several distinct missions. Acceding to a UN 
request to help monitor the then-toothless ban on military flights over Bosnia, the NAC 
initiated Operation SKY MONITOR in October 1992 using collective Alliance assets: the 
multinational NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF). In April 1993, after 
NAEWF had fruitlessly reported over 500 violations of the no-fly zone,213 the UN authorized 
211See AFSOUTH Fact Sheet: Selection of Events Significant to AFSOUTH (Naples: AFSOUTH 
Public Information Office, March 1994), p. 2. 
212Adm. Mike Boorda, USN, "Loyal Partner-- NATO's Forces in Support of the United Nations," 
NATO's Sixteen Nations (January 1994), p. 8. 
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NATO to actively enforce the ban. The NAC quickly agreed to provide combat forces to 
augment the monitoring effort, and the operation's name was changed to DENY FLIGHT to 
reflect its revised mission. Following another request from the UN Security Council, the 
NATO Foreign Ministers, meeting in council in June 1993, agreed to further expand DENY 
FLIGHT to include Close Air Support (CAS) for the oft-beleaguered UN Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) in Bosnia. Following the June 1993 decisions, DENY FLIGHT was tasked: 
• To conduct aerial monitoring and enforce compliance with the "No-Fly Zone" over 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
• To provide close air support for UN ground troops at the request of, and 
controlled by, UN forces. 
• To conduct, after request by and in coordination with the UN, air strikes against 
designated targets threatening the security of the UN-declared "safe areas."214 
Each of these three missions required a separate cooperative arrangement with the 
UN, none of which was particularly efficient or well regarded by NATO forces and 
commanders. Enforcing the No-Fly Zone was the most straightforward, as criteria for 
violations were well-defined. Nonetheless, a complex set of rules of engagement requiring 
unambiguous identification of violators and multiple warnings constrained NATO aircrews; 
over DENY FLIGHT's duration, only one aerial violation was met with force. 215 For use of 
214Condensed from AFSOUTH Fact Sheet: Operation DENY FLIGHT (Naples: AFSOUTH Public 
Information Office, 21 December 1995), p. 1. 
215In February 1994, four NATO fighters shot down four of six hostile aircraft conducting ground 
attacks in Bosnia. 
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force authorization, the CAS and air strike missions each employed a variation on a basic 
theme: the notorious "dual key." Until mid-1995, this system was, in effect, a triple-key, as 
approval was needed from both the civilian envoy from the UN Secretary-General and the 
UNPROFOR Commander before NATO forces, subject to CINCSOUTH permission, could 
carry out CAS or air strikes.216 After a somewhat acrimonious debate between NATO and 
UN officials, a true dual-key system was initiated in July 1995, with the UN civilians removed 
from the scheme. Although the UN officially initiated all requests for air strikes, NATO often 
had to lobby that recalcitrant body to take action. For instance, in April 1994, the NAC 
forced the UN's hand by declaring its intent to authorize force to protect NATO-declared 
"military exclusion zones" superimposed over UN Safe Areas. 217 
Similarly, the August 1995 DELIBERATE FORCE bombing campaign, an offshoot 
ofDENY FLIGHT, originated with CINCSOUTH, and was heartily endorsed by SACEUR 
and the NAC. Meeting at London in July 1995 to discuss issues pertaining to the former 
Yugoslavia, the NATO Foreign Ministers drew a "line in the sand," declaring that "an attack 
on [UN Safe Area] Gorazde will be met by substantial and decisive airpower."218 Later that 
month, the NAC specified that any further Bosnian Serb offensive action against safe areas 
would be met with force. All of these decisions were taken independently of the UN and 
216Tim Ripley, "Bosnia Mission Stretches Airborne Eyes and Ears," International Defense Review 
(January 1, 1994), p. 56. 
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irrespective ofUN policies on the use of force. NATO was tired of being a spectator. On 28 
August 1995, a Bosnian Serb mortar barrage caught a Sarajevo marketplace, killing 38 
citizens and wounding 85. Adm. Smith, who, as CINCSOUTH, possessed predelegated 
authority from the NAC to launch retaliatory airstrikes, immediately pressed the UN 
authorities for concurrence on a bombing campaign intended both to punish the Serbs and to 
prevent further attacks. The resulting air strikes, directed against 48 target complexes, were 
conducted on eleven days during the period 29 August- 14 September 1995. The campaign 
was broken by a 50 hour pause initiated by the UN, which felt that the Serbs had "gotten the 
message" after the first few days. After a heated exchange between Brussels and New York, 
the Alliance emerged very much in the driver's seat; from that point on in Bosnia, "the United 
Nations would follow NATO's lead in dictating new strictures to the Serbs."219 
The forces that comprised DENY FLIGHT originated from a variety of sources. 
Most were drawn from NATO-dedicated forces throughout Europe, augmented by additional 
national forces, both land- and carrier-based. Both the French and the Spanish chose to 
participate fully in this operation, and quietly placed their aircraft under NATO's operational 
control, establishing national liaisons at the Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF) 
Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) _at Vicenza. This deliberately ill-publicized 
arrangement was a quiet reversal of long-standing French and Spanish policy, the first 
concrete indication of a thaw in their relations with the NATO military structure. Command 
21~ck Atkinson, "How the Western Alliance Paused and Came of Age," The Washington Post 
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and control arrangements were relatively straightforward, "drawn directly from the 
[integrated military structure], with modifications as required to permit interface with the 
UN."220 These modifications were few: NATO and the UN exchanged representatives 
between 5 ATAF and UN headquarters in Zagreb and Sarajevo.221 In spite of the difficulties 
"associated with being a peace-enforcing NATO operation working in support of a 
peacekeeping UN operation,"222 DENY FLIGHT convincingly demonstrated the Alliance's 
ability to operate in a non-Article 5 environment, while the DELIBERATE FORCE campaign 
"validated force as an effective handmaiden to diplomacy ... and infused NATO with a new 
sense of strength and vibrancy. "223 
2. Operation SHARP GUARD 
Like DENY FLIGHT, Operation SHARP GUARD began as a monitoring mission. 
This time, NATO was responding to two stimuli: a request from the UN to help monitor 
compliance with UN sanctions imposed on the former Yugoslav republics, and a competing 
effort initiated a month earlier by the WEU. While the Alliance would likely have responded 
to the UN request in any case, "WED's decision, at French bidding, to implement [a] naval 
embargo off the Montenegrin coast in June 1992 [while] militarily superfluous, had the effect 
22
'Drew, The Evolution ofNATO ... , p. 14. 
221AFSOUTH Fact Sheet: Operation DENY FLIGHT, p. 1. 
222Joris Janssen Lok, "DENY FLIGHT Turns to Affirmative Action," Jane's Defense Weekly 
(September 9, 1995), p. 55. 
223Rick Atkinson, "With Deliberate Force in Bosnia," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition (Nov. 27 -Dec. 3, 1995), p. 6. 
91 
of spurring NATO to parallel action."224 By July 1992, both operations were running in 
tandem, with MARITIME MONITOR (NATO) and SHARP VIGILANCE (WEU) 
alternating weekly between the Montenegrin coast and the Straits of Otranto. In November 
1992, the mandate of both operations was expanded to include embargo enforcement, and 
they were renamed MARITIME GUARD and SHARP FENCE, respectively. MARITIME 
GUARD was directed by COMNAVSOUTH, CINCSOUTH's naval component commander, 
using the multinational NATO Standing Naval Forces, Atlantic and Mediterranean 
(STANA VFORLANT and STANA VFORMED), and NATO-dedicated maritime patrol 
aircraft. SHARP FENCE, on the other hand, was conducted by the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Italian Navy (CINCNA V), acting as an agent of the WEU Council, using French, Italian 
and Spanish ships hastily assembled into a WEU Contingency Maritime Force 
(WEUCONMARFOR). 225 
These two headquarters were not co-located, making high-level coordination difficult. 
Although effective informal agreements were made between the forces at sea, the overall 
situation represented "exactly the sort of competition and wasteful duplication of effort about 
which the U.S. had always been concemed"226 regarding NATO-WEU relations. Finally, in 
conjunction with strengthened UN sanctions, the WEU and NATO met in joint Council in 
224Foster, p. 22. 
225See Adm. Guido Venturoni, ITN, "The Italian Navy in Allied Adriatic Operations," NATO's 
Sixteen Nations (January 1994), p. 39. 
226Drew, The Evolution ofNATO ... , p. 13. 
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June 1993 and approved a combined operation: SHARP GUARD. The new arrangement, 
"with unity of military command maintained through the NATO chain, but responding to joint 
political decisions of the NATO and WEU Councils, was somewhat artificial,"227 but not 
unmanageable. The revised command structure, called Combined Task Force 440 (CTF 440), 
was headed by COMNA VSOUTH, responsible to CINCSOUTH. An Italian Rear Admiral, 
representing the WEU, served as deputy task force commander. CTF 440 was staffed by the 
operations, logistics and intelligence elements of the NA VSOUTH staff, augmented by an 
add-on WEU "cell" headed by a French Rear Admiral. 
In practice, the operation was "nearly seamless ... [WEU and NATO forces] used 
standard NATO procedures and communications."228 CTF 440's task was doubtless made 
easier by the fact that SHARP GUARD requires no interface with the UN. The relevant UN 
Security Council resolutions establishing the embargo contained a mandate for their 
enforcement, and all necessary contro~ including decisions on the use of force, was delegated 
to NATO and the WEU. The operation actually enforced a twin embargo: one intended to 
prevent all arms from entering any part of former Yugoslavia, and the other designed to 
prevent all unauthorized shipping from entering the territorial waters of Serbia and 
227Drew, The Evolution of NATO ... , pp. 13-14. 
228Tirn Ripley, "Isolating Yugoslavia," International Defense Review (October 1994), p. 75. 
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Montenegro.229 Each embargo had an associated operating area: one in the Straits ofOtranto 
and the other off of the Montenegrin coast, respectively. 
The three operational commanders, COMST ANA VFORLANT, 
COMST ANA VFORMED and COMWEUCONMARFOR, rotated on a monthly basis 
between the two operating areas, with the third cycle being an off-period. To accommodate 
the varying ship maintenance and rotational requirements, the three squadrons were combined 
into a single functional pool of ships; thus, it was not uncommon to have one of the NATO 
Commanders exercising tactical command of a WEU ship, and vice versa. The task groups 
were supported by national oilers, who provided service to WEU, NATO and national assets 
alike. Additionally, the U.S. Sixth Fleet provided SHARP GUARD with a cruiser to 
deconflict CTF 440 and DENY FLIGHT air operations; this ship was placed under the 
operational control of the Montenegro task group commander, regardless of whether that 
individual was a NATO or a WEU officer. Supporting maritime patrol aircraft from eight 
nations, representing both NATO and the WEU, operated together as Combined Task Force 
431, also subordinate to COMNA VSOUTH. 230 While politically unwieldy, CTF 440 proved 
the feasibility of NATO-WED operational cooperation, though the necessity for WEU 
involvement was doubtful in this case as the U.S. was a full participant in the operation. 
229See AFSOUTH Fact Sheet: Operation SHARP GUARD (Naples: AFSOUTH Public Information 
Office, October 2, 1996), p. 1. 
230Ibid, p. 4. 
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3. Operation PROVIDE PROMISE 
Operation PROVIDE PROMISE was somewhat of an anomaly. Ostensibly a catch-all 
Joint Task Force for U.S. national support of UN humanitarian efforts, it encompassed a 
hospital in Croatia plus air-delivered food and medical shipments to Bosnia, and was run by 
the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNA VEUR). In February of 
1993, the operation was transferred to CINCSOUTH- CINCUSNA VEUR' s NATO "hat" --
as a multi-national effort to air-deliver foodstuffs to Sarajevo and isolated Bosnian towns. 231 
The precise character of the operation was ambiguous; officially, the U.S., U.K., French, 
German and Spanish cargo planes were not under NATO's operational control. Regardless 
of their exact status, however, PROVIDE PROMISE flights flew from NATO bases and were 
tactically controlled by the 5 ATAF CAOC, which ensured that they were integrated into the 
overall air effort. 
B. A MATURING PROTOTYPE: IFOR 1995-1996 
On 1 December 1995, the NAC authorized SACEUR to commence Operation JOINT 
ENDEA YOUR, NATO's military support for the Peace Agreement signed in Dayton on 21 
November 1995. As NATO's first non-Article 5 ground operation, IFOR is "tangible proof 
that, in addition to carrying out the core functions of defense of the Alliance, its military 
forces have the flexibility to be used outside the NATO area."232 A truly joint-service 
organization, with coordinated ground, maritime and air elements, the JOINT ENDEA YOUR 
231AFSOUTH Fact Sheet: Selection of Events ... , p. 3. 
232IFOR Fact Sheet (Naples: AFSOUTH Public Information Office, October 25, 1996), p. 8. 
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Implementation Force (IFOR) supersedes previous NATO, WEU and UN operations in, 
around and over Bosnia. Unlike the quasi-independent activities that preceded it, JOINT 
ENDEA YOUR meets the technical definition for a CJTF: a multinational, multiple service 
force under unified command with a specific operational mandate. While lacking CJTF' s still-
developing political control and military planning structures, IFOR "nonetheless bears many 
of its characteristics and the lessons to be learned from the management of such a complex 
operation will be invaluable for the development of the concept. "233 
1. IFOR's Command Structure 
JOINT ENDEAVOUR is being conducted under the auspices of the Dayton Accords 
and complementary UN Security Council Resolutions which authorize NATO to take over 
the enforcement of the settlement's military provisions. The operation itself, however, has no 
direct connection to the UN; instead, IFOR gets its political guidance from the NAC. 
SACEUR, as the closest MNC and the principal force provider, has overall military 
responsibility for JOINT ENDEA YOUR. SACEUR has chosen to delegate command of 
IFOR to CINCSOUTH as a separate "hat": COMIFOR. 234 Deputy COMIFOR is not a "dual 
hat" ofDeputy CINCSOUTH, who is traditionally an Italian General. Rather, SACEUR has 
delegated the IFOR Deputy billet to France,_in recognition of France's past experience in 
Bosnia as well as the size of the French troop contribution. Likewise, the selection of 
233Cragg, p. 8. 
234Information for the following paragraphs on IFOR command arrangements was taken from the 
IFOR Fact Sheet. 
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COMIFOR's service component commanders has not followed strict conformity with existing 
AFSOUTH structures. For the ground component, COl\1LANDSOUTH, another Italian 
general, was passed over in favor of the Commander, ACE Rapid Reaction Corps 
(COMARRC), a British General who commands NATO's only readily deployable major 
ground headquarters. This choice, while perhaps frustrating to the Italians, reflects the large 
British troop contribution as well as the mobility and unique training of the ARRC staff as 
opposed to the more static Article-S oriented LAND SOUTH. 
COMAIRSOU1H, an American, was chosen to command the IFOR air component. 
This was a logical choice, as the AIRSOUTH staff and its subordinate elements had been 
running DENY FLIGHT for the past three years; also, the U.S. has supplied almost 2/3 of the 
air assets for IFOR support. Most unusually, command of the IFOR maritime component has 
been split between two commanders. COMNA VSOUTH, an Italian Admiral,· has maintained 
control of SHARP GUARD as a quasi-independent operation, as well as providing 
minesweeping and escort support to troop convoys in the Adriatic. The Commander, Striking 
Forces Southern Europe (COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH), the NATO "hat" for the commander 
of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, has been given authority for all IFOR carrier battle group (CVBG) 
and amphibious ready group (ARG) support. This is a logical choice, given the fact that the 
U.S. possesses the preponderance of these assets in the Mediterranean and has been 
traditionally uncomfortable with the idea of placing these forces under foreign commanders. 
As with any NATO headquarters, COMIFOR HQ has a multinational staff with a chief of 
staff and assistants for logistics, operations, intelligence, etc .. Many of the flag and general 
97 
officers filling these billets have come from Alliance headquarters other than AFSOUTH, both 
for political reasons and to avoid stripping AFSOUTH of all of its senior leaders. Most of the 
lower-level IFOR HQ staff members have been furnished by AFSOUTH, augmented as 
necessary by personnel from other NATO staffs. 
2. IFOR Ground 
On 2 December 1995, IFOR "Enabling Forces" began to move into positions in 
Bosnia, Croatia and Hungary to "facilitate the smooth flow of the IFOR deployment . . . they 
consisted primarily of headquarters, communications, and logistic elements involving around 
2,600 NATO personnel."235 By 20 December 1995, the designated date of Transfer of 
Authority (TOA) between the UN and NATO, the ARRC headquarters was mostly in place 
and began to coordinate IFOR ground operations. In managing the transition, COMARRC' s 
job was made considerably easier by the fact that many of the forces that would comprise the 
IFOR ground element were already in theater as part of the United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR). These forces, predominantly British and French, were smoothly folded in to 
Allied operations; thus, at TOA, COMARRC had over 17,000 troops available in Bosnia.236 
More were soon to follow as NATO embarked on a massive trooplift which would bring 
43,000 more troops into theater by 18 February 1996, when the IFOR ground deployment 
was declared complete. IFOR ground forces have been grouped into three multinational 
divisions: 
235IFOR Fact Sheet, p. 7. 
2361bid, p. 3. 
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e Multinational Division (South West), commanded by the British and composed of 
British, Canadian, Dutch and Czech components 
• Multinational Division (South East), commanded by the French and composed of 
French, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Ukrainian and Egyptian troops 
• Multinational Division (North), commanded by the Americans and composed of 
U.S., Turkish and Russian troops, plus a multinational Nordic Brigade composed 
ofNorwegians, Danes, Swedes, Finns, and Poles. 
Additional specialist troops, including medical, civil affairs, engineers, and military police, 
operate independently under direct control of the IFOR Ground Component Commander. 
3. IFORAir 
The transition from DENY FLIGHT to IFOR air operations was much simpler. The 
headquarters, aircraft, procedures and tasks of the former were absorbed by the latter with 
little but a name change to mark the transfer. The IFOR air component has been primarily 
concerned with the provision of surveillance and close air support to NATO ground troops. 
Although IFOR has used several small punitive air strikes to destroy weapons in restricted 
areas, these weapons have not been defended. NATO has not flown an opposed combat 
mission since the TO A. 
4. IFOR Maritime 
Given its unique status as a joint NATO/WEU operation with a mandate distinct from 
IFOR's, SHARP GUARD continued to run after the TOA as an independent operation. 
CO:MNA VSOUTH continued to direct the embargo, reporting to Adm. Smith in his 
CINCSOUTH "hat" rather than as COMIFOR. In March of 1996, the general economic 
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sanctions and the embargo on small arms and munitions were lifted in accordance with the 
Dayton Peace Agreement. Accordingly, SHARP GUARD eliminated the Montenegro task 
group and released STANA VFORLANT back to SACLANT control. STANA VFORN.IED 
and WEUCONMARFOR continued to enforce the prohibition on heavy weapons until June 
1996, when this measure was suspended by the UN Security Council. Though SHARP 
GUARD operations were complete, the two remaining squadrons were "ready to resume, at 
short notice, full implementation of sanctions if the conditions set by the UNSC resolutions 
were not met."237 Not until 1 October 1996, were sanctions permanently lifted; SHARP 
GUARD was officially terminated the next day.238 
The IFOR maritime component commanded by COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH 
encompassed the various national carrier and amphibious task groups which had been 
operating off-and-on in the Adriatic for over three years. At various times, the U.S., U.K., 
France and Spain had deployed carrier groups near the former Yugoslavia to protect national 
troop components and participate in DENY FLIGHT; though under national control in the 
pre-IFOR period, these groups coordinated operating schedules on an informal basis and used 
NATO standard procedures. Activating them as the IFOR maritime component was simply 
a matter of formalizing these arrangements. In addition to the capital ships under 
COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH, smaller ships have been deployed to the Adriatic under 
COMNA VSOUTH control for support purposes. These ships have primarily been provided 
237 AFSOUTH Fact Sheet: Operation SHARP GUARD, p. 2. 
2381bid, p. 1. 
100 
by smaller Allied navies in the Mediterranean, particularly Italy, Greece, and Turkey. 
Minesweeping and protection of Allied shipping are their stated tasks, though these functions 
have not often been called for. This arrangement reflects political imperatives; it provides 
CO:MNAVSOUTH, an Italian four-star officer, with a role in the operation, and thus 
compensates the Italians for their exclusion from the other principal IFOR billets. The 
maritime support forces also allow non-carrier Allied navies to play a role, however minor, 
in IFOR. 
5. IFOR's Composition: NATO-Plus· 
Although several Partners had been contributing individually to the UN Protection 
Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia, the PfP concept was not formally tested until 
December 1995, when the Allies invited 13 Partners, Russia included, to join IFOR. Alll3 
responded affirmatively, although some have caveated their contributions. As well as being 
a demonstration of Allied resolve, IFOR is, in the words of NATO Secretary General Javier 
Solana, a chance to "strengthen further the patterns of cooperation already in place between 
NATO and its Partners ... indeed, PfP would seem to have been tailor-made for the Bosnia 
operation."239 Partner and other non-NATO forces number 10,000 troops, over 15% of 
!FOR's total,240 and are integrated into the NATO chain of command (with the exception of 
Russia). Although the drama in the former Yugoslavia has unfolded at a time when the 
nations of Central and Eastern Europe are still in the painful process of shedding their 
239Solana, "NATO's Role in Bosnia ... ," p. 4. 
240IFOR Fact Sheet, p. 3. 
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Communist political, military and economic baggage, these states have been eager to take 
part. IFOR represents a golden opportunity for each participating Partner to convince the 
Allies that it is politically and militarily mature enough to be admitted to NATO as a full 
member. Even if NATO expansion is not immediately forthcoming, most of the Partners 
consider "closer integration in NATO activities as a hedge against instability and external 
threats."241 For Partner militaries, the opportunity to work side-by-side in IFOR with 
mainline NATO forces, including headquarters staffs, is enabling them "to demonstrate their 
tactical readiness to make the grade"242 as well as providing on-the-job training in NATO 
military procedures. 
C. LESSONS LEARNED IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
1. NATO-UN Command Relations 
Overall, the greatest operational handicap faced by NATO in the former Yugoslavia 
prior to IFOR was the disastrous command relationship with the UN. The problem was based 
partly on conflicting goals and missions, and partly in the two bodies's radically different 
strategic cultures. While serving as CINCSOUTH, Adm. Smith observed pointedly that "the 
United Nations mandates are for peacekeeping ... on the other hand, NATO mandates are 
for enforcement . . . so it's very difficult to_ draw these two together so that you have a 
241Drew, The Evolution of NATO ... , p. 23. 
24~aj. Gen. Edward B. Atkeson, USA (ret.), "The Superpower's New Challenge," Anny Magazine 
(February 1996), p. 26. 
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confluence of expectations."243 The "dual-key" system of approval for air strikes was 
emblematic of the frictions between the two bodies: "the dual-key was designed to prevent 
NATO military commanders from acting without the approval of the UN civilian command. 
And so it is no key at all; it is really the opposite of a key: it is a stronger and fancier lock. "244 
Disagreements between the two bodies over the use of force became more frustrating when 
NATO and UN contingents from the same nations were forced to operate under drastically 
different ROE. The addition of non-NATO nations to UNPROFOR created an additional 
layer of mistrust. For instance, in spite of exchanged liaison officers between 5 ATAF and 
UNPROFOR, the "exchange of information was not completely open. NATO officers at 
AIR.SOUTH expressed concern about security arrangements inside UNPROFOR, and 
particularly UN military personnel from non-NATO countries."245 Whatever the reason or 
combination of reasons for the impasse between NATO and the UN, the result was often 
paralysis. 
The pre-IFOR operation that suffered the least from UN restrictions was SHARP 
GUARD. As there was no direct support of UN forces by the NATO/WEU ships, there were 
no locks and no keys other than the rules laid out by CINCSOUTH to his own commanders. 
This is the desired pattern for the future, a situation where the UN "remains the source of an 
international legal framework; if the leading powers in the Security Council can agree on a 
243
"An Interview with Admiral Smith," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (September 1995), p. 48. 
244
"Notebook," The New Renublic, Vol. 213 (August 14, 1995), p. 8. 
245Ripley, "Bosnia Mission ... ," p. 55. 
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role for NATO, let them grant an enabling 'fig-leaf mechanism that permits NATO 
headquarters the margin to set their own precise guidelines on the use of force. "246 
Regardless of the exact circumstances, Adm. Smith's warning remains valid: "don't ever have 
another dual key . . . I would not make that mistake again. "247 
2. Integration ofWEU and National Elements 
Another persistent problem has been the mix-and-match nature of the staffs and 
operating forces, which has had the potential to dilute the cohesiveness and efficiency of 
NATO units. Rather than exclusively using pre-existing NATO formations, Balkan operations 
in 1992-95 became a patchwork of national and multinational units which, though using 
common procedures, had not necessarily trained together. Much of the reason for this was 
political; the inclusion of France and Spain (which were non-participants in NATO's 
integrated military structure) in UNPROFOR and the WEU participation in SHARP GUARD 
propitiated many of the voices proclaiming that the age of Europe had arrived. Still, a 
common operational heritage served to bridge gaps, and "NATO personnel were able to 
fashion a command-and-control architecture which provided a degree of order among a 
potentially confusing mix of international and national operations in the Balkans. "248 Many 
of the working arrangements succeeded because of the "dual-hatting" of key commanders and 
staffs. For example, NATO "did not directly command the [PROVIDE PROMISE] airlift and 
246Foster, p. 65. 
247
"Interview: Adm. Leighton Smith, USN," Jane's Defense Weekly (28 January 1995), p. 17. 
24%p1ey, "Bosnia Mission ... ," p. 57. 
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air-drop operations. Western air operations over Bosnia, however, have become 'seamless,' 
with NATO combat air patrols positioned to protect aid flights ... this type of coordination 
took place because the PROVIDE PROMISE [Air Component Commander] was 'dual-
hatted,' being also the director of the 5 ATAF CAOC."249 In the future, however, such happy 
coincidences should not be taken for granted, and NATO commanders should "not be forced 
to patch together their own working arrangements to make up for the fact that their political 
leaders are acting separately."250 
IFOR's advent improved this situation considerably. Under IFOR, France and Spain, 
as well as non-Allied participants have been compelled to use standard NATO procedures, 
including ROE. While the newcomers have had to learn many ofNATO's procedures in the 
field, they have absorbed them rapidly and applied them to good effect. Equipment 
interoperability -- or the lack thereof -- has been the source of considerable frustration, 
particularly for non-NATO contingents. Unfortunately, a ready solution for this problem is 
not at hand, as these nations lack the economic resources to completely re-equip their units 
on-the-spot with NATO-standard equipment. The chain of command has been unified for all 
participants, save Russia, which operates under a unique arrangement. Refusing to place their 
forces under NATO operational control (OPCON), the Russians have specified that they will 
only place their forces under American tactical control (TACCON). A Russian General has 
been installed at SACEUR headquarters as the "Deputy IFOR Supreme Commander for 
24~pley, "Bosnia Mission ... ," p. 55. 
2500rew, "A View from the U.S.," p. 13. 
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Russian Forces in Bosnia." This officer, Col.-Gen. Leonty Shevtsov, "provides advice to 
SACEUR on all matters which relate to Russian participation in IFOR ... [and] fully 
participates in the situation-assessment and staff-planning process, being fully integrated into 
the IFOR decision-making mechanism on matters related to Russian participation."251 
The chain of command for Russian forces thus bypasses both COMIFOR and the 
IFOR ground component commander. SACEUR coordinates with Gen. Shevtsov, who 
exercises operational command over the Russian brigade commander, who is also under the 
tactical control of the American general officer in command of the Multinational Division 
(North). As Lt. Gen. Christman remarked, "one will not find this command arrangement in 
any field manual, but it works ... further, the Russian troops, operating in a particularly 
delicate and difficult area of Bosnia, have shown great professionalism and serious 
commitment to the mission."252 In the final analysis, General Christman's latter point is the 
most important. Regardless of the awkward arrangements, IFOR is demonstrating the validity 
of a key concept behind CJTF and PfP: that non-NATO nations, including the Russians, can 
effectively operate in conjunction with Allied forces, for mutual benefit in a common mission. 
3. The Resource Drain 
The duration of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia has also caused problems. When 
NATO operations commenced in 1992, its military structure responded with commendable 
251Col.-Gen. L. Shevtsov, presentation at the Headquarters, U.S. Anny Europe Conference on 
Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations, July 1996. 
252Christman, p. 78. 
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speed in providing forces and resources to CINCSOUTH. Most of NATO's rapidly-
deployable maritime and air forces, including the two standing maritime immediate reaction 
forces, were involved in operations from the beginning. Their continued involvement, 
however, has come at the detriment of their worldwide mobility and availability for use 
elsewhere. Although individual ships and air squadrons have been rotated regularly, staffs and 
structures -- as well as the bulk ofiFOR ground forces -- have become frozen in place, raising 
the inevitable question of how the Alliance could respond to a new crisis while still heavily 
involved in the Balkans. Peacetime training routines have suffered as well. The Alliance's new 
force structure, when fully implemented, will include Augmenting Forces to replace Reaction 
Forces after their initial deployment; one must ask the question, however, of where these 
forces will come from, given the shrinking militaries of NATO members. Shortages have 
been and will continue to be particularly evident in specialized units and equipment: special 
forces, command and control, electronic warfare, and airborne early warning. 
After IFOR' s major military milestones had been passed in April 1996, SACEUR 
received authority from the NAC to coordinate a limited restructuring ofiFOR. While troop 
levels stayed the same, some heavy forces were rotated out and replaced with lighter 
formations better suited for civil-military relations tasks. While this rotation provided some 
relief to the ground forces, a significant number of units have been in place throughout the 
operation. NATO has also been forced to consider the effect of four years of prolonged 
operations on the AFSOUTH staff, particularly those seconded to the IFOR HQ in Sarajevo. 
While the AFSOUTH staff has performed commendably, its regular functions of planning and 
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exercising for other regional contingencies and general war have atrophied. The ARRC staff 
has also suffered in this manner, though not for as long a time. In order to provide some relief 
to these staffs, the NAC announced in September 1996 that it had "agreed to new command 
arrangements for IFOR, to allow for the phased withdrawal of HQ ARRC and HQ 
AFSOUTH from Bosnia and their replacement by a headquarters based on Allied Land Forces 
Central Europe (LANDCENT). "253 Accordingly, Gen. William Crouch, USA, 
(COMLANDCENT) relieved Adm. Joseph Lopez, USN (CINCSOUTH) as CO:MIFOR on 
7 November 1996; on 20 November 1996, Gen. Crouch also relieved Lt. Gen. Sir Michael 
Walker, British Army (COMARRC) as the IFOR Ground Component Commander.254 By 
substituting one new headquarters for both the main IFOR staff and its co-located ground 
component staff, the Alliance hopes to lower JOINT ENDEAVOUR's overhead while 
conserving staff resources for other NATO uses. 
4. NATO's Inherent Reliance on U.S. Resources 
Finally, operations in the former Yugoslavia have highlighted NATO's -- and, by 
proxy, the WEU's- dependence on U.S. resources. Even when Americans were not involved 
on the ground, the U.S. military provided the bulk of the transport and combat aircraft in 
theater, a greater number of ships than any other single contributor, plus virtually all of the 
253IFOR Fact Sheet, p. 4. 
254Inforrnation gleaned from the NATO World Wide Web site (www.nato.int). For Further details, see 
Transcript of the Transfer of Authority Ceremony held at Sarajevo on 7 November 1996 (http://www.nato.int/ 
ifor/afsouth/t9611 07 a.htm) and Transcript of the Transfer of Authority Ceremony held at Sarajevo on 20 
November 1996 (http://www.nato.int/ ifor/afsouth/t961120b.htm). 
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satellite-based communications and intelligence. DELIBERATE FORCE, in particular, 
"illustrated that a sustained NATO combat expedition is impossible without U.S. muscle: 
satellite intelligence, [electronic warfare] and other technological contributions were virtually 
all American, and the U.S. flew two-thirds of all aircraft sorties."255 This situation bodes ill 
for a realistic and truly independent ESDI: "unless and until Europeans build up their own 
force projection, logistics and intelligence capabilities, they will remain dependent, not just 
on NATO, but on the U.S. as well."256 Though France and others have initiated viable 
programs of their own in the critical fields of communications and intelligence, "current levels 
of defense spending ... militate against the quick replacement of these [U.S.] capabilities. "257 
As a result, "the need for U.S. support will likely give the United States decisive influence 
over the choice of missions"258 for a European-led CJTF in the foreseeable future. 
255 Atkinson, "With Deliberate Force ... ," p. 6. 
256IISS, "NATO, CJTFs and IFOR," p. 2. 
257Barry, "NATO's Bold New Concept. .. ," p. 53. 
258Sloan, CJTF and New Missions for NATO, p. 4. 
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VI. IFOR'S POLITICAL DIMENSIONS 
Ironically, while the political underpinnings of NATO's future are more concrete than 
the details of its projected military structure, JOINT ENDEAVOUR thus far has posed more 
political problems than operational ones. Achieving IFOR' s various goals without straying 
beyond the bounds of Alliance consensus has undoubtedly been difficult and often frustrating 
for the Alliance's military leadership. After all, "people in battle dress have to convert the 
subtle language ofpinstriped politicians and diplomats into something doable."259 NATO's 
transition from making piecemeal air and maritime contributions to the larger international 
effort in the former Yugoslavia to becoming the chief agent of that effort is a high-stakes cast 
of the die. Political failure, even in the face of military success -- the specter of Vietnam --
would likely have dramatic repercussions for the Alliance. While failure in Bosnia need not 
compromise NATO's effectiveness as a defensive organ, it would cause widespread doubt 
as to the validity of the Alliance's intention, expressed at the January 1994 Brussels Summit, 
to "undertake missions in addition to the traditional and fundamental task of collective 
defense."260 The political debates and rhetoric surrounding !FOR's mission and the manner 
in which it is being carried out comprise potential stumblingblocks that future CJTFs will 
undoubtedly face, regardless of how they are structured militarily. 
25!bavid H. Hackworth, "Learning About War the Hard Way," Newsweek (December 4, 1995), p. 34. 
260J3russels Declaration, para. 7. 
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A. IFOR'S MISSION: PEACE IMPLEMENTATION 
The official characterization of the Alliance's role in Bosnia is that "NATO will not 
be imposing a settlement, but will take the necessary action to ensure compliance"261 with the 
Peace Agreement. As its name suggests, IFOR is in the "peace implementation" business; 
unfortunately, this function is not defined in MC 327 or the 1993 Athens Report of the NACC 
Ad Hoc Group on Peacekeeping-- the closest things NATO has to official peacekeeping 
doctrine-- nor is it a UN-standard term. According to MC 327, peacekeeping 
narrowly defined, is the containment, moderation and/or termination 
of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of an impartial 
third party intervention, organized and directed internationally; using military 
forces and civilians to complement the political process of conflict resolution 
and to restore and maintain peace. Peacekeeping operations based on Chapter 
VI of the UN Charter have traditionally involved the deployment of a 
peacekeeping force in the field, with consent of the parties, including 
supervising demarcation lines, monitoring cease-fires and controlling buffer 
zones, disarming and demobilizing warring factions and supervising borders. 262 
By these standards, JOINT ENDEA YOUR would appear to have a peacekeeping mission, 
as IFOR fulfils all of the above criteria. Strangely, however, neither the Dayton Peace 
Agreement nor UN Security Council Resolution I 031, which jointly authorize NATO to form 
and deploy IFOR, contain any reference to peacekeeping. Both documents give IFOR 
authority to "ensure compliance" with the settlement and to take "enforcement action" if 
needed. The use of the word "enforcement" is deliberate, calling to mind the mission of peace 
enforcement, defined by MC 327 as "using military means to restore peace in an area of 
261Statement on Bosnia-Hercegovina, p. 1. 
262MC 327, quoted in Foster, pp. 6-7. 
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conflict under Chapter VII of the UN Charter."263 Gen. George Joulwan, USA, the current 
SACEUR, characterizes JOINT ENDEA YOUR as "NATO proving it can respond robustly 
and quickly to its new mission of peace enforcement [emphasis added]."264 Gen. Joulwan has 
also stated flatly that "IFOR will be a Chapter VII versus a Chapter VI operation,"265 referring 
to the sections of the UN Charter which govern, respectively, Action with Respect to Threats 
to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression (referenced in the MC 327 
definition of peace enforcement) and the Pacific Settlement ofDisputes (referenced in the MC 
327 definition of peacekeeping). In fact, UNSCR 1031 specifically invokes Chapter VII in 
authorizing NATO to deploy IFOR, as the Allied force is manifestly a military means of 
influencing the situation in Bosnia. 
In the past few years, the lines of distinction between peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement have grown blurry. David Lightbum, a staff member in the Alliance's Division 
ofDefense Planning and Policy, notes insightfully that "NATO's interest in and contributions 
to international peacekeeping occur . . . at a time when the fundamental nature of 
peacekeeping is changing."266 Rather than the relatively tidy inter-state peacekeeping of the 
past, such as Cyprus or the Sinai, with well-defined borders and the consent -- however 
263MC 327, quoted in Foster, p. 7. 
264Gen. George Joulwan, USA, "SHAPE and !FOR: Adapting to the Needs of Tomorrow," NATO 
Review, Vol. 44, No.2 (March 1996), p. 7. 
265Quoted in Russell Watson and John Bany, "Going Into Action," Newsweek (November 27, 1995), 
p. 41. 
266David Lightburn, "NATO and the Challenge of Multifunctional Peacekeeping," NATO Review, 
Vol. 44, No.2 (March 1996), p. 10. 
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grudging -- of both sides, peace operations are increasingly being conducted in "security 
conditions that are complex, unpredictable and dangerous, combined with a serious 
humanitarian situation. "267 In view of the increasingly complicated environment for peace 
operations, Shashi Tharoor, Special Assistant to the UN Under Secretary General for 
Peacekeeping Operations, has proffered the term "multifunctional peacekeeping" for non-
traditional cases. Recognizing the utility of the new UN term, the NACC Ad-Hoc Group took 
note of it in a follow-on to their original report. 268 The military tasks in "multifunctional 
peacekeeping" go beyond "traditional peacekeeping functions such as separation of forces, 
observation, disarmament and de-mining" into the realm of"military support for a range of 
political and humanitarian operations; and, if required, application of coercive military 
measures including a measured and appropriate use of force. "269 In addition to encompassing 
a wider variety of tasks, "multifunctional peacekeeping may be undertaken in a hostile 
environment, sometimes within a state where factions or irregular forces not controlled by the 
government may be operating. "270 The concept of "multifunctional peacekeeping" straddles 
aspects of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement; it also neatly encapsulizes IFOR' s 
mission. 
267Lightburn, p. 11. 
268follow-On to the 1993 Athens Report on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, Issued at the Meeting of 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council at Brussels, December 6, 1995. 
26~ightburn, p. 13. 
270f"ollow-On to the 1993 Athens Report, para. 4. 
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Regrettably, neither the term "multifunctional peacekeeping" nor its Dayton 
equivalent, peace implementation, has been formalized by NATO; this discrepancy forces 
Alliance policymakers to choose between the two most applicable conventional definitions, 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement, when attempting to categorize IFOR. NATO officials, 
particularly on the military side, prefer to speak in terms of peace enforcement -- the less 
applicable of the two in IFOR' s case -- apparently because peacekeeping has negative 
connotations. The current sense of peacekeeping-as-a-dirty-word is largely due to the 
egregious failure of the UN effort in Bosnia, widely -- though somewhat inaccurately -- seen 
as a traditional peacekeeping operation. Although the Somalia disaster has contributed to a 
distinctly negative impression of the UN, particularly in the U.S., the misadventures of the UN 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia have been the most glaring example ofthe UN's 
difficulties in adapting to post-Cold War conditions. So great were UNPROFOR's 
inadequacies and so obvious were its failures in the world's eyes that "Bosnia [became] for 
the United Nations what the Vietnam war was to the United States."271 
The UN' s attempts to graft the accoutrements of traditional peacekeeping -- a small, 
lightly armed force with mainly monitoring functions -- onto a situation which had 
deteriorated beyond such measures resulted in what might be termed culpable inefficacy. The 
lesson learned by many observers was, unfortunately, the wrong one: "peacekeeping ... is 
271David Rieff, "The Institution that Saw No Evil: the UN and Bosnia," The New Republic (February 
12, 1996), p. 23. 
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probably morally bankrupt and certainly an idea whose time has passed. "272 It is unfair to 
malign the concept of peacekeeping simply because it was applied to the wrong situation. In 
the first place, the belligerents had not agreed to a settlement. Antonio Pedauye, a former 
UNPROFOR Head of Mission, believes that "it was very wrong to call UNPROFOR a 
peacekeeping operation since there was no peace to keep, nor even a cease fire to monitor 
until12 October 1995."273 Also, UNPROFOR's mandate was contradictory. The force was 
initially introduced into Bosnia in 1992 with the consent of the warring parties to guard and 
ensure delivery of foodstuffs and medicine to isolated areas. In 1993, however, the U.N. 
added a completely different mission: the protection of six widely separated "safe areas." 
At this point, UNPROFOR' s mandate became "inherently unenforceable ... asking 
the same force to distribute aid one day and fight a defensive battle the next meant that neither 
task was done well."274 The force's size, armament and rules of engagement (ROE) were 
never substantially upgraded to compensate for its enormous expansion of responsibility. In 
essence, a small peacekeeping force was supposed to accomplish a limited form of peace 
enforcement. Any hopes of success at protecting the safe areas were dashed by the UN's 
restrictive ROE and the fact that UNPROFOR "never had enough troops available to sustain 
any consistent policy other than to supply food and medicine to the civilian population," and 
272Rieff, p. 19. 
273Transcript of Press Briefing on Bosnia and Hercegovina given at New York by the UN Secretariat, 
7 February 1996, p. 1. 
274Lawrence Freedman, "Bosnia: Does Peace Support Make Any Sense?", NATO Review Vol. 43, 
No. 6 (November 1995), p. 25. 
116 
the humanitarian mission was "compromised by the fact that it was being undertaken in the 
middle of a war."275 The result was impotence so widespread that the UN was forced to call 
on NATO to provide deterrent airpower. Even air strikes did not have much of an effect, as 
they were "emasculated by UN officials to the point that they became mere pinpricks of no 
deterrent value . . . they emboldened, rather than constrained, the aggressors. "276 
B. IFOR'S MILITARY TASKS AND POWERS 
To assuage the fears of publics and politicians worried about the dangers of 
UNPROFOR-style "peacekeeping," the Alliance created a far larger and more heavily armed 
force for Bosnia. While emphasizing the fact that "IFOR is not in Bosnia to fight a war or 
impose a settlement,"277 NATO leaders highlighted the differences between IFOR and 
UNPROFOR JOINT ENDEAVOR's director of plans, Maj. Gen. J.B. Burns, characterized 
IFOR as having "robust force, ROE and resolve; the 'three Rs' so to speak."278 On the 
ground, IFOR employs over 60,000 troops, mostly in heavy formations: mechanized infantry 
and armored brigades. Backing up the ground force is an all-weather air surveillance and 
close air support capability. As opposed to the UN, NATO "clearly plans to rely on their 
275Freedman, pp. 21, 23. 
276Zbigniew Brzezhinski, "After Srebrenica," The New Republic (August 7, 1995), p. 21. 
277NATO's Role in the Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement, NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 
11 (Brussels: NATO Office of Information, September 1996), p. I. 
278Transcript of the IFOR Press Briefing held on 17 February 1996 at the Sarajevo Coalition Press 
Center, p. 3. 
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weapons to motivate compliance"279; furthermore, the ROE permit IFOR to use them. The 
Dayton Peace Agreement clearly authorizes IFOR "to take such action as required, including 
the use of necessary force to ensure compliance with this [agreement], and to ensure its own 
protection."280 While the exact terms of the ROE are classified, they "allow troops to defend 
themselves whenever they feel threatened-- including firing first ifnecessary."281 Moreover, 
there is no UN-style civilian control of ROE, as all authority is delegated to the IFOR 
Commander (COMIFOR) "without interference or permission of any party. "282 The last "R," 
resolve, is more difficult to quantifY, though judging from the amount of bluster and swagger 
that many officials, particularly in the U.S., exhibited as the force stood up, IFOR's resolve 
must be high indeed. 
The most important difference between IFOR and UNPROFOR, however, is the 
former's clear mandate. When asked at a press conference what made him believe that IFOR 
could accomplish in 12 months what the United Nations could not do in four years, IFOR's 
then-commander, Adm. Leighton Smith, unhesitatingly replied: "because the United Nations 
27!1f3arbara Starr, "Facing the Challenge ofPeace in Bosnia," Jane's Defense Weekly (03 January 
1996), p. 22. 
280General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Annex A: Agreement on the 
Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement, 14 December 1995, Art. I, para. 2(b). 
281Richard J. Newman, "The Devilish Details of Peacemaking," U.S. News and World Report 
(December 11, 1995), p. 47. 
282Bosnia Peace Agreement. Annex A, Art. VI, para 5. 
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did not have a signed peace agreement and we do."283 The essence of !FOR's role in 
implementing this settlement, in Secretary General Solana's eyes, is to "interpose themselves 
between the various parties and provide the safe environment and climate of confidence which 
are needed for peace to take root in Bosnia."284 IFOR is directly responsible for monitoring 
and enforcing the military aspects of the peace settlement, which are centered on the 
following primary tasks: 
• to monitor and help ensure compliance with the cease-fire 
• to ensure the withdrawal of forces from the agreed cease-fire zone of separation, 
and to ensure the separation of forces 
• to assist in the safe, orderly withdrawal of UN forces not transferred to IFOR 
• to control the airspace over Bosnia-Hercegovina?85 
The cease fire and withdrawal of forces followed specific time tables. The first deadline, the 
withdrawal of military forces from Sarajevo, occurred seven days after the transfer of 
authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR (D+7). By 0+30, all parties were to have their forces 
withdrawn from the Zone of Separation (ZOS) along the cease fire line, and areas to be 
transferred from one faction to another had to be demilitarized by 0+45. Finally, by 0+ 120, 
283Transcript of COMIFOR Press Conference held after Transfer of Authority Ceremony, Sarajevo, 20 
December 1995, p. 6. 
284Solana, "NATO's Role in Bosnia ... ," p. 3. 
285From NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 11, p. 2. 
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all heavy weapons had to be withdrawn into designated cantonments for counting and 
monitoring. 
To accomplish the above tasks, CO:MIFOR has been given two primary tools: IFOR' s 
weapons and his personal input into the UN Security Council's lifting or imposition of 
economic sanctions on the belligerents. The emphasis given to COMIFOR' s judgement is 
significant. As the "final authority in theater regarding interpretation of . . . the military 
aspects of the peace settlement,"286 CO:MIFOR may declare any party in violation and choose 
to report or punish the offense at his discretion. Specific military violations that are obvious 
and intentional are typically dealt with on the spot, especially if they are judged to pose a 
threat to IFOR. For example, on 21 February 1996, an IFOR patrol found an occupied 
Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) bunker in the Zone of Separation; the VRS soldiers' weapons 
were confiscated immediately and the bunker was destroyed. 287 
Not all violations are as clear cut; many can be "attributed mainly to ignorance and 
lack of leadership rather than deliberate non-compliance."288 For these cases, the Peace 
Agreement provides for resolution through mediating bodies known as Joint Military 
Commissions (JMC), composed at the theater level of COMIFOR, representatives from the 
various non-governmental organizations iitvolved with the settlement, and the army 
commanders of the three Former Warring Factions (FWF). This body was put to the test 
286Bosnia Peace Agreement Annex A, Art. XII. 
28722 February 1996 IFOR Transcript, p. 10. 
2881FOR Fact Sheet, p. 3. 
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within the first two days ofiFOR's deployment, when some VRS air defense radars came on 
in violation of the settlement. COMIFOR assessed that the violations were the result of poor 
communications between VRS headquarters and outlying units; the matter was "addressed 
through the JMC . . . the [Serbs] took immediate action, and we have had no violation 
subsequent to that. "289 This structure is mirrored at the brigade and battalion level, so that 
local violations and disputes may be resolved and upper level JMC decisions passed on to 
sector authorities. 
Apart from dealing with specific cases, COMIFOR is responsible for assessing the 
general state of compliance and reporting at regular intervals to the UN. He may also submit 
a special report of non-compliance at any time. 290 A judgement of non-compliance can result 
in the UN Security Council refusing to lift or re-imposing economic sanctions, as well as 
blocking access to IMF reconstruction grants. Thus far, COMIFOR has only resorted to this 
method once, recommending on 21 February 1996 that the UN delay the scheduled D+60 
suspension of sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, primarily because the Bosnian Serbs were 
refusing to attend JMC sessions. Within five days, the Bosnian Serbs were back at the table 
and the sanctions were lifted as scheduled. 
At the time of this writing, the last major military milestones in the peace agreement 
have been reached. The zones to be transferred between factions were demilitarized almost 
immediately and remained so until the transfer was complete at D+90. All heavy weapons 
28920 December 1995 COMIFOR Transcript, p.7. 
290Transcript ofiFOR Press Briefing held on 27 February 1996 in Pale, p. I. 
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were withdrawn into cantonments by D+ 120; this may have been the niost difficult provision 
for the FWFs to achieve, not necessarily due to a lack of cooperation, but rather to the 
physical difficulty of accounting for and moving the detritus of five years of fighting. 
Nonetheless, it would appear that the main opportunities for direct military confrontation 
between IFOR and the FWFs have passed. Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Rose, BA, the most 
controversial ofUNPROFOR's commanders, resisted confrontation with the warring parties 
because "there is a limit to peacekeeping in terms of how much enforcement can be used 
without losing the essential element of consent."291 Yet IFOR has decisively crossed the 
enforcement threshold without major problems, forcibly destroying or confiscating several 
heavy weapons in the ZOS, including AA guns and tanks. 
C. "MISSION CREEP": IFOR'S NON-MILITARY ROLES 
Even though the settlement's military milestones have passed without difficulty, many 
analysts worry that the civil tasks still have the potential to derail the peace train. IFOR, 
though not responsible for carrying out nation-building efforts, unavoidably shares the burden 
oftheir attainment, for ''NATO can pull out and declare victory only if there's success across 
the board, and that includes on the civilian side."292 The inextricable linkage between civil and 
military tasks has manifested itself in an unavoidable graying of the boundaries of IFOR' s role 
in Bosnia. The lack of an official NATO peacekeeping doctrine and the Alliance's overall 
291Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Rose, "Bosnia-Herzegovina 1994 --NATO Support for UN Wider 
Peacekeeping Operations," NATO's Sixteen Nations, Vol. 39 No. 3/4 (August 1994), p. 11. 
292Rick Atkinson, "The Year of Living Dangerously," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition 
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inexperience in peace operations have been keenly felt in the "mission creep" debate. 
Regrettably, NATO's military leadership, heavily influenced by the experiences of Allied 
nations participating in UN operations in Bosnia and Somalia, may be resisting "mission 
creep" too strenuously. Turning the blind eye to blatant misconduct on the grounds that "it 
isn't in our mandate" threatens to put IFOR into the same (a-)moral league as UNPROFOR. 
The issue ofiFOR support for the various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
struggling to implement the civil aspects of the Peace Agreement has been a contentious one. 
The fortunes of the operation's military and civil sides are largely indivisible; one NATO 
official has pointed out that "it will be no good saying the military side was a success if the 
overall operation has failed."293 Gen. Joulwan likewise acknowledges that "the key to success 
in Bosnia will be the effectiveness of civilian organizations, not military forces."294 
Unfortunately, the various NGO efforts in Bosnia were slow to come on line and are still not 
adequately funded, manned or organized. This "increasingly obvious disparity between the 
well-organized military and a largely civilian democracy-building effort"295 has military leaders 
worried; they fear "their troops could get sucked into an unwanted 'nation-building' role if 
the civilian organizations do not do their job."296 Conditioned by their unhappy peacekeeping 
experience in Somalia, U.S. military leaders have been especially reluctant to let IFOR be 
293Jonathan Clayton, "NATO to do More on War Crimes," Reuter's World Service, 4 March 1996. 
294Joulwan, p. 9. 
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drawn into non-military roles. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an attempt to get a handle 
on the problem of "mission creep," drafted a mission statement specifying "among other 
things, jobs that IFOR will not do: oversee security during elections, conduct humanitarian 
missions, help civilians move about or act as a local police force. "297 
This statement does not square with the provisions of the Peace Agreement, which 
specifies the following supporting tasks for IFOR, to be fulfilled "within the limits of its 
assigned principal tasks and available resources, and on request"298 : 
• to help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of non-military tasks 
associated with the peace settlement, including free and fair elections 
• to assist in the movement of organizations in the accomplishment of humanitarian 
missions 
• to observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations, 
refugees and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence 
to life and person 
• to monitor the clearing of minefields and obstacles. 
Some analysts and policymakers consider the language of these tasks a "deliberate 
fudge" 299 designed to create a back door through which the military's status as impartial 
referees may be compromised and NATO troops pulled into open conflict with the FWFs. 
Others are less disturbed by the prospects of"mission creep"; in their view, given the linkage 
297Newman, p. 49. 
29BJ3osnia Peace Agrrement Annex A, Article VI, para. 2(d). 
299J.Iackworth, p. 36. 
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between the military and civil success, it may be in the best interests of the military to insure 
the success of the other aspects of the settlement. In this vein, Walter Clarke, former U.S. 
Deputy Chief of Mission at the embassy in Somalia, believes that "responses to urgent 
requests by relief agencies for logistical support cannot be cited as evidence of 'mission creep' 
... especially when such requests are predictable and probably intrinsic to mission success. "300 
IFOR's military leaders, however, have been slow to awaken to this reality, particularly on 
the issues of war crimes investigations and the exercise of police functions. 
Officially, IFOR is cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) by agreeing to "detain and transfer to the ICTY persons indicted for war 
crimes ... when it comes into contact with such persons in carrying out [IFOR' s] duties" as 
well as by "providing logistical support to the ICTY case by case."301 NATO is making it 
clear, however, that "we are not engaged in identifying them, searching for them or tracking 
them down ... we're not conducting a house to house, car to car search for these 
individuals."302 On the face of it, this seems a reasonable policy; IFOR is too busy to conduct 
extensive searches which would probably do little more than antagonize the populace. 
Critics, however, charge that the policy is being used to camouflage the fact that "IFOR 
300Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention," Foreign 
Affairs (Spring 1996), p. 79. 
301IFOR Assistance to the International Tribunal, NATO Press Release (96)26, 14 February 1996. 
302Transcript of the IFOR Press Briefmg Given on 12 February 1996 at the Sarajevo Coalition Press 
Center, p. 2. 
125 
seems to look the other way when war criminals pass by."303 When pressed by journalists 
after reports that the two most prominent alleged war criminals, the Bosnian Serb President 
Radovan Karadzic and VRS Gen. Ratko Mladic, had passed through IFOR checkpoints, 
NATO officers admitted somewhat sheepishly in February 1996 that no photos or 
descriptions of any indicted war criminals had been handed out to IFOR troops manning 
checkpoints. Only after the embarrassed U.S. State Department "insisted that the 
photographs be distributed to the lowest levels"304 did IFOR agree to do so. 
IFOR is understandably hesitant to do anything that would disrupt the general flow 
of the peace process or incite the anger of one of the factions against the force; the arrest of 
the Bosnian Serb leader by NATO troops would certainly have these effects. Indeed, when 
NATO transported to the ICTY in February 1996 two indicted Bosnian Serbs held by the 
Federation government, the Bosnian Serbs refused to attend the JMC meetings in Sarajevo 
for over a week. IFOR hastily distanced itself from the event: "these are requests from the 
ICTY, the events ... were entirely under the control of the ICTY, they made all the 
arrangements, they were controlling at all times. "305 
An even thornier war crimes issue loomed as the FWFs vacated zones to be turned 
over to other parties. In the process, they deliberately destroyed as much evidence as possible 
303Bruce W. Nelan, "With Malice Towards All," Time (26 February 1996), p. 17. 
304Transcript of the IFOR Press Briefing Given on 13 February 1996 at the Sarajevo Coalition Press 
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at war crimes sites. Official IFOR guidance is that the force "will not be in the position of 
guarding sites . . . that is a proper task for civilian authorities and police. "306 Outcry in the 
press and from war crimes investigators, however, prompted a policy modification; NATO 
promised to guarantee their safety as the snow began to melt in the spring of 1996 and sites 
became more accessible. 
IFOR has been drawn increasingly into police functions such as riot control and 
refugee movement. As the crowded Sarajevo suburbs were transferred from Bosnian Serb 
to Federation control in February and March 1996, looting and arson appeared as an 
unofficial "scorched earth" policy on the part of angry Bosnian Serbs. The initial NATO 
stance was that the prevention of "criminal looting is the responsibility of the proper civil 
authorities"307 and that "IFOR is not a police force and cannot assume responsibility for law 
and order in places like Sarajevo."308 The scale of the destruction and the small size of the 
Federation police force prompted a reluctant IFOR to act more vigorously as the situation 
deteriorated. Media pressure was especially heavy at this point; headlines like "NATO Forces 
Watch as Sarajevo Area Bums"309 did nothing to contribute to !FOR's popularity with the 
publics of the participating nations. Starting on 6 March 1996, IFOR troops were assigned 
306Transcript of the Joint Press Conference with Secretary General and SACEUR at Brussels, 19 Jan 
1996,p.9. 
30727 February 1996 IFOR Transcript, p. 3. 
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to guard warehouses containing UN relief supplies, and some participated in reinforced foot 
patrols in the affected districts. These developments, and the inevitable escalation of !FOR's 
overall civil role, created a profound sense of unease on the part of military leaders, 
prompting a formal "re-thinking" of the mission. In March 1996, SACEUR formally 
requested NAC "assistance to enable IFOR to continue to support the missions of the civilian 
agencies under the Dayton Agreement,"310 to include clearer political guidance on the 
undertaking of non-military tasks. Following this request, NATO declared that "in view of 
the importance of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement, IFOR is providing increased 
support for civilian tasks within the limits of its existing mandate and available resources. "311 
The current parameters for IFOR employment amount to official sanction for "mission 
creep," reflecting the ascendancy of civil over military considerations in Bosnia. In addition 
to providing the "secure environment" that civil agencies need to operate, IFOR has been 
providing transportation, supply and medical assistance to the various NGOs in theater. 
IFOR has also become heavily involved in nation-building in its own right. IFOR' s Civilian-
Military Coordination Organization (CIMIC), headed by a U.S. Army Brig. General, has 
members presently "integrated with, and in many cases seconded to, the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR.),"312 the civilian commissioner charged with coordinating the nation-
310Transcript of the IFOR Press Briefmg Given on 05 March I996 at the Sarajevo Coalition Press 
Center, p.I. 
311Basic Fact Sheet No. II, p. 7. 
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building efforts for the various civilian organizations represented in Bosnia. CIMIC soldiers 
"are working with the OSCE on election preparations and human rights monitoring,"313 at 
every level, to the extent that "NATO officers planned and carried out the September 14 
[1996] national vote after acknowledgment by the OSCE, whose job it was to organize the 
elections, that it could not complete the task."314 Additionally, IFOR's engineering battalions 
have embarked on an extensive program of public works rebuilding with funding provided by 
the World Bank and the NATO Security Investment Programme. 
More than anything else, IFOR' s mission debates illustrate the underlying tension 
between a conservative military Alliance unused to the vagaries of peacekeeping, and a 
diplomatic community desperate to "attempt to salvage honor from a peace settlement that 
amounts to a partition. "315 Much of the friction between IFOR and civilian agencies can be 
traced to the fact that "the two cultures -- that of the civilian agencies and the military -- have 
fundamentally different ways oflooking at crisis situations ... the civilian agencies often think 
that they understand and can deal with the situation better than the military. "316 In Bosnia, the 
313
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reverse has more often been the case: "NATO officers and their troops seem to think more 
creatively and push harder to reach solutions than their civilian counterparts."317 
The general success ofiFOR' s nation-building efforts seems to have vindicated those 
who have pushed for "mission creep." Unfortunately, "mission creep" is a difficult game for 
NATO to win, as it is hard to gauge the amount of"creep" sufficient to assume the mantle 
of moral authority without overextending the Alliance. If IFOR fails to actively pursue its 
humanitarian responsibilities, it will be castigated -- rightly -- for the same kind of deliberate 
blindness to evil that characterized UNPROFOR. On the other hand, if IFOR allows itself 
some "mission creep" and encounters trouble, particularly in the form of rising casualties, its 
critics will have a field day. The same principles apply to IFOR's projected successor, which 
the Alliance agreed in November 1996 to establish. 
D. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN BOSNIA 
As vexing as the "mission creep" debate has been, Bosnia holds more serious threats 
to the Alliance's reputation and future. Some analysts believe that "the greatest threat to 
NATO's cohesion today is the possibility of failure in Bosnia ... no other issue has such a 
potential to tear NATO apart -- not the debate over enlargement or disagreements about how 
to handle the Russians."318 On the surface, all seems well. Thus far, the operation has been 
a smashing success, with no battle casualties and all parties in general compliance with the 
318John Hillen, Getting NATO Back to Basics, Backgrounder No. 1067 (Washington, DC: The 
Heritage Foundation, February 7, 1996), p. 2. 
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Dayton Accords. In spite of the appearance of Allied solidarity, however, "Americans and 
Europeans have been pursuing different agendas, and Clinton's primary theater of operations 
has been at home."319 Several key provisions in the Dayton Agreement, especially IFOR's 
initial12-month mandate and the regional arms control ratios, were formulated as much to 
appease American domestic unilateralist sentiments as they were to promote a lasting peace. 
Indeed, some commentators have remarked that Dayton was really "two peace agreements 
. . . one among the warring parties in Bosnia and another between Bill Clinton and the 
Republicans in Congress."320 The 12 month deadline and the exit strategy debate that revolved 
around it, as well as the question of arming the Bosniaks, had the potential to sour all the 
Allied goodwill that has coalesced around the peace process. 
1. Finding an Exit Strategy 
The given reason for a fixed 12-month IFOR mandate was to prevent the force from 
"becoming a permanent structure in the region, or indeed an alibi for the parties in Bosnia not 
to commence the urgently required process of national reconciliation."321 In theory, a year 
long break in fighting would give the parties a chance to rebuild civil structures and become 
truly self-governing. From a practical viewpoint, most of IFOR' s major tasks were 
completed in the first three months; Adm. Smith claimed from the outset that "we're going 
31!lf'oster, p. 16. 
320Watson and Barry, p. 40. 
321Solana, "NATO's Role in Bosnia ... ," p. 3. 
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to know in about 90 days whether or not we've got a viable agreement."322 Many diplomats 
and senior military officers, especially in Europe, doubted that this was a realistic exit 
strategy, based as it was on time and short-term milestones rather than lasting 
accomplishment. Drawing on his experience in Somalia, diplomat Clarke observed that this 
schedule did not address "the humanitarian needs on the ground, whose pace of resolution 
cannot be controlled by Washington, New York or Brussels" although it "might buy some 
short-term domestic political support."323 
Indeed, the question of domestic support for troops abroad in an American election 
year was at the heart of the 12 month mandate. Sending in troops so close to an election was 
a courageous move on President Clinton's part, though it can be argued that pressure from 
the international community to honor his previous promises left him no choice. Having 
displayed this courage, he "wanted American troops headed homeward before next 
November's election,"324 which meant that they would have had to begin their withdrawal at 
least two months before the expiration of the IFOR mandate. 
This prospect infuriated the European Allies, who were already irritated by the 
American domestic preoccupation. French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette is on record 
as stating that "the troops of different countries will arrive together and leave together . . . it 
is out of the question for the U.S. to take its troops home, for example, on the eve of an 
32220 December 1995 COMIFOR Transcript, p. 5. 
323Clarke and Herbst, p. 81. 
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American presidential election and leave the Europeans to finish the job."325 Fortunately for 
the sake of Allied harmony, the Bosnian theater remained quiet in the months preceding the 
U.S. Presidential election. With public pressure for an early withdrawal slackened, the U.S. 
has officially confirmed that IFOR troop withdrawals, called "redeployments" to avoid the 
negative connotations of a "withdrawal," will be "beginning in [late] November [ 1996], but 
[NATO will] still have a fully capable IFOR force on December 20 (0+365), ... with a rapid 
acceleration in the redeployment after the 20th ofDecember [1996]."326 
Unfortunately, the publicity given to the one-year deadline means that "the time 
horizon has been stressed to the point where it may be difficult to alter, whether or not the 
mission is essentially complete at the end of the period."327 UN Security Council Resolution 
1031 provides for an extension of !FOR's mandate, subject to the recommendations of the 
participating nations and a Security Council vote. The Europeans's urge to remain in place 
and protect their security investment is strong. While American resistance is equally strong, 
the U.S. has relented enough to permit "NATO military authorities to assess the prospects 
for stability in Bosnia over the next year and develop a range of security options . . . [which] 
include withdrawing on schedule, but which also include options for providing stabilization 
in Bosnia next year. "328 Three broad courses of action emerged for consideration: 
325Quoted in Alain Franchon, "The U.S. Ruffies Gallic Feathers," World Press Review (February 
1996), p. 1. 
326Perry, Bergen press conference transcript, p. 1. 
327Edward Atkeson, "The Superpower's New Challenge," Army Magazine (February 1996), p. 28. 
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e withdraw IFOR as planned, leaving the parties to maintain peace under the 
pressure of public scrutiny and international economic and political leverage 
(carrots and sticks) 
• extend IFOR' s deployment 
• opt to enforce peace beyond IFOR by leaving a residual force or follow-on force --
an IFOR II operation -- with the intent of putting more time between the recent 
war and an unchaperoned peace. 329 
The middle of the two options was the least likely; the U.S. government had staked 
too much domestic and international credibility to make an about-face at this point, although 
the recent election somewhat reduced the President's need to appease the public. The :first 
option- "carrot-and-stick" -would have probably resulted in the creation of a NATO aerial 
deterrent force in the Southern Region capable of instantly retaliating against violations of the 
peace, essentially a return to NATO's pre-IFOR role. This approach was unlikely to be 
adopted. Even in the U.S., there was widespread recognition that the Bosnian peace is too 
fragile to be left "unchaperoned," and U.S. military planners were reluctantly coming to the 
conclusion that airpower alone would probably be insufficient to keep the FWFs in line. 
European support has always been strongest for the third option, a follow-on force. 
Significantly, early European stay-behind planning was done by the WEU, providing the 
Alliance with a golden opportunity to strengthen its institutional bonds to that body; after all, 
the use ofNATO assets by the WEU is one of the CJTF concept's raisons d'etre. From the 
329J.,t. Col. Charles Barry, USA, "After IF OR: Maintaining a Fragile Peace in the Balkans," NDU 
Strategic Forum, No. 62 (February 1996), p. 2. 
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European viewpoint, a successful handover between NATO and the WEU "would [have 
been] an inaugural implementation of the Berlin agreement, and a return from global to 
regional management. "330 Such an arrangement would have constituted an even more 
thorough "road test" for the CJTF concept than IFOR has been. If the U.S. were at least to 
contribute intelligence and command-and-control assets, if not airpower, to a WEU CJTF, 
both sides could potentially have gained something: ~he Americans could have walked away 
from Bosnia after a year with a clean conscience, and the Europeans could have demonstrated 
that an ESDI exists outside of documents. On the American side, the problem with this 
proposal was that it would have left U.S. assets under the control of"foreign" commanders, 
a "hot-button" issue for certain members of Congress. Moreover, the WEU was not ready to 
undertake such a large responsibility, even with U.S. resource support. Gen. Naumann put 
it bluntly: "the Europeans cannot do a post IFOR operation by themselves."331 European 
military shortcomings aside, this proposal was too much of a risk for Europe to assume at this 
point. If matters were to go sour, the cause of ESDI and CFSP would be set back 
considerably; support for economic and political integration in Europe would be significantly 
reduced as well. 
The most likely outcome was the one approved by NATO in November 1996: a 
NATO-led operation (a CJTF in fact, but not in name) in Bosnia, with the U.S. providing the 
preponderance of air and support assets and the Europeans supplying the bulk of the ground 
330IISS, "NATO, CJTFs and IFOR," p. 2. 
331Naurnann, NDU remarks. 
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forces. In June 1996, Secretary Peny acknowledged that "it is a separate consideration [from 
the decision to 'redeploy' IFOR] as to whether NATO will fill a requirement to provide any 
additional security to Bosnia on into next year, and the U.S. would fully participate in any 
decision made by NAT0."332 
The European Allies had some anxious moments in their effort to convince U.S. 
policymakers to approve an IFOR follow-on. On 5 November 1996, Military Committee 
discussions of post-IFOR proposals were abruptly brought to a halt by U.S. objections, 
principally because the Europeans pressed for U.S. troops on the ground. Lamented a 
European diplomat, "we were supposed to begin reviewing [options] today and could not 
because of the Americans ... we don't know if it is for political reasons, to create some 
distance from the election, or if there is a real stiffening in the American position."333 If a 
smooth transition is to be effected between IFOR and its successor, a decision had to be made 
promptly. 
In the wake ofPresident Clinton's re-election, the U.S. underwent a not-unexpected 
sea-change. On 16 November 1996, President Clinton declared that "I have carefully 
reviewed its options, and I have decided to . . . inform our allies that in principle, the United 
States will take part in a follow-on force in Bosnia. "334 The European Allies wasted no time 
332Perry, quoted in Rick Atkinson, "NATO is Expecting Longer Bosnia Stay," The International 
Herald Tribune (June 11, 1996). 
333Unnamed European diplomat, quoted in Elaine Sciolino, "A Longer NATO Stay in Bosnia Uncertain," The New York Times (November 7, 1996), p. A6. 
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in moving forward with post-IFOR planning. On 18 November 1996, the NAC instructed the 
Military Committee to draw up plans for a follow-on force, to be called the Stabilization 
Force (SFOR). As its name implies, SFOR will be charged with maintaining a stable 
environment within which the nation-building process can proceed without coercion. While 
the details ofSFOR's charter have not been finalized as of this writing, on 4 December 1996, 
NATO Secretary General Solana informed participants at the Peace Implementation 
Conference in London that 
SFOR will be a smaller force, roughly half the size of IF OR, and its 
mission will necessarily be more limited. We are planning for an 18-month 
mission, to be reviewed at 6 and 12 months, with a view to progressively 
reducing the force's presence to a deterrent posture and eventual withdrawal. 
In preparing SFOR, we have been consulting closely with the 17 non-NATO 
nations who have contributed to IFOR ... all 17 wish to contribute to SFOR, 
and two more of our [PtP] Partners -- Bulgaria and Slovenia -- have also 
signaled a willingness to contribute. As was the case for IFOR, SFOR will 
require a clear Chapter Vll mandate from the UN Security Council. Also, like 
IF OR, we expect the new force to operate with the consent of the parties to 
the Peace Agreement.335 
Significantly, the force will include 8,500 American ground troops.336 While this 
represents a reduction in the percentage ofU.S. ground troops from roughly 33% to 25%, 
it is still a significant contribution and reflects a distinct reversal of American policy 
statements over the past year. For this reason, U.S. officials, including the President, have 
been careful to point out to Congress and the American public that "the prolongation ofU.S. 
335Transcript of the Presentation by the NATO Secretary General to the Peace Implementation 
Conference, London, December 4, 1996 (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/I996/s961204a.htm), pp. 1-2. 
336Peter Baker and Bradley Graham, "Clinton Decides to Keep U.S. troops in Bosnia," The 
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troops in Bosnia [is] not a sign that the initial military mission had failed, but [is] a 
consequence of a lagging economic and political reconstruction effort. "337 As anticipated, the 
President's announcement has been followed by some political backlash, particularly from the 
opposition; nevertheless, there appears to be a grudging bipartisan consensus in Congress for 
continued U.S. participation in Bosnia. The U.S. decision to support a continued NATO 
presence in Bosnia with its political and military clout is an encouraging signal to the 
European Allies that America intends to remain fully engaged in Europe. 
2. Arming the Bosniaks 
The issue of anning and training the Bosniaks under a broad regime of regional arms 
limitations has likewise been a bone of contention between America and its European allies. 
Other than the 12 month drop-dead date, the U.S. exit strategy "almost certainly depends on 
another device as well . . : an unwritten agreement with the Bosnian government to arm and 
train the Bosnian army. "338 Equipping the Bosniaks is not mandated under the Peace 
Agreement or the associated UN resolutions; neither is it prohibited. UN Security Council 
Resolution 1 021 currently governs the arms embargo against all warring parties, which has 
been lifted incrementally. Small and light arms and munitions may be brought into the country 
beginning at D+90. Heavy weapons remained prohibited until D+180, when the UN 
Secretary General assessed as satisfactory FWF compliance with the Peace Agreement's 
337Baker and Graham, p. A1. 
338Tom Morgenthau and John Barry, "On the March," Newsweek (11 December 1995), p. 29. 
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Annex lB, the Agreement on Regional Stabilization. 339 Annex lB is a CFE treaty in 
miniature, using the same guidelines and formulae to establish maximum limits on armed 
forces in the former Yugoslavia. Under the Annex, the Bosnian Serbs must give up over half 
of their heavy equipment, while the Bosniaks are permitted to double theirs. 340 Paradoxically, 
permission for the Bosniaks to build up to their new limit is tied to Bosnian Serb cooperation 
in building down to theirs unless subsequent resolutions separate the two issues. 
Achieving arms parity between the traditionally outgunned Bosniaks and their 
antagonists is a longstanding goal of the U.S. Congress, which pushed for the lifting of the 
arms embargo for three years. Buried within the desire to see the Bosniaks better able to 
defend themselves is the notion that this measure might have forestalled the need for U.S. 
ground intervention by "Bosnianizing" the war. The advent of IFOR rendered this 
(temporarily, at least) a moot point, but the feeling that a well-armed Bosnian army is the best 
way to maintain the peace still permeates political circles in Washington, including -- for the 
moment-- the White House. Both the U.S. military and the European Allies vigorously 
oppose this notion, believing that such an effort, even if undertaken by only a single nation, 
would constitute "the ultimate sin for peacekeepers ... it's an impossible task [to] keep a 
peace that not everyone wants and at the same time [to be] training one of the combatants. "341 
339(}nited Nations Security CoWlcil Resolution 1021 (1995), adopted by the Security CoWlcil at its 
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For this reason, UK Armed Forces Minister Nicholas Soames, voicing a common sentiment 
in Europe, has bluntly stated that "neither NATO nor any contingent in IFOR will arm and 
train the Bosnians."342 Likewise, Adm. Smith was adamant that IFOR "does not have an 
equip, arm and train mission ... we are not involved in it-- period."343 
Faced with such stiff opposition, including that of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Congress and the Clinton administration have backed off somewhat. While agreeing 
that U.S. forces -- and, one presumes, the forces of all other IFOR participants -- will not be 
involved in training or equipping the Bosniaks, Secretary of State Warren Christopher has 
promised that the U.S. will coordinate an international effort to arm the Bosniaks. 
Presumably, this will involve a non-IFOR sponsor nation or private contractor that can 
channel U.S. equipment-- perhaps funded with Arab dollars-- to the Bosniaks. Many in 
Europe see blatant American preference for the Bosniaks as a destabilizing influence on the 
settlement, possibly leading to a drive for Bosnian Serb and Croat rearmament. Just as 
disturbing to the European Allies is the American willingness to break ranks with the Alliance 
when it suits domestic purposes. To be fair, most ofNATO's members have indulged in such 
practices in the past, but "the consequence for NATO of an open and deepening rift is certain 
342Quoted in "Over 30,000 IFOR members in place by D+30," Jane's Defense Weekly (January 24, 
1996), p. 3. 
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to be far more damaging for the Alliance now that it has assumed a leading role in the 
operation and is no longer in a position to shift blame to the UN."344 
344
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1996 has been a year of significant progress in reshaping the Alliance. CJTF and the 
LTS are close to fruition, and expansion seems likely in the near future. More than anything 
else, however, 1996 has been "the year of Bosnia, which will continue to intrude on other 
issues in the alliance . . . but it may intrude in ways that are instructive for the reform 
process."345 Without the catalyst ofBosnia, NATO might have ended up in history's dustbin, 
the victim of a not-so-amicable divorce between the Atlantic and European pillars. Some 
commentators believe that it was a mistake on the part ofNATO to have made Bosnia a test 
case for its future relevance and its new structures. Adam Garfinkle, writing in The National 
Interest, believes that the Alliance's commitment in the former Yugoslavia foolishly raises 
"the specter of abject failure on a comparatively minor issue at the outset of a new era, and 
before the astonished eyes of the entire world. "346 
For NATO to have done nothing would have amounted to the same thing, however. 
Bosnia was an unavoidable issue for the Alliance. It has highlighted the Alliance's ability, 
unique among the world's security organizations, to match carefully reasoned political 
consensus with effective military force. Bosnia has also reminded both Alliance pillars of the 
importance of the transatlantic relationship. Finally, it has underscored the need for the 
345Stanley Sloan, "France and NATO," p. 8. 
346Adam Garfinkle, "Into the Shooting Gallery," The National Interest (Winter 1995/96), p. 117. 
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Alliance to continue the process of political and military adaptation, to ensure that NATO will 
be able to respond to future crises more promptly and with less disarray. 
A. VALIDATING THE MAINSTREAM CONCEPT FOR CJTFS 
Overall, IFOR and its predecessor operations have demonstrated the inherent 
robustness and flexibility ofNATO's integrated military structure, and its viability to serve 
as the foundation for the CJTF concept. In Bosnia, NATO did not have to create a new 
structure; rather the Alliance "used an existing structure, but invented procedures to use it in 
a way which was more or less consonant with the operation at hand ... and that it heresy, if 
you will . . . it taught us that the current structure could be made to be used for some 
purposes which had nothing to do with its original mission."347 Throughout NATO's 
involvement in the former Yugoslavia, "existing structures and processes proved to have 
capability for growth as well as for reduction while retaining basic cohesion and commonality 
of purpose. "348 Contrary to the fears of some nations, the integrated military structure has 
facilitated, rather than hindered, the flow of political guidance to the IFOR military 
commanders. A series of complicated but manageable working arrangements has permitted 
France and Spain-- as well as non-NATO nations-- to participate fully, setting a precedent 
for future operations. The principal complaint about operations in the former Yugoslavia from 
both the political and military sides is that the level of "ad hockery" has been too high; the 
diplomats feel that important decisions have been rushed, while NATO military leaders have 
347Andreani, "France and NATO," p. 12. 
348Genschel, Transatlantic Relations and International Security, p. 5. 
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chafed under. the necessity of waiting for the political authorities to pass down policy, 
especially during the years prior to the establishment of IFOR. The critical task for the 
Alliance in the next few years will be to modify its structure in a way that makes it easier to 
achieve Allied consensus and political-military coordination. A true CJTF, as envisioned, 
would be simpler to deploy than IFOR, with preset arrangements for command and extra-
Allied participation; the idea is "to have such deployments prepared for and practiced well in 
advance, with clear lines of military and political control, rather than putting them together 
in an ad hoc manner. "349 
B. NATO'S RENAISSANCE AND THE REASSERTION OF THE 
TRANSATLANTIC LINK 
In examining NATO's post-Cold War odyssey, "we will find that practice outpaces 
theory."350 Lacking a formal peacekeeping doctrine or a finalized agreement on CJTF, the 
Alliance has nonetheless been able to unite its often fractious members and build a coalition 
of over 30 nations to implement the Bosnia Peace Agreement. NATO's military success in 
the former Yugoslavia in the absence of a definitive CJTF format demonstrates that the 
Alliance's real effectiveness is not so much a function of its 
349IISS, "NATO, CJTFs and IFOR," p. 1. 
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structures and assets, but [of] the common political will and 
coordinated policy to commit such assets . . . indeed, in the absence of 
political will to act and the ability to agree among the Allies, new 
organizational structures will not be of much use. NATO's problem in Bosnia 
from 1991-95 was less that it lacked proper command structures than that it 
could not agree how to act, and its success since 1995 results from political 
agreement and will rather than new structures. 351 
The Allied consensus ofNovember-December 1995 to support with military means 
the Bosnian Peace Agreement stands out as a watershed in NATO history: the point at which 
the Atlantic Alliance rediscovered itself and "responded to the out-of-area or out-of-business 
challenge to its existence with a determined reply that it will stay in business."352 Once NATO 
awoke to its own capabilities and importance to regional, if not global, stability, it wasted no 
time in "jumping into the driver's seat" in Bosnia. As Chapters V and VI of this thesis 
illustrate, NATO has displaced the UN in Bosnia not only militarily, but politically as well; 
the UN, however, still provides broad legitimization for the NAC's political decisions and the 
NATO Military Authorities's evaluations and recommendations. 
The Alliance's "robust health is particularly striking for an organization that had 
seemed, at the end of the cold war, to be in danger of becoming redundant. "353 The key factor 
in this transformation has been the realization, on both sides of the Atlantic, that NATO is the 
organization best-suited to serve as the linchpin ofEuropean security. At the January 1994 
NATO summit in Brussels, the Allies confirmed "the enduring validity and indispensability 
351IISS, "NATO, CJTFs and IFOR," p. 2. 
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of our Alliance . . . based on a strong transatlantic link, the expression of a shared destiny . 
. . [and] designed to contribute to lasting peace, stability, and well-being in the whole of 
Europe,"354 but at that point, neither Europe nor America was prepared to make concrete 
steps to reassert the transatlantic link with regard to out-of-area challenges. Not until the 
situation in Bosnia began to seriously deteriorate in mid-1995 did both pillars begin to move 
towards one another. On the part of the Europeans, this meant "truly accepting the U.S. as 
a permanent European power, not just a temporary protector during the Cold War. "355 The 
U.S. came to the same conclusion, recognizing that "Europe may no longer play the central 
role it used to in U.S. defense planning as an endangered continent, but it has become more 
important as an ally and a partner.''356 
NATO unanimity in supporting the Dayton Accords signaled a renewal of Alliance 
cohesion and a reaffirmation of the leading role of the United States after a period of apparent 
American disinterest. American initiative -- and arm twisting -- in Dayton was indisputably 
the glue that held the peace process together. Moreover, it reminded the U.S. and the other 
Allies that "America succeeded because only America could ... America remains not just a 
member ofNATO, but its comerstone."357 In tum, America's newly restored confidence in 
354Brussels Declaration, para. I. 
355Volker RUbe, German Minister of Defense, "The New NATO," lecture delivered at the Johns 
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its role in Europe reinvigorated the Alliance, emboldening it to make its historic commitment 
to peacekeeping operations beyond the territory of the member states. Some Allies were less 
pleased than others by America's re-awakening. France in particular smarted at the evident 
demonstration of the failure of European solutions. In one sense, Dayton "demoted the 
French; the largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping force became a junior partner in 
IFOR."358 Fortunately, the U.S. handled the issue with greater diplomatic skill than usual and 
generally succeeded in making the French comfortable. IFOR arrangements deliberately 
preserved much ofF ranee's military role in Bosnia, while shifting much of the responsibility--
and potential for blame- onto the U.S.; they also gave JOINT ENDEA YOUR the flavor of 
a Great Power arrangement, an irresistible temptation for the French. IFOR has had the 
welcome side effect of making the French more comfortable with NATO, as well as 
demonstrating to them that the Alliance, and not some other body, would be the focus of 
European security efforts in the near future; it was "no coincidence that the French 
announcement [of their decision to participate as a full member in the Military Committee] 
came on the day NATO authorized the deployment ofiFOR."359 
All of the effects of America's efforts at Dayton appear positive, yet America may not 
be ready to write a blank-check renewal of its interest in Europe. Secretary General Solana 
emphasizes the fact that "of all of the implications of !FOR, one stands out: the centrality of 
35~ussell Watson and Rod Nordland, "Sarajevo on the Spot," Newsweek (December 18, 1995), p. 
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the transatlantic link."360 Nonetheless, the American end ofthat bridge may have shaky 
foundations. The dark side of America's vigorous leadership in the peace process has been 
its tendency to ride roughshod over the opinions of the other Allies, either prodding them 
farther than they want to go or stopping them short of their objectives. America must realize 
that just as France is realizing the drawbacks of"NATO ala carte," so the U.S. cannot have 
''Europe a Ia carte" without penalty. On the other hand, as President Kennedy archly noted, 
Europe "really cannot have both [American] military presence and our diplomatic absence. "361 
The solution, as is typical for NATO, will be a compromise: "the Alliance must reflect 
a transatlantic partnership based on the understanding that the U.S. remains committed to 
Europe's security but takes advantage of organized European solidarity."362 From the 
American side, this means encouraging, even to the point of helping underwrite, a viable 
ESDI. In return, the Europeans -- France in particular -- must ensure that an ESDI evolves 
in a manner that complements, rather than competes with, U.S. security strategy. While this 
basic compromise was struck at Berlin, it has not yet been implemented. As CJTF is finalized, 
there are several questions which, if not addressed satisfactorily, have the potential to derail 
what analyst Stanley Sloan calls "the new transatlantic bargain." 
360Solana, "NATO's Role in Bosnia ... ," p. 6. 
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C. FUTURE QUESTIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE 
1. How Far Out of Area? 
While the Alliance's commitment to operating out of area is strong, there has been 
very little open discussion of just how far out of area NATO is prepared to go. The 
Washington Treaty does not explicitly establish NATO as a regional security organization 
under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, but the preamble implicitly confines the Alliance to 
the "North Atlantic area" (Article 6 of the Washington Treaty contains a more precise 
geographic definition for the purposes of ArticleS's collective defense commitments). In the 
global age, however, the security of the North Atlantic area is inextricably linked with the rest 
of the world. Perhaps the clearest example of this principle was the 1991 Gulf War, which 
"awakened Europe to the risk of resource and trade interruptions originating 'out of area' . 
. . since virtually all of the European countries depend heavily upon seaborne trade and large-
scale deliveries of oil and other raw materials, they will be unable to ignore the possibility of 
future crises in the Middle East and elsewhere."363 Likewise, the U.S. and Canada have 
significant interests in Asia. Foil owing the 1973 oil embargo and continuing into the 1980s, 
the Alliance considered the prospect of intervening out of area in order to protect vital 
strategic resources but never found a consensus, Most Allies thought that such planning might 
divert NATO resources from the Soviet threat, and preferred to rely upon the U.S., France, 
and the UK for the maintenance of security beyond the North Atlantic area. 
363Gary L. Geipel, Multinational Naval Cooperation Options With the North Atlantic Countries 
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For the first few years following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the 
Cold War, there was "a tendency to divide responsibilities ... [for example] for the [U.S.] 
to say 'let Europe take care of Bosnia' and for the Europeans to say 'we can do it on our 
own"'364 during the breakup ofYugoslavia in 1991-92. Similarly, the 1990-91 Gulf War was 
viewed by many in Europe as an American problem, despite Europe's reliance on energy 
imports from the Middle East. While the U.S. accepted the bulk of the responsibility for the 
GulfWar, the strain upon American resources was evident. In the future, the other Allies will 
probably not be able to "free ride" on the U.S. in respect to extra-European threats any more 
than the U.S. can expect a "free ride" on Europe for the solution of problems on the 
continent. For a true transatlantic partnership to exist, "it has to be confirmed politically in 
the Alliance that we need to share responsibilities even if tasks are divided."365 Both pillars 
ofNATO should consider a definition of"out of area" that includes not only Central Europe 
and the Mediterranean, but the Middle East and possibly Asia as well. The Alliance also needs 
to consider which MNCs and MSCs (or SCs and RCs if the LTS terminology is adopted) will 
have responsibility for monitoring these areas and planning for operations in them. 
2. How to Flesh Out a "Renovated" Integrated Military Structure? 
Particularly for the Europeans, out of area operations call for forces that are raised, 
trained, and equipped differently than forces optimized for static defense. As the Europeans 
found in the GulfWar, the current legal and moral ramifications of sending conscripts to fight 
364Sloan, "France and NATO," p. 8. 
365Ibid. 
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in foreign wars greatly complicated meaningful European participation. The principal 
exceptions were the British Armed Forces and certain French units, notably the Foreign 
Legion, composed of volunteer professionals. With the demise of the Soviet threat and the 
rise in out of area missions, most of the Europeans are having to profoundly re-think their 
armed forces. France "is the first of our major European partners to recognize the need to 
fundamentally restructure their forces to make them deployable and sustainable in sufficient 
numbers."366 In February 1996, France announced its switch to an all-volunteer force and a 
shift towards mobile formations. The necessary trade-offs, of course, are much reduced 
manpower (from over 500,000 to fewer than 350,000) and transition costs that have 
effectively halted the procurement of major new systems. 
Most of the other European militaries are following suit, including Germany, which 
is now permitted to participate in multinational "out of area" operations, based upon a 1994 
constitutional re-interpretation. The result of these national force structure changes has been 
a net drop in forces available to NATO, though the forces offered are of increased value for 
expeditionary warfare. As the individual Allies revise their force structures, NATO needs to 
"ensure that we do not lose our core combat competencies and structures as we embrace new 
missions."367 Of the European Allies, only Germany seems to be paying great attention to 
NATO's continuing requirement for collective defense: "Germany will be maintaining 
substantial main defense forces ... the Bundeswehr, with its capacity to mobilize to a wartime 
366Christman, p. 77. 
361Jbid, p. 77. 
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strength of about 700,000 troops, will remain the cornerstone of NATO's collective 
defense."368 If NATO is to successfully re-orient its forces towards out of area operations 
while simultaneously maintaining a robust collective defense, the Allies -- including the United 
States -- will have to stem their post-Cold War decline in defense spending. This is not likely 
to be popular or even possible for the European Allies in the face of the general economic 
down-tum which has occurred in Europe over the past few years, which means that Europe 
will continue to be dependent upon the U.S. military for the foreseeable future. 
3. How to Improve European Military Capacity? 
One might argue that rather than reducing European dependence upon U.S. defense 
resources, the CJTF initiative is designed to take advantage of it. Nevertheless, it is a stated 
European goal to eventually become less dependent on the U.S. in defense matters. This 
objective will not be attained anytime soon; IFOR has convincingly demonstrated Europe's 
present reliance on the U.S. for a broad range of special capabilities. As long as key NATO 
assets in transportation, communication and intelligence are provided almost solely by the 
U.S., the Americans will maintain a de facto veto over NATO operations. In the past, 
collectively-funded NATO assets have been a means of ensuring that a single nation cannot 
paralyze the Alliance by withholding critical equipment; the best examples of this are the 
NATO AWACS (NAEWF) and the command and control systems which link the major Allied 
headquarters. These aircraft and electronics systems are paid for collectively and are 
36~Uhe, p. 5. 
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dedicated solely to NATO missions. One way for Europe to reduce its dependence upon the 
U.S. would be to increase the amount of common-funded assets. At the June 1996 meeting 
of the Defense Planning Group, the Allies generated force goals in which "particular attention 
was given to enhancements to the Alliance's ability to move its forces within and between 
theaters and to sustain them once deployed."369 
While there is no formal plan to collectivize NATO logistics, Gen. Naumann believes 
that NATO "must rethink the principle of logistics as a national responsibility . . . we must 
slaughter one ofNATO's sacred cows."370 Presumably, this could involve the acquisition of 
common cargo aircraft and rolling stock. Similarly, there has been some talk of forming a 
NATO ground surveillance force by collectively purchasing U.S.-built J-STARS aircraft. 
While a good idea in theory, the U.S., as the largest potential contributor, may not want to 
spend its already overstretched defense dollars in order to buy capabilities for NATO that the 
U.S. already provides, just so the Europeans can feel more assured about their control of such 
assets. 
More practically, the Europeans should consider funding these items without U.S. 
help, perhaps under the WEU banner. The WEU Satellite Center in Torrejon, Spain is just 
such a project. European collective assets could then be provided to NATO in much the same 
manner as the EuroCorps presently is. If Europe "is really serious about the development of 
369f'inal Communique Meeting of the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group 
at Brussels. June 13 1996, para. 6. 
37~aurnann, NDU remarks. 
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its security and defense identity, even within NATO, it should start to develop and acquire 
its own assets ... the agreement [being] reached on CJTF provides them with an interim 
period to put their house in order."371 The real question is whether Europe is really willing to 
pay the price of a truly viable ESDI, or whether that identity will remain a pipe-dream. 
371Blaauw, paras. liii-Iiv. 
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